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Richard J. Westley

A PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONCRETED AND THE CONCRETE

The Constitution of Creatures according to Gilbert de la Porrée

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There is good reason for the perfunctory way in which Gilbert de la Porrée[1] is treated in most of the currently popular histories of medieval philosophy.[2] The best from among them must of necessity be preponderantly the result of options which their authors make according to the subject matter, their own interests and training, as well as the ever-present limitations of time and space. I personally think Gilbert is a powerful metaphysical spirit, but I do not mean to imply by this that he ranks with such intellectual giants as St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Ockham, or Suarez. But if we speak only of contributions made in the order of the philosophical as opposed to the theological, it seems certain that the recently published critical editions of some of Gilbert's works[3] place him in the company of such noted thinkers as Boethius, Scotus Erigena, St. Anselm, Abelard, and St. Bonaventure. The profound perspicacity of his commentaries evidences both his originality and his ability to interpret the text of his *auctor*—Boethius. So true is this that one cannot be sure he has truly grasped Boethius's meaning if he has not read Gilbert. Therefore Gilbert's works issue in a double benefit for the student of the history of medieval philosophy. Apart from giving him an understanding of Gilbert's own thought, they help him sharpen his judgment regarding the doctrine of Boethius; and second they delineate for him something of the state of twelfth-century thought

apart from the context of the problem of universals. They thus establish a metaphysical (not merely logical) continuity between Gilbert's age and philosophers of succeeding centuries.[4]

But if all this is true of Gilbert, there must be some reason why

[1]Gilbert de la Porrée was born about 1076 A.D., in the city of Poitier, to which he was destined later to return as holder of the episcopal see. His first studies were conducted in Poitier under a certain Hilary. Then he went to Chartres, where he studied under Bernard of Chartres, who was to be for all time *the* master for Gilbert. It was under Bernard, one of the most celebrated teachers of the twelfth century, that Gilbert began his studies in the trivium. After he completed his studies with Bernard, Gilbert was attracted by the fame of the Cathedral School of Notre Dame in Paris and studied under William of Champeaux. He remained there until William's forced retirement in 1108, after which he studied at the school of St. Geneviève under Peter Abelard, whose attacks had ended William's academic career.

Gilbert did his theological studies under Anselm of Laon and completed them the year of Anselm's demise, 1117. In 1124 Gilbert is listed as a canon at the Cathedral School of Chartres, and in the following year he became a professor on the faculty of that school. Gilbert became chancellor at Chartres in 1126, filling the vacancy left by his one-time master Bernard. He held this position as late as 1137, after which he returned to Paris, where he held a chair of dialectic and theology, remaining there until 1140. In 1141 at the command of his bishop, Gilbert returned to his native city of Poitier as Master of the School of St. Hilary. In 1142 he was made bishop of Poitier but continued teaching for the first years of his episcopate. About Easter, 1147, Gilbert was called before a council at Paris and, in 1148, before the Council of Rheims, which did not condemn him. He returned to the duties of his see and died on September 4, 1154.

[2]This of course does not preclude the possibility of objecting to the inaccuracies which abound in most of the discussions of Gilbert's philosophy. Two of the more widespread are that Gilbert was condemned by St. Bernard at the Councils of Paris and Rheims, and that he is the author of the *Liber Sex Principiorum*. Nor does this relieve the authors of these histories from the objection that they tend to speak of Gilbert as if his writings were not extant, basing their discussions of his doctrine on the remark of John of Salisbury: "Porro alius, ut Aristotelem exprimat, cum Gilberto episcopo Pictavensi, universalitatem formis nativis attribuit, et in earum conformitate laborat" (*Metalogicus* II, 17). See E. Brehier, *Histoire de la philosophie* (Paris, 1947), I, Fasc. 3, 593-95; F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (Newman, 1952), II, 151-52; E. Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris: Payot, 1952), pp. 262-68; Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Random House, 1955), pp. 140-44; 620-21; M. De Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (London: Nelson, 1952), pp. 205-9.

[3]It is interesting to note that all of Gilbert's extant works are commentaries, which is in accord with the spirit of his age. They fall into two parts, the commentaries on Holy Writ and those on the theological tractates of Boethius. His scriptural commentaries on the Psalms and the Epistles of St. Paul, which are in the process of being published critically, have never been printed heretofore. Cf. A. M. Landgräf, *Einfuhrung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik* (Regensburg, 1948), pp. 79-80.

The first printed edition of his Boethian commentaries appeared in the Boethius *Omnia Opera* (Basel, 1570) 1128-1273. It was this very text which Migne reprinted in 1861 in *PL*, LXIV, cols. 1247-1412 and on which all Gilbertian scholarship had to depend

this is not reflected in the treatment he has received at the hands of historians of medieval philosophy. And indeed there is. It is that Gilbert has been considered vague, obscure, and in places even contradictory by many historians. There is a twofold reason for this. Gilbert chose to comment on Boethius by incorporating the whole of the Boethian text grammatically into his own commentary—and this even when he was disagreeing with him. Until an edition of Gilbert's commentaries was available which clearly distinguished the words of Gilbert from those of Boethius, it was not possible to eliminate these seeming contradictions. The text, besides running Gilbert's words and those of Boethius together, contained many mistakes which had the effect of making Gilbert seem obscure. The appearance of Father Haring's critical editions of *In De Hebdomadibus*, *In De Duabus Naturis*, and *In De Trinitate* has eliminated both sources of trouble. Gilbert

until the appearance of the critical edition of the Reverend Nicholas M. Haring, S.A.C., of the faculty of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. Father Haring is the foremost Gilbertian scholar, and his brilliant defense of Gilbert's theology has removed much of the stigma previously connected with Gilbert's teaching on the Trinity. Cf. "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitiers," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 1-40.

Because all of the Gilbertian scholarship prior to the appearance of the critical edition employed the Migne numberings, we feel it was a mistake to eliminate them completely from the new editions. Therefore though we quote the text established by Father Haring, we shall give the cross-references to the Migne numbering.

For the three works critically done, see "The Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers on Boethius' 'De Hebdomadibus,' " *Traditio*, IX (1953), 177-221 (hereafter referred to as *In De Hebd., Trad.*); "The Commentary of Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers, on Boethius' *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 1954, pp. 241-357 (hereafter referred to as *In De Duab., Arch.*); "The Commentaries of Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154) on the Two Boethian *Opuscula Sacra* on the Holy Trinity," *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers*, ed. Reginald O'Donnell, C.S.B. ("Studies and Texts," I. Toronto, 1925), pp. 23-98 (hereafter referred to as *In De Trin.*, S. and T.). The Migne edition was used for the fourth opusculum, *Gilberti Porretae Commentaria in Librum De Praedicatione Trium Personarum* (*PL*, LXIV, cols. 1301-10).

[4]"Gilbert's doctrine is more elaborate than that of Bernard of Chartres, and its technical solidity has insured its influence. . . . This influence is recognizable by the persistence, up to the thirteenth century and beyond it, of a certain tendency to reduce real beings to their intelligible essences, which are their forms, and to think of them in this abstract way. There is in this a certain 'formalism' of thought . . . which, reinforced by Avicenna's influence, will come into full bloom in the doctrine of Duns Scotus. Gilbert of la Porrée himself had inherited it from Boethius, whose theological opuscules he annotated" (Gilson, *Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 142).

writes excellent, if intricate, Latin and is neither contradictory nor obscure. Thanks to Father Haring's efforts, a more accurate appraisal of Gilbert's philosophy is now possible, but no one seems to be interested. There has been only one work devoted solely to the *philosophy* of Gilbert, a monograph dating back to 1892. Now, some four or five years after the appearance of a text in which historians can have complete con-

[5]A. Berthaud, *Gilbert de la Porrée et sa philosophie* (Poitiers, 1892). It is true that since the appearance of the new text a monograph on Gilbert has appeared, but though it contains much of Gilbert's philosophy it is concerned primarily with his theology. Cf. M. A. Schmidt, *Gottheit und Trinitaet* (Basel, 1956).

[6]The *Physics* and *Metaphysics* were most certainly unknown to Gilbert so he could not know the division of science contained in them. Cf. *Metaphys.* 6. 1. 1026a; *Physics* ii. 2. 193b23 ff. Cf. Fliche et Martin, *Histoire de l'église*, XIII, 183.

[7]Cf. Boethius, *De Trinitate* (Loeb ed.), pp. 8, 10. In Migne cf. *PL*, LXIV, 1250A-B.

[8]"Scientiae multorum sunt generum. Aliae namque sunt theoricae id est speculativae . . . Aliae vero sunt practicae id est activae . . . Ut autem de practicis taceamus, speculativae ex his quae per ipsas inspicimus contrahunt appellationem: et vocantur aliae quidem physicae id est naturales, aliae vero ethicae id est morales, aliae autem logicae id est rationales. Et (ut item morales atque rationales praetereamus) illarum, quae uno nomine 'naturales' dicuntur quae etiam usu majore 'speculativae' vocantur, TRES PARTES SUNT: una quae universali omnium nomine specialiter dicitur 'naturalis', alia quae 'mathematica', tertia quae 'theologica'" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 46, no. 1; *PL*, LXIV, 1265 B-C). (Note that in these texts the capital letters within Gilbert's texts indicate the very words of Boethius which he has incorporated into his commentary.)

The text can be diagramed as follows:



[9]If one considers Gilbert's division of speculative philosophy into ethical, physical, and logical, it seems obvious that "physical sciences" in this context refers to those speculative sciences which treat of extramental reality. "Physical" here should be taken in its etymological sense.

[10]On this matter see J. M. Parent, O.P., *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres* (Vrin, 1938), pp. 20-22; and in this same work, "An Anonymous Commentary on the *De Trinitate*" (Paris BN Lat. MSS 14489), pp. 180-82. See also Wilhelm Jansen, *Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate* (Breslau, 1926), pp. 27, 35, 40; and in this same work, "*Librum Hunc* of Thierry of Chartres," pp. 3*, 4*, 8*, 9*.

[11]"Schon Boethius zeigt die Tendenz, die drei 'Teile der Wissenschaft' nicht in einer dreifachen Hierarchie übereinander aufzubauen, sondern in ihnen göttliches und geschaffenes Sein, Erkenntnis Gottes und Erkenntnis der Kreatur antithetisch einander gegenübertreten zu lassen" (M. A. Schmidt, *Gottheit und Trinitaet*, p. 179).

[12]"Ait ergo: NATURALIS dicitur quae est IN MOTU atque INABSTRACTA quod graece dicitur ANHYPEXAIRETOS, hoc est inseparabilis. Et quare inabstracta vel inseparabilis, supponit: CONSIDERAT ENIM CORPORUM FORMAS CUM MATERIA, QUAE formae A CORPORIBUS SEPARARI NON POSSUNT non dico ratione sed ACTU" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 46, no. 2; *PL*, LXIV. 1265D).

[13]"Cum enim nativa sicut sunt (id est concreta et inabstracta) considerat, ex sua quidem propria potestate, qua humano animo datum est ex sensuum atque imaginationum praeeuntibus adminiculis reri sensilia, 'ratio' dicitur" (*ibid.*, p. 48, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1267A). "Ac per hoc IN NATURALIBUS quae,

fidence, this monograph still remains the only such work, and this despite the fact that it is considered inadequate by present-day standards.[5] It would be a bit presumptuous for me to think that I could make up for so long-standing a lack. However, perhaps a somewhat detailed sketch of Gilbert's philosophy of the constitution of creatures will serve to augment the necessarily truncated treatments of Gilbert in our histories.

Gilbert, as might be expected from the fact that he comments on Boethius, is heir to the Aristotelian division of sciences[6] as it was transmitted to the early Middle Ages in Boethius's *De Trinitate.*[7] That science or philosophy which seeks to know whether things are, what they are, of what sort they are, and why, is speculative; while that science or philosophy which seeks knowledge for the sake of activity is practical. Like Boethius before him, Gilbert passes over the division of practical philosophy and turns to the task of distinguishing the speculative sciences. In a very personal way Gilbert then distinguishes three kinds of speculative science according to their different objects—the physical sciences, the ethical or moral sciences, and the logical or rational sciences. The traditional division of speculative science is then made a subdivision of physical science. For the physical sciences are either natural, mathematical, or theological.[8] And so it would be possible according to Gilbert's terminology to call theology and the mathematical science "physical."[9] And it should further be noted that Gilbert must also be classified with those who maintain that logic and ethics are speculative sciences.[10]

Gilbert's threefold division of physical science is not based on a threefold division of reality but on a distinction between the created and the divine.[11] Natural science considers the forms of bodies along with their matter and, consequently, as they are in matter and unable to be separated from it actually.[12] In the natural sciences one must proceed *rationabiliter,* which means in such a way as to grasp the form of a thing with its matter; that is, with the help of sense perception and imagination.[13] Now, the forms of material things cannot actually

sicut sunt, percipi debent, scilicet concreta et inabstracta, OPORTEBIT philosophum VERSARI RATIONABILITER ut . . . ea vi mentis, qua concreta reri debet, diligenter attendat: quid proprie sibi vel quod est vel quo est concretionis consortio exigat, et quid caeterarum speculationum locis communicet" (*ibid.*, p. 49, no. 12; *PL,* LXIV, 1628B).

(*actu*) be separated from their matter, but this in no way prevents their being separated from matter by the mind (*ratione*).[14] For although the forms of sensible things are inabstract and are involved in change, they can be considered abstractly without motion or change by a kind of imitation of things which are truly abstract.[15] When we consider the forms of sensible things other than as they really are—that is, other than as being in matter and in motion—we are involved in mathematical speculation.[16] It would therefore be inaccurate to limit mathematical speculation for Gilbert to arithmetic, geometry, music, and the like. For mathematical speculation concerns itself not only with number, quantity, figure, and proportion but with any and every attempt of the human mind to conceive the form of a sensible

[14]Cf. n. 12 above.

[15]"Formae vero sensilium, quamvis inabstractae indoque motum habentes, si tamen abstractim attendantur, hac vere abstractorum imitatione sine motu esse dicuntur. Non enim tantum sicuti sunt verum etiam aliter quam sint, res aliquae saepe vere concipiuntur" (*ibid.*, p. 48, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1266D).

[16]"Alia vero speculatio, quae nativorum inabstractas formas aliter quam sint id est abstractim considerat, ex fine quo illud facit graece quidem MATHEMATICA, latine vero disciplinalis vocatur" (*ibid.*, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1267C).

[17]Both William of Conches and Thierry of Chartres held this same doctrine. See Parent, *Doctrine de la création*, p. 22.

[18]"Tertia vero speculatio, quae omnia nativa transcendens in ipso eorum quolibet principio (scilicet vel Opifice, quo auctore sunt, vel idea, a qua tamquam exemplari deducta sunt, vel hyle, in qua locata sunt) figit intuitum per excellentiam 'intellectualis' vocatur" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 49, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV, 1267D).

One problem which is difficult to solve on the basis of Gilbert's commentaries on Boethius (perhaps help will come from his published scriptural commentaries) is whether or not the "ideas" which he lists as principles of things (cf. *ibid.*, p. 72, no. 3; *PL*, LXIV, 1287A) are divine ideas and hence identical with God. I personally feel that one can say that Gilbert holds for only two principles of beings—God and matter, since the ideas are God. Cf. *In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 261, no. 1; *PL*, LXIV, 1360D-61A. See in this matter "Chalcidii Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum," Sec. 305 in Mullach's *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* (Paris, 1867), II, 246.

[19]"IN DIVINIS QUOQUE, quae non modo disciplina verum etiam re ipsa abstracta sunt, INTELLECTUALITER VERSARI OPORTEBIT id est propriis theologicorum rationibus illa concipere et non ex naturaliter concretorum aut disciplinaliter abstractorum proprietatibus judicare" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 49, no. 14; *PL*, LXIV, 2268C).

It was the failure of his opponents to see that Gilbert faithfully adhered to this principle that led to his trouble with his brother bishops in 1147 and 1148. On this theological controversy and the complete misunderstanding of Gilbert's doctrine—a misunderstanding which has persisted from the time of St. Bernard to the present—see M. A. Schmidt, *Gottheit und Trinitaet* (Basel, 1956); M. E. Williams, "The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta on the Trinity," *Analecta Gregoriana*, 1951. For the finest treatment, as we have said, see N. M. Haring, "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitier," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 1-40.

[20]Jansen, *Kommentar des Clarenbaldus*, pp. 29* ff. For Gilbert's idea of theology see "Theologie," *DTC*, XV, cols. 369-370.

[21]*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 62, no. 2; *PL*, LXIV, 1278D.

thing apart from its matter. This very broad view of mathematical speculation seems to have been the common teaching at Chartres.[17]

The forms of sensible things give rise to two kinds of science, the natural and the mathematical; but there is a third type of speculation which treats of extramental reality. It treats of those things which transcend the sensible world and which may be called its principles; that is, God, ideas and prime matter.[18] So the theological or divine science treats things which are actually abstract, and not so merely by consideration of the human mind. Consequently it must judge of its objects in a way proper to things which actually and completely transcend the sensible, and not use the principles of the natural or mathematical sciences except analogically.[19] It must be kept in mind that Gilbert is talking here of that theology which is a part of philosophy or science. In his commentaries on Boethius, Gilbert seems to use the term "theology" in this Aristotelian sense, which was characterized by Clarenbaldus of Arras as *philosophare de Deo*.[20]

These three kinds of physical science, and indeed all sciences, must proceed according to their own proper *rationes*. If we turn to Gilbert's philosophy, its most important first principle may be stated as follows: "In naturalibus enim aliud est *quod est*, aliud *quo est*." [21] And as is the case with principles, Gilbert offers it as self-evident. To ask him to prove this principle would indicate that one had not grasped the significance of its being a fundamental self-evident assumption on which natural philosophy rests. One can and should ask for a clarification or explanation of just what Gilbert is assuming by this principle, but after the explanation the only option is to accept or reject it.

What does Gilbert mean by this principle? In reality there are individual existents; that is, things which are (*ea quae sunt*). A single one of these individual existents would be a thing which is—in short, an *id quod est*. But every *id quod* exists and is the kind of thing it is because of some intrinsic cause. This cause is not itself an individual existent; rather it is that *in* an individual existent which accounts for the fact that it exists or that it is the kind of thing it is or both. Since it is *that by means of which a thing is* and is the kind of thing it is, it is called an *id quo est*. Consequently, when Gilbert says that the *id quod* is other than the *id quo* in the natural order, he means to say

that an existent substance is not the same naturally as the "by whichers" which make it an existent, a substance, and the kind of thing it is.[22]

This principle, which is so fundamental in the philosophy of sensible reality, is equally important in Gilbert's doctrine of knowledge and in his division of the sciences. This very principle is equally important in Gilbert's theology of the Trinity and the Incarnation, where it is

[22]I can think of no philosopher who treats of an extramental world for whom this principle does not have some meaning.

[23]On the theological use of this principle see the authors cited in n. 19 above.

[24]See Priscian, *Institutio de Arte Grammatica*, II, 5, 25; ed. M. Hertz (Leipzig, 1855), p. 58; Remigius of Auxerre, *In Artem Donati Minorem Commentum*, ed. W. Fox (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 8 ff.; St. Anselm, *Quomodo Grammaticus Sit Substantia et Qualitas*, Vol. I of *Obras Completas* (B.A.C., 1952), pp. 462 ff.; Maritain, *An Introduction to Logic* (Sheed and Ward, 1946), p. 62.

[25]"Omne vero *nomen* diversa *significat, substantiam* videlicet *et qualitatem*: ut album id, quod appellatur 'album' (quod est substantia nominis), et id, quo appellatur 'album' (quod est ejusdem nominis qualitas)" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 302, no. 22; *PL*, LXIV, 1382D).

[26]"Quos hic ipse error patenter ostendit omnino nescire hujus nominis, quod est 'substantia', multiplicem in naturalibus usum: videlicet non modo id, quod est, verum etiam id, quo est, hoc nomine nuncupari . . ." (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 63, no. 5; *PL*, LXIV, 1279D).

[27]"QUAE quantum ad subsistentias, quae horum nominum sunt qualitates, VEL GENERA SUNT ut *animal, lapis, lignum*; VEL SPECIES ut homo" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 279, no. 13; *PL*, LXIV, 1370D).

[28]"A cursory glance at Gilbert's system of sciences will reveal how the originally grammatical rule was transformed from a logical principle of speech and 'law of philosophical disputation' into a formula expressing what may be called the metaphysical constitution of 'concrete', composite beings, both material and spiritual" (Haring, *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 5).

[29]"In their study of grammar, the students were told that a *nomen* signifies both substance and quality. . . . Rigorously applied, this grammatical rule would have forced theology into silence. Abelard refused to submit to the 'rules of Donat' and Hugh of Rouen declared that he would still speak of God 'against the laws of philosophical disputation', while Robert Pulleyn was clearly at a loss as to how to cope with the objection. We learn from John of Salisbury that Gilbert acknowledged the principle as laid down in *rationali facultate* (logic) and defended the right to follow it in theology. It seems that his teacher, Bernard of Chartres, had already transformed its meaning and raised it to a higher level of philosophical speculation" (*ibid.*).

See also M. D. Chenu, "Grammaire et théologie aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles," *Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt.*, X-XI (1935-6), 5-28. There can be little doubt that all the authors listed by Father Haring learned the principle spoken of in grammar and logic first, and it was this that led them to talk as they did about it. But does this necessarily mean that the principle as such is primarily a grammatical principle? I think not. It means rather that the thinkers of the twelfth century came to know this principle, which is fundamentally a principle of being, under its grammatical and logical form. Obviously the only reason the principle holds true in logic and grammar is that it is a true principle of being. At least this is true for a man like Gilbert.

used analogously.[23] Passing over its use in theology, let us see its use in Gilbert's doctrine of knowledge and then in the division of the sciences.

It was a well-known grammatical principle that every name signifies both a substance and a quality.[24] Gilbert accepts this principle of grammar underlining the fact that a *nomen* signifies substance in one way and quality in another.[25] He indicates further that in signifying substance a *nomen* signifies an *id quod*, and in signifying a quality it signifies that *id quo* by means of which the *id quod* gets its name.[26] For example the term "white" signifies simultaneously the substance or *id quod*—for example, a swan or a piece of paper—and the quality or *id quo* by which the swan or paper is white; that is, whiteness. But we should not infer from this that the *qualitas nominis* is necessarily related to the category of quality.[27] For the term "man" signifies both the human substance or human *id quod* and the human quality or human *id quo*; that is, humanity, which is not an accident at all. Thus every name which we impose on a substance will do more than merely signify the substance; it will signify that *id quo* in the substance which allows us to call the substance by the name in question. The *id quo* need not be an accident, for the name may well be imposed on a substance because of some essential perfection within it, and the *id quo* would then itself be essential.

Some hold that this grammatical principle is *the* central principle in twelfth-century philosophical and theological thought, and that it is likewise the primary principle for Gilbert.[28] Historically speaking, there is much to recommend this interpretation.[29] However, it has the effect of making Gilbert's principle of the otherness of the *id quod* and *id quo* in the natural order dependent on, and a derivation from, the grammatical principle of the twofold signification of names. The unity of his thought, however, seems to demand that, for Gilbert at least, the grammatical principle was valid because it was in its turn dependent on, and derived from, a natural self-evidence.[30] To avoid

[30]Gilbert himself expressly states that "tria quippe sunt, res, et intellectus, et sermo. Res intellectu concipitur, sermone significatur." This seems to indicate the fundamental priority of the real over the logical and grammatical. It seems to be against Gilbert's philosophical realism to give priority to a grammatical principle. No one would have tried to use a *solely* grammatical or logical principle in theology. The principle had a basis in the natural

misunderstanding, let it be noted that both the grammatical and natural principles are of the first order of importance for Gilbert; it is solely a question of their proper order.

The principle of the otherness of the *id quod* and the *id quo* is also important in explaining intellectual knowledge of sensible substances. For according to Gilbert, it is not possible for a man to form a concept of a sensible reality unless he in some way grasps the *id quo* which causes it to be as it is and hence intelligible to us.[31] For example, the human mind cannot really conceive what it is to be a body, white, or extended unless it grasps what corporality, whiteness, and extension are, and can truly distinguish these *id quo*'s from one another as well as from the *id quod* in which they are found.[32] Consequently, our very ability to form concepts of the world about us is based on the principle that in that world no *id quod* is identical with the *id quo*'s which account for its being and its nature. And so we might infer from all this that not only scientific knowledge but all truly intellectual knowledge is, for Gilbert, in some way through causes.

All of this has profound ramifications in Gilbert's distinction of the

order of *res*, and this is what allowed its proper analogical use in theology; and this too is what allowed the few to succumb to the temptation of using such a principle improperly. In fact Gilbert says that it is the natural (as opposed to the logical and the grammatical) order which is prior when it comes to the use of analogies and of transferring principles from one faculty to another. Cf. *In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 65, no. 1; *PL*, LXIV, 1218A. And further, Gilbert accuses the Arians and Sabellians not of using a grammatical principle in theology but a natural one. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 35, no. 4; *PL*, LXIV, 1255D. I would think therefore that it is more proper to say that Gilbert's logic depends on his philosophy rather than that his philosophy depends on his logic.

[31]"Nativa namque per aliquam sui vel efficientem vel efficiendi proprietatem concipiuntur: ut album per albedinem et albedo per naturam faciendi album. Nihil enim naturalium nisi per causam et nihil mathematicorum nisi per efficiendi potestatem concipi potest" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 260, no. 7; *PL*, LXIV, 1360B).

[32]"Verbi gratia: non perpendit ratio, quid sit esse corpus, et esse coloratum et esse latum, nisi disciplina quid sit corporalitas, quid color, quid latitudo cognoscat. Quod fieri non potest, nisi haec inabstracta atque concreta et ab eo, in quo sunt, et a se invicem abstrahat et discernat" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 48, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1267C).

[33]See *ibid.*, p. 45, nos. 14-15, and p. 36, nos. 6-7; *PL*, LXIV, 1265A-B and 1257A.

[34]"A thorough study of the *id quo* and *quod* with all its ramifications in Gilbert's writings is as vital as a proper understanding of act and potency in the works of St. Thomas . . . Gilbert constantly leads the solution of a problem to an *id quo*" (Haring, *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 8).

[35]How else to explain the atoms of the early Greek atomists, the sensible world of Plato, the matter and form of Aristotle, the essence and *actus essendi* of St. Thomas, the Monads of Leibniz, and even the *elan vital* of Bergson? For all such philosophers it is true in some sense that there is more to reality than beings.

various kinds of speculative science. An adequate intellectual and scientific knowledge of the external sensible world will require not only knowledge of the sensible *id quod* but also of its *id quo*'s. Since an *id quod* cannot be known in the same way as an *id quo*, it follows that two types of science will be required for complete scientific knowledge of reality. One type, the natural sciences, will treat of reality as sensible *id quod*'s. This is by its very nature an imperfect kind of knowledge, since it is not knowledge of the causes which make the *id quod*'s as they are. This knowledge must then be complemented by another type, the mathematical sciences, which treat the *id quo*'s which make the *id quod*'s of reality what they are. The theological sciences are not held to this rule because of their subject matter; and the *id quod—id quo* distinction can only be used in them by a kind of proportionality.[33]

From these few introductory remarks it must already be apparent that one cannot understand Gilbert's thought without a thorough understanding of his doctrine of *id quod* and *id quo*.[34] Since a cause is naturally, if not temporally, prior to its effect we shall consider the *id quo* first and then the *id quod*.

Gilbert's Philosophy of the *id quo*

Now, it should be said at the very start that *id quo*'s are not beings; that is, they are not beings in the sense of existent things, for all such are *id quod*'s. And if there is anything clear at this point about Gilbert's thought it is the fact that in the natural order no *id quo* is an *id quod*. To say that *id quo*'s are not beings is not to relegate them to the order of nonbeing; rather it is to assert that there is more to reality than beings. Such an assertion must be made by all who wish to explain beings.[35] The reason is obvious. If I wish to explain the constitution of beings and can do so only in terms of realities which are themselves beings, I shall be involved in an infinite regress. I will be explaining beings in terms of beings, and these in terms of still other beings. No matter when I stop—beings will go unexplained. Consequently, either the constitution of beings is inexplicable, since the only explanation is in terms of other beings, a possible but hardly philosophical solution; or the explanation must of necessity be in terms

of realities which are not themselves beings but are in some way the very constitution of beings. Philosophers have always been uneasy in the presence of such realities, not because they have not understood them but because, having understood them, they are forced to speak of them in language which is geared to the discussion of being.[36]

Being in the hylomorphic tradition of Plato and Aristotle as transmitted to the twelfth century through the works of Boethius, Porphyry, and Chalcidius, Gilbert speaks of two such realities within beings. They are of course prime matter and form.[37] Neither as such is a being, yet each is in some way a constituent of sensible beings.

[36]Nor does Gilbert escape this difficulty in speaking of *id quo*'s. He constantly makes qualifications to prevent a misunderstanding. For example: "Subsistentia vero est substantia, non cui quid nitatur *quo* ipsa aliquid sit, sed qua solum subsistens est ALIQUID . . ." "DIVERSUM EST ESSE, id est subsistentia quae est in subsistente, ET ID QUOD EST, id est subsistens in quo est subsistentia . . ."

[37]"Hic dicendum quod materia multiplex nomen est et forma similiter. Origo namque sive initium rerum, quod Plato vocat necessitatem et fraudem et receptaculum et nutriculam et gremium et matrem et sinum et locum totius generationis, auditores vero ejus appellant hylem id est silvam, ipse Plato nominat primam materiam eo quod in ea formantur quaecunque recipiuntur ab ea, cum tamen ipsa nullam ex eis contrahat formam" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 46, no. 3; *PL*, LXIV, 1265D).

[38]"Generaliter ENIM OMNE CORPUS, QUOD vere secundum omnia quae in ipso sunt, SUBSISTIT, IN GENERATIONE ET secundum aliqua IN CORRUPTIONE VIDETUR HABERE et habet revera COMMUNEM MATERIAM: non modo hylem quam Plato silvam nominat (quae quidem secundum philosophos est, sed non est aliquid) . . ." (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 333, no. 22; *PL*, LXIV, 1399C).

[39]Quae vero sunt subsistentium esse, sicut jam dictum est . . . 'formae' . . . nuncupantur . . . et cetera, quae in subsistentibus eorumdem esse sequuntur, 'formae' . . . cognominantur" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 47, no. 7; *PL*, LXIV, 1266D).

[40]This division is not found as such explicitly in Gilbert, and it must be admitted that it is a simplification of his total theory of *id quo*'s. For we shall not discuss God and exemplars as *id quo*'s, since we are involved in a discussion on the natural level. Also we shall omit what could be called transcendental *id quo*'s—such as *unitas*, which accompanies every other *id quo*.

[41]"Quoniam tamen harum [naturae] accessione subsistens, in quo habent fieri, generatur et decessione corrumpitur, non tam participatione quam substantia (sicut genera ipsa quibus adsunt vel species de quibus sunt) subsistenti inesse dicuntur" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 198, no. 21; *PL*, LXIV, 1324B).

[42]"Verbi gratia: quoniam corporalitas, quae est esse corporis in quo est et qua ipsum est aliquid naturaliter id est corpus . . ." (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 47, no. 4; *PL*, LXIV, 1266A).

[43]"SUBSISTIT ENIM illud et quadam ratione est per se, QUOD NON INDIGET ACCIDENTIBUS, UT ESSE POSSIT. Immo accidentia eo, quod hac ratione subsistere et per se esse dicitur, adeo indigent quod, nisi illa adsint, nulli inesse possunt. Omne etenim accidens alicujus subsistentiae addictum est potestati" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 288, no. 18; *PL*, LXIV, 1375B-C).

[44]"*Subsistit enim* homo, quoniam subsistentia, qua est et qua dicitur 'homo', id est humanitas, nulli homini, in quo est, tanquam accidens adest" (*ibid.*, p. 294, no. 32; *PL*, LXIV, 1378A).

Philosophically speaking, matter, for Gilbert, can only be said to exist; it has no nature or perfection which make it to be this or that kind of thing.[38] It simply exists having no parts and being the receptacle of forms. Those constituents within a being which are not themselves beings, which are received in matter causing beings to be and to be of this or that sort, are forms.[39] But to speak of "forms" or *id quo*'s is to speak generically. Such expressions tell us little more than that we are not dealing with beings but rather with a cause of being. There are different kinds of forms or *id quo*'s according to the different effects which they produce in the order of being. For convenience' sake, they may be divided into substantial and accidental *id quo*'s.[40]

Substantial *id quo* 's

How does one determine whether an *id quo* is substantial? The first criterion to be employed is this. Does the removal of this form bring about the corruption of the substance (*id quod*)? If it does and if the coming of this form brings about the generation of the substance, then the *id quo* in question is substantial.[41] And because the presence of this form accounts for the fact that its subject exists, Gilbert calls such an *id quo* the very being (that is, *esse*) of its subject. For example, humanity is the very being (*esse*) of man, and corporality the very being (*esse*) of body.[42]

The second criterion is this: Does the *id quo* in question cause the substance to subsist? Put another way we might ask whether this form gives its subject existence independently of any accidents it may have. If it does, then the form is substantial; and because it causes its subject to subsist it is called the subject's subsistence (*subsistentia*).[43] Consequently, the reason man (the *id quod*) subsists is that the very being (*esse*) which makes him exist and be a man—that is, humanity —is a form which never depends on any other form in its subject for its own existence.[44] Therefore, if one were to speak most formally, the humanity of a given man would be called his being (*esse*) if one wanted to stress the fact that it caused him to exist; and it would be called his subsistence (*subsistentia*) if one wanted to stress the fact that it caused him to subsist—that is, to exist independently of any accidental perfections he might have. One and the same form is both

the being and the subsistence of its subject. Gilbert, one of the remarkably few thinkers who always speaks most formally, does not press this distinction and will use "being" and "subsistence" interchangeably. Therefore in what follows whatever is said of subsistences should be understood also of being (*esse*).

Gilbert speaks of three different kinds of being (*esse*) or subsistence, the special or specific subsistence, which is made up of the general or

[45]". . . item subsistentiae generales et differentiales, quae partes sunt specialium subsistentiarum . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 309, no. 42; *PL*, LXIV, 1386B).

[46]"Diligenter tamen attendendum est quod, quoniam specifica differentia cum genere constituit speciem, cujuslibet specialis subsistentia simplex esse non potest" (*ibid.*, p. 274, no. 48; *PL*, LXIV, 1368A).

The relationship of the differential subsistence to the generic subsistence is sometimes described by Gilbert in terms which make the differential subsistence a quasi-accident of the generic subsistence. "Tales sunt omnes differentiae . . . Hae omnes non modo habitu illo quo *inhaerent* subsistenti, verum etiam illo, quo generibus ejus praedicta potestate atque proprietate *adhaerent* dicuntur 'haberi'. Ac per hoc duplici ratione participantur" (*ibid.*, p. 198, no. 21; *PL*, LXIV, 1324B). However, it would seem prudent to say that for Gilbert differential subsistences are related to their generic subsistences in a way *analogous* to the way in which accidental forms are related to substantial forms. The word to stress is "analogous."

[47]"Quotiens enim subsistens ex subsistentibus conjunctum est, necesse est ejus totum esse (id est illam, qua ipsum perfectum est, subsistentiam) ex omnium partium suarum omnibus subsistentiis esse conjunctam" (*In De Praedicatione*, *PL*, LXIV, 1305D).

"Cujuslibet enim subsistentis tota forma substantiae non simplex est . . . ut de aliquo homine tota forma substantiae, qua ipse perfectus homo, et omne genus omnisque differentia, ex quibus est ipsa composita . . ." (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 52, no. 6; *PL*, LXIV, 1270 A).

"Item: quidquid est alicujus esse, aut est tota substantia illius, cujus dicitur esse, aut pars ejus, quod est tota substantia. Et tota quidem substantia species, quae de eo dicitur, est" (*ibid.*, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1271A).

[48]"Semper enim totum genus est illius, cujus genus est esse. Sed nunquam est totum esse, quoniam ejusdem generis plures divisivae potentiae (immo omnes, quae cum ipso genere speciem componunt) ejus, cujus et ipsum genus, sunt esse" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 200, no. 24; *PL*, LXIV, 1325C).

[49]"Et tota quidem substantia species, quae de eo dicitur, est. Pars vero ejus, quod est totum esse, genus est aut differentia quae speciem ipsam constituit" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., pp. 52-53, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1271A).

[50]Bittle calls Gilbert a conceptualist; cf. *Reality and the Mind* (Milwaukee, 1936), p. 237. Prantl and Clerval, however, consider him to be an extreme realist. See Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (Leipzig, 1927), II, 223; and Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartre au moyen âge* (Paris, 1895), p. 262.

[51]"Subsistit quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget. ITAQUE GENERA ET SPECIES id est generales et speciales subsistentiae SUBSISTUNT . . ." (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 288, no. 19; *PL*, LXIV, 1375C).

[52]"Genus vero nihil aliud putandum est, nisi subsistentiarum secundum totam earum proprietatem ex rebus secundum species suas differentibus similitudine comparata collectio. Qua similitudinis comparatione omnes illae subsistentiae dicuntur unum universale, unum dividuum, unum commune, unum genus, una eademque natura" (*ibid.*, p. 315, no. 62; *PL*, LXIV, 1389D).

generic, and the differential subsistences.[45] Thus the specific subsistence whereby a man is and is a man, humanity, cannot be simple because it is composed of two parts—the generic subsistence, animality, and the differential subsistence, rationality.[46] Since the specific subsistence is made up of parts, it is a certain kind of whole; and therefore Gilbert will sometimes refer to it as the "whole being" (*totum esse*), the "whole form" (*tota forma*), or the "whole substance" (*tota substantia*) of its subject.[47] Conversely, although the generic or differential subsistences may be called the being (*esse*) of their subject, they are never its whole being (*totum esse*).[48] Thus we may conclude that whatever is the being (*esse*) of a thing either is its whole substance (*tota substantia*) or part of its whole substance (*tota substantia*). If it is the whole substance, it is the species of its subject; if it is part of the whole substance, it will be either the genus or difference which constitute the species.[49]

Some people have taken this to mean that Gilbert was an exaggerated realist with regard to the problem of universals.[50] This erroneous interpretation of Gilbert is due in part to a failure to distinguish the universals of genus, difference, and species from their foundation in reality—the generic, differential, and specific subsistences which are the very being (*esse*) of existents. On at least one occasion Gilbert corrects Boethius when he calls the forms within a subsistent genus and species. Gilbert prefers to call them generic and specific subsistences.[51] Let it suffice for now that universals which express the genus, difference, and species of some substance are, for Gilbert, the result of an act of the intellect. It is an act whereby the intellect abstracts or collects the common properties of the subsistences of things and whereby, in an act of comparison, it forms the common concept or universal.[52] The universals thus formed by this act of comparison on the part of the intellect are posterior to, and dependent on, the particular subsistences which are their ground. Consequently it is simply wrong to think of these substantial *id quo*'s or subsistences as universals in Gilbert's philosophy.

Since a subsistence is an *id quo*, it must of necessity produce some effect in the order of beings; as we have seen, it causes its subject to

exist and to subsist.[53] But philosophically speaking it is proper to say that a subsistence causes its subject both "to be" (*esse*) and "to be something substantially" (*esse aliquid in eo quod est*).[54] For example, John is said to exist because of his being (*esse*), humanity, but this

[53]Theologians have a different explanation, since they look at everything in its relation to God. A theologian, according to Gilbert, would say that a thing exists because of an extrinsic denomination from its principle, God. Consequently, for the theologian the subsistence merely causes its subject to be the kind of thing it is. "Cum enim dicimus 'corpus est' vel, 'homo est' vel hujusmodi, theologici hoc esse dictum intelligunt quadam extrinseca denominatione ab essentia sed Principii. Non enim dicunt corporalitate corpus *esse* sed *esse aliquid*; nec humanitate hominem *esse* sed *esse aliquid*" (*In De Hebd., Arch.*, p. 188, no. 6; *PL*, LXIV, 1318A).

Philosophers do not explain things by reference to God; so for Gilbert they fall into two groups—those who say that by the same *id quo*'s a thing is and is the kind of thing it is, and those who say that by substantial *id quo*'s a thing is and by accidental *id quo*'s is the kind of thing it is. "Illorum vero philosophorum . . . alii quaelibet illa orationum suarum themata, id est materias de quibus locuntur, eodem quo dicunt *esse* dicunt *esse aliquid*. . . . Alii vero dividunt et ea quae subsistunt dicunt *esse* subsistentiis et *esse aliquid* his quae subsistentias comitantur . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 188-89; *PL*, LXIV, 1318A).

We feel that philosophically Gilbert would endorse the first position and we say this on the basis of note no. 55 and no. 56 below.

[54]"ILLIC ENIM, id est cum de quolibet dicitur 'est aliquid' ita quod non potest addi: 'in eo quod est', SIGNIFICATUR esse ACCIDENS id quo ita *esse aliquid* dicitur (ut quod opus, dicitur esse triangulum). HIC vero, id est cum de quolibet dicitur 'est aliquid' ita quod potest addi 'in eo quod est', SIGNIFICATUR esse SUBSTANTIA, hoc est subsistentia, id quo ita *esse aliquid* dicitur . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 191, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1319D).

[55]"Sicut praediximus: ea, quae subsistunt, quidam philosophorum dicunt *esse* solis subsistentiis et *esse aliquid* quibusdam, quae alia sunt a subsistentiis, videlicet solis accidentibus. Secundum hunc usum hoc loco solum subsistens solis accidentibus *esse aliquid* dicitur. Dicimus etiam quoniam id, quod est aliquid, quandoque dicitur *esse aliquid in eo quod est* (et hoc quoque duobus modis), quandoque vero ita simpliciter esse aliquid quod nullo modo in eo quod est. Verbi gratia: aliquod opus, et aereum dicitur et humanum et triangulum: sed *aereum* atque *humanum in eo quod est* (diversa tamen ratione), *triangulum* vero nulla ratione in eo quod est sed *tantum* triangulum" (*ibid.*, p. 191, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1319B).

[56]"SED IPSUM ESSE, id est subsistentia quae inest subsistenti, NULLO MODO PARTICIPAT ALIQUO. Quippe quod in se non habet esse, quo sit, nullo modo cum esse potest habere in se, quo quale vel quantum sit. . . . Itaque, cum esse non possit in se habere quo sit, nec participatione aliud aliquid in se habebit" (*ibid.*, p. 190, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1318D-1319A). "*Mathematica* vero, etsi nec re nec proportione dicuntur habere in se quo sint vel aliquid sint . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 192, no. 12; *PL*, LXIV, 1320B).

[57]"Nativa namque per aliquam sui vel efficientem vel efficiendi proprietatem concipiuntur: ut album per albedinem et albedo per naturam faciendi album. Nihil enim naturalium nisi per causam et nihil mathematicorum nisi per efficiendi potestatem concipi potest" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 260, no. 7; *PL*, LXIV, 1360B).

[58]"Quia namque et esse et id, quod est, cujusdam consortii ratione sine se esse non possunt (ut corporalitas et corpus. Actu namque corporalitas nihil est, nisi sit in corpore. Et corpus non est, quod vocatur, nisi in ipso sit corporalitas, quae est ejus esse) . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 287, no. 16; *PL*, LXIV, 1374D).

same humanity also accounts for the fact that John is a man. Obviously, this humanity cannot be said to explain why John is tall or white; but it does explain why he is human, animal, and rational. All of which are substantial perfections. And as we shall see, this is what distinguishes subsistences from accidental forms. For accidental *id quo*'s cause their subject simply to be something (*simpliciter esse aliquid*), whereas subsistences cause their subject to be something substantially (*esse aliquid in eo quod est*).[55]

From what we have seen, we can conclude that an *id quod* or a subsistent is, and it is the kind of thing it is because of its subsistences. In fact, this causality is so important that one cannot truly know an *id quod* intellectually unless he somehow grasps its subsistences. If an *id quod* is as it is because of *id quo*'s, what accounts for the fact that an *id quo* is the kind of thing it is? In other words, what accounts for the fact that corporality causes its subject to be a body, whereas animality causes its subject to be animal and not vice versa? It cannot be a subsistence within corporality and animality, for then they would not be *id quo*'s but *id quod*'s—since subsistences (substantial *id quo*'s) cause their subjects to subsist and hence to be *id quod*'s.[56] It cannot be an accidental *id quo* within corporality or animality which causes them to produce their proper effects, since it is no accident that corporality causes a body and animality causes an animal. In fact, the reason why corporality and animality are the kinds of subsistences they are cannot be due to an *id quo* at all. For if Gilbert were to posit an *id quo* within a subsistence which accounted for its being the kind of subsistence it is, he would be involved in another infinite regress. For if one *id quo* requires another to be what it is as an *id quo*, then there is no explanation of *id quo*'s. The answer is that every *id quo* is a cause, and as such it has a certain power with respect to its effect. Or better, to be a form, substantial or accidental, is precisely to be a real dynamic power (*potestas efficiendi*) within a being producing there its proper effect.[57] And when Gilbert says that the forms of things are actually nothing apart from their subjects,[58] he means among other things that a form, apart from actually exercising its power of producing an effect, is nothing. So we can say that for Gilbert not only is every form a dynamic power (*potestas efficiendi*) within a being; it

is that power in act.[59] Consequently it would seem to be a simplification to say that all philosophies of form deprive being of its proper dynamism.

Summarily, then, the substantial *id quo*'s are said to be the very being (*esse*) or the subsistences of their subjects. This is because they cause their subjects to exist and to subsist. The specific subsistence, made up as it is of the generic and differential subsistences, can alone be called the whole being (*totum esse*) of its subject. Subsistences also cause their subjects to be something substantially (*esse aliquid in eo quod est*); and they are able to do this because each is a form, and a form is nothing more than the dynamic power of producing an effect in a subject. Subsistences as substantial forms produce a substantial effect.

[59]We are speaking here of the forms of material things. Gilbert really says that "forms" taken most accurately are never in matter. He would have us therefore distinguish between exemplar-forms, which are forms in the truest sense of the word, and image-forms, which are not forms most properly. Cf. *In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 57, no. 24; *PL*, LXIV, 1274C.

[60]"Quamvis enim accidentia et nativa sint et aliquorum sint . . . quia tamen non sunt subsistentium esse et ideo illorum nec accessu generatio nec abscessu corruptio fieri potest . . ." (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 271, no. 40; *PL*, LXIV, 1366D).

[61]"Sed praeter has alia quaedam esse disciplinalis scientia mathematicorum attendit, quae logici graece 'symbebekota', Latine 'accidentia' vocant, quae scilicet (sicut differentiae) non modo generum sed etiam differentiarum et specierum potestati proprietate addicta sunt et nec species subsistentium nec specierum partes esse possunt" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 198, no. 22; *PL*, LXIV, 1324B).

[62]"Et dicimus quod non corporalitas colorem aut lineam sed color et linea corporalitatem sequuntur. Non enim haec corporalitatis sed horum corporalitas causa est" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 67, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV, 1283B).

[63]"Omne etenim accidens alicujus subsistentiae addictum est potestati. Et ideo 'accidens' vocatur, quondam illi adest, cum alicui subsistentium inest: ut color adest corporalitati, ut insit corpori" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 288, no. 18; *PL*, LXIV, 1375B).

[64]". . . ut cum speciali subsistentiae, qua homines sumus, adesse dicantur in nobis color, sanitas atque scientia, ideo utique haec dicuntur, quoniam ejus partibus proprietatis ratione (color scilicet corporalitati, sanitas sensibilitati, scientia rationalitati) conveniunt" (*ibid.*, p. 270, no. 35; *PL*, LXIV, 1365C).

[65]". . . (sicut in homine ejusdem subsistentiis adsunt diversorum generum accidentia) . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 295, no. 34; *PL*, LXIV, 1378D).

[66]". . . homo nunc hoc nunc illo situ vel loco vel habitu vel relatione vel tempore vel actione vel passione statuitur et, idem permanens, secundum extrinsecus sibi accidentia variatur" (*ibid.*, p. 322, no. 6; *PL*, LXIV, 1393A).

[67]"ILLA vero QUAE id de quo dicuntur id est subsistens DESIGNANT, non aliis *e regione* sed seipsis praedicatis, ESSE ALIQUID, VOCANTUR PRAEDICATIONES SECUNDUM REM. QUAE secundum rem praedicationes CUM DICUNTUR DE REBUS causa subsistentiarum suarum quibus in illis adsunt, sibi SUBJECTIS, VOCANTUR quidem ACCIDENTIA, eo quod rerum illarum subsistentiis adsunt, sed tamen SECUNDUM REM eo quod ipsis subsistentibus ipsa quoque insunt et eadem esse aliquid faciunt" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 78, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1291C).

Accidental *id quo*'s have a twofold characteristic. First, their coming and going does not bring about the generation or the corruption of the subject.[60] And it is for this reason that no accidental *id quo* can be called the being (*esse*) of any substance. So a white man's being (*esse*) will be the humanity whereby he is and is human, and not the whiteness whereby he is white.[61] Secondly, accidental *id quo*'s not only cannot cause their subjects to subsist; that is, to exist independently of any other forms they may have; but they themselves are dependent for existence not only on their subjects but on the subsistences of their subjects. So true is this for Gilbert that the subsistences of the subject, as well as the subject itself, can be called the causes of accidents.[62] In fact, Gilbert says that these *id quo*'s are called "accidents" not because of some relation to their subject but because they befall (*accidit*), adhere to, or are added to some subsistence in order to inhere in a subject.[63] But a given accident cannot just adhere to any subsistence; it must adhere to that subsistence which is its cause and which has the power to cause it. Thus the accidents of color, health, and knowledge should not properly be attributed to the whole being (*totum esse*) of man; that is, humanity. Rather, color should be attributed to corporality, health to sensibility, and knowledge to rationality, all of which subsistences are parts of humanity.[64] Gilbert also makes it clear that one and the same subsistence can cause, or have within its power to produce, many accidents of different kinds. For example, both the color and the length of a body are due to accidental *id quo*'s which adhere to, and are caused by, the same corporality.[65]

Accidents are divided by Gilbert into two groups. Quantity and quality constitute the first group, which is characterized by the fact that accidents of this group actually inhere in a subject. Relation, action, passion, time, place, position, and habit constitute the second group, which is characterized by the fact that its accidents do not inhere in a subject but are added to it extrinsically.[66] Both types of accidents can be truly predicated of their subject; but only those of the first group can be predicated, as Gilbert says, *secundum rem*. This means in such a way as to indicate that the subject possesses a perfection within itself.[67] The accidents of the second group are truly predicated of their

subject but *extrinsecus*, which indicates that the subject is not endowed by their presence with any intrinsic perfection. Rather, by the presence of such accidents a subject already constituted from certain substantial and accidental *id quo*'s is placed in a certain relationship to something else. Although not conferring an intrinsic perfection on their subjects, such accidents give them a certain *status*—that is, the *status* of being clothed, armed, in the forum, seated, and other things of this sort.[68] Therefore, speaking most formally, it would be proper, according to Gilbert's thought, to refer to quantity and quality as accidents and the remaining accidental categories as the states or circumstances of subject.[69] This is particularly true when one recalls that for Gilbert the word "accident" refers to those *id quo*'s which befall (*accidunt*) a subsistence in order to inhere in a subject.[70]

Accidents, as opposed to circumstances or states, actually cause their

[68]"Hae vero sunt substantiales formae et, quae illis in ipso subsistente adsunt, qualitates et intervallares mensurae. Caetera vero, quae de ipso naturaliter dicuntur, quidam ejus 'status' vocantur, eo quod nunc sic nunc vero aliter . . . statuatur. . . . Idem enim est homo sedendo quod standO, et extra domum quod intra, et inermis quod armatus . . ." (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 321-2, nos. 6-7; *PL*, LXIV, 1393A).

[69]"Loca, tempora, actiones, passiones, habitus, situs recte vocat *rei circumstantias* quoniam, quamvis esse in loco vel in tempore non sit esse aliquid, tamen nihil est in loco vel in tempore, nisi ipsum sit aliquid. Similiter quamvis agere vel pati vel habere vel sisti non sit esse aliquid, tamen quidquid agit vel patitur vel habet vel situm est, est aliquid" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 77, no. 9; *PL*, LXIV, 1291B).

[70]See n. 63 above.

[71]"Unde manifestum est quod DIVERSUM est 'ESSE ALIQUID TANTUM', id est cui, cum praedicatur *esse aliquid*, non potest addi: in eo quod est, ET 'ESSE ALIQUID IN EO QUOD EST', id est cui, cum dicitur *esse aliquid*, potest addi: *in eo quod est*. Vere. ILLIC ENIM, id est cum de quolibet dicitur 'est aliquid' ita quod non potest addi 'in eo quod est', SIGNIFICATUR ACCIDENS id quo ita *esse aliquid* dicitur (ut quod opus dicitur esse triangulum). HIC vero, id est cum de quolibet dicitur 'est aliquid' ita quod potest addi 'in eo quod est', SIGNIFICATUR SUBSTANTIA, hoc est subsistentia . . ." (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 191, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1319D).

[72]"Accidentia vero de illis quidem substantiis, quae ex esse sunt aliquid, dicuntur (sive in eis creata sive extrinsecus affixa sint) sed eis tantum, quae esse sunt, accidunt, quia illis recte non 'inesse' sed 'adesse' dicuntur" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 67, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1282D). Cf. n. 63 above.

[73]"Omne etenim accidens alicujus subsistentiae addictum est potestati. Et ideo 'accidens' vocatur, quoniam illi adest, cum alicui subsistentium inest: ut color adest corporalitati, ut insit corpori" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 288, no. 18; *PL*, LXIV, 1375B).

[74]"Qua ratione illa corporis est esse, haec vero in eodem corpore illi adsunt. Ideo primum illa, deinde quod ea corpus est, vera ratione est horum substantia : haec vero primum corporalitatis et per eam corporis accidentia. His enim vere substat et corporalitas, cui adsunt, et corpus cui insunt" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 67, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV, 1283B).

[75]"FORMAE VERO SUBJECTAE ESSE NON POSSUNT id est juxte aliquam, quam in se habeant, subsistentiam nullum accidens in se suscipiunt" (*ibid.*, p. 56, no. 22; *PL*, LXIV, 1273D).

subjects to be beings of this or that sort (*esse aliquid*). That is, they actually endow their subjects with a certain attribute or perfection. In this accidents are like subsistences, since the perfection caused by each is actually in the subject. However, they differ because the accidents do not cause their subjects to be anything substantially (*esse aliquid in eo quod est*).[71] Nor can accidents directly inhere (*insunt*) in their subjects as subsistences do. Prior (in nature, not in time) to inhering in their subjects, accidents must adhere to (*adsunt*) some subsistence or being (*esse*) within their subject.[72] Accidents, then, cannot inhere in any subject unless they also adhere to, befall, are added to, or are caused by some subsistence. For an accident is added to the power of some subsistence, and it is accidental to this subsistence because it adheres to it. For color adheres to corporality in order that it might inhere in a body.[73] Thus one and the same body is a body, is colored and delineated; but the *id quo*'s by which the body in question is each of these things are distinct. Corporality, color, and line account for these different aspects of the same body; but corporality is more fundamental, as the other *id quo*'s follow upon it and not vice versa. For color and line do not cause corporality; rather, corporality is their cause. Thus color and line adhere to corporality which is the being (*esse*) of the body. So in some way accidents may be said to be supported by both the body and its being (*esse*), for they adhere to corporality in order to inhere in body.[74] One can see here how careful Gilbert is to avoid speaking of accidents as if they were "in" subsistences, for *id quo*'s can only be said to be "in" *id quod*'s and as we have already noted; *id quo*'s do not have other *id quo*'s within themselves. In short, then, no form can be the subject of other forms.[75] When Gilbert speaks of accidents as adhering to, befalling, or being added to subsistences, he is trying to explain how accidental and substantial *id quo*'s are joined, since the mode of union cannot be inherence. For if an accident inhered in a subsistence, then the subsistence would be the subject of that accident rather than the *id quod*. And it would further follow that corporality would be white instead of the body. It should be noted that because this adherence of which Gilbert speaks is a relationship between *id quo*'s it is itself a mathematical concept.

Summarily, then, accidental *id quo*'s never cause their subject to be;

hence they can never be the being (*esse*) or subsistence of a subject. They cannot cause their subjects to subsist; and in fact the very existence of accidental *id quo*'s themselves is dependent on the subsistences of their subject as well as on their subject. Every accident will be added to a given subsistence within its subject; namely, to that subsistence of which it is the proper effect. Thus a certain propriety is maintained so that corporality, not rationality, will be the cause of, say, color. Further, an accident is said to adhere to, to befall, to be added to, and to be caused by its own proper subsistence. Consequently, though accidents and subsistences are intimately related, the accidents are never said to be "in" their proper subsistences, for no effect is said to be actually in its cause. Accidents adhere to subsistences and inhere in subsistents. There are two kinds of inhering accidents—quantities and qualities. There are other accidental *id quo*'s which are extrinsically added to their subject—and these would be more properly called the circumstances of a thing rather than its accidents. If one insists on calling them accidents, they should be called *extrinsic* accidents. Intrinsic accidents produce an accidental perfection in their subject in such a way that their subject may be really (*secundum rem*) said to be this or that, but not substantially. Extrinsic accidents may be truly predicated of their subject but not really (*secundum rem*); that is, not in such a way as to posit a perfection *in* their subject.

[76]"OMNE QUOD EST, scilicet omne subsistens, PARTICIPAT EO QUOD EST 'ejus' ESSE, non quidem ut eo sit aliquid, sed ad hoc tantum UT eo SIT" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 192, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV, 1320A).

Speaking theologically, Gilbert would demand many precisions; see n. 53 above. *Est* is said in the natural order primarily of subsistents, but we do not mean to deny that *id quo*'s can be said to exist secondarily and indirectly. Nor do we mean to imply that *est* is said primarily of natural subsistents to the detriment of God. For God is not merely said to be, He is also said to be being itself; that is, *essentia*. *Est* is said of Him essentially. "Essentia est illa res, QUAE EST IPSUM ESSE id est quae non ab alio hanc mutuat dictionem ET EX QUA EST ESSE id est quae caeteris omnibus eandem quadam extrinseca participatione communicat. Non enim de quolibet suae essentiae proprietate dicitur 'est'. Sed ab eo, qui non aliena sed sua essentia proprie est, ad illud quod creata ab ipso forma aliquid est et ad ipsam creatam formam et denique ad omnia quae de ipsis vere dicuntur (quoniam ex eo tamquam ex principio sunt) dictio ista transumitur, ut de unoquoque divinae formae participatione recte dicatur 'est' " (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 50, no. 2; *PL*, LXIV, 1269A).

[77]"Subsistit quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 288, no. 19; *PL*, LXIV, 1375C).

[78]"SUBSTAT AUTEM ID, QUOD ALIIS id est ACCIDENTIBUS QUODDAM SUBJECTUM, UT ESSE POSSINT, SUBMINISTRAT: ut corpus colori" (*ibid.*, p. 288, no. 18; *PL*, LXIV, 1375B).

Quite properly Gilbert never questions the fact that the world in which he lives is made up of individual existents, which he describes as *ea quae sunt* ("things which exist"). This truth is itself part of the first principle that in natural things (as opposed to supernatural) an existent is other than that by which it exists. It is equally as self-evident, then, that there are existents in the world as that these existents are distinct from, and other than, the realities which cause them to be and to be what they are. These beings (*id quod*'s) are such that existence can be truly said of them: "this stone exists," "this tree exists," "this dog exists," and "John exists." *Est* is said *philosophically* of such existents properly and primarily because each has its own being (*ejus esse*) by which it exists.[76] *Est* cannot be properly and primarily said of any *id quo* since, as we have seen, no *id quo* has a being (*esse*) within itself. This is the most fundamental difference between *id quod*'s and *id quo*'s (namely, that the former is primarily and properly the subject of existence, and the latter is not), and it accounts for other secondary differences.

Id quod's are said to subsist and to substand. The key to understanding Gilbert on this point is to accept his definitions of what it is "to subsist" and "to substand." Following Boethius, he defines both subsisting and substanding in terms of accidents which neither subsist nor substand. For that is said to subsist which does not require accidents in order that it be.[77] And that is said to substand which furnishes (*subministrat*) accidents with their proper subject.[78] One must be very careful to understand Gilbert correctly here. That subsists which does not require accidents in order to be, but the question to be answered is, Do only existents (*id quod*'s) subsist? If one interprets this to mean do only subsistents exist as *id quod*'s, then the answer is affirmative; but this is not what Gilbert has in mind. By "to subsist" he means "to be independent of accidents"; and from all we have said it should be obvious that both *id quod*'s and substantial *id quo*'s are independent of accidents. So for Gilbert, unlike St. Thomas, *id quo*'s

as well as subsistents are said to subsist.[79] Thus we can see that it would be wrong to say that for Gilbert *id quod*'s subsist and *id quo*'s do not. The real difference between them, as we have noted above, is that *id quod*'s are the primary subjects of existence and *id quo*'s are not.

A completely similar situation obtains with respect to substanding. Since Gilbert defines substanding in terms other than those of existing *in se et non in alio*, there is no reason why substanding should be the

[79]Subsistit quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget. ITAQUE GENERA ET SPECIES id est generales et speciales subsistentiae SUBSISTUNT TANTUM. . . Non enim ipsa genera species indigent accidentibus, ut sint. INDIVIDUA VERO SUBSISTUNT quidem. Vere. NAM NEQUE IPSA individua sicut nec genera nec species INDIGENT ACCIDENTIBUS, UT SINT" (*ibid.*, p. 288, no. 19; *PL*, LXIV, 1375C).

For St. Thomas, that subsists which exists *in se non in alio* (*ST*, I, q. 29, a. 2); but in Gilbert's frame of reference that which exists *in se non in alio* (in the sense of having its own *esse*) is an *id quod*. Consequently we must be careful to use *subsistere* here only in the Gilbertian sense, for he expressly says that subsistences which exist in an *id quod* also subsist.

[80]"Non enim subsistens tantum sed etiam subsistentia appellatur 'substantia' eo quod utraque accidentibus, diversis tamen rationibus, substant. Subsistens igitur est substantia non qua aliqua rerum est aliquid (nihil enim subsistente est aliquid), sed est illa substantia, quae est aliquid. Subsistentia vero est substantia, non cui quid nitatur quo ipsa aliquid sit, sed qua solum subsistens est ALIQUID . . ." (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 76, no. 4; *PL*, LXIV, 1290B).

[81]"Quos hic ipse error patenter ostendit omnino nescire hujus nominis, quod est 'substantia' multiplicem in naturalibus usum: videlicet non modo id, quod est, verum etiam id, quo est, hoc nomine nuncupari . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 63, no. 5; *PL*, LXIV, 1279D).

[82]"Quoniam tamen omnium (id est et corporalium et incorporalium) subsistentium . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 65, no. 4; *PL*, LXIV, 1281D).

"Ex hujus igitur loci universitate omnibus etiam hominibus naturaliter cognita venit haec conceptio sive enuntiatio *naturalis* qua dicitur: *Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse.* Locus enim, *et* quo locale *et* quo locatum aliquid vere intelligitur, solis corporibus accidit" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 187, no. 5; *PL*, LXIV, 1317C).

[83]"Corporibus et incorporalibus nulla est communis materia. Vere utique, quoniam nulla omnino est incorporeorum materia. Quod ait ita: OMNIS ENIM NATURA INCORPOREAE SUBSTANTIAE talis est, quod NULLO FUNDAMENTO MATERIAE nititur. Nam nec etiam hyle potest eorum esse materia. NULLUM VERO CORPUS EST, CUI (hoc est: cujus naturae) NON SIT SUBJECTA MATERIA. Nam hyle quidem corporibus, corporum vero naturis caeteris a prima subsistentia ipsa corpora" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 335, no. 26; *PL*, LXIV, 1400A).

[84]"Nam omnia *naturalia* non modo creata sed etiam concreta sunt" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 192, no. 12; *PL*, LXIV, 1320B).

[85]A discussion of God is beyond the scope of our present endeavor. On the simplicity of God cf. Haring, *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 17; and Gilbert, *In De Hebd., Trad.*, pp. 192-94, nos. 12-13; *PL*, LXIV, 1320D-21A).

[86]"Duobus modis composito accipitur. Unus est, quo subsistens aliquod ex subsistentibus inter se diversis et a quibus compositum ipsum aliud est dicitur esse compositum ut homo, qui ex carnibus atque ossibus vel ex corpore et spiritu compositus est" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 193, no. 13; *PL*, LXIV, 1321A).

exclusive prerogative of *id quod*'s. In fact, since he defines substanding in terms of affording a certain substrate for accidents and since he has consistently taught that every accident must adhere to a subsistence in order to inhere in its proper subject, it follows quite logically that substantial *id quo*'s or subsistences be included as the substrates for accidents. But again it cannot be said that both the subsistent and its subsistence substand accidents in the same way. In fact, Gilbert calls the former the *substantia quae* and the latter *substantia qua.*[80] And it is only because of subsistences within it which are the proper causes of its various accidents that an *id quod* or *substantia quae* substands these accidents. And conversely it is only because these subsistences are within a subject that they are, and are able to cause, accidents. This intimate interdependence of the subsistence and the subsistent in substanding accidents allows Gilbert to give to each the name "substance," but not so as to indicate that they substand accidents in the same way. For subsistents substand accidents as their *id quod* or subject, while subsistences substand accidents as the *id quo*'s which are their causes and to which they are added or adhere within their subject.[81] Gilbert speaks of two main kinds of subsistents, those which are corporeal and in place and those which are incorporeal and are not in place.[82] The main differences between them is, of course, that the *id quo*'s of corporeal things are in matter, while the *id quo*'s of incorporeal beings are not.[83] But it is an interesting note to Gilbert's philosophy that both corporeal and incorporeal subsistents, with the exception of God, can be said to be concrete.[84] So "concretion" in Gilbert's philosophy does not necessarily concern itself with matter, as we shall see.

Apart from a consideration of God, who is the only truly simple subsistent,[85] no subsistent is simple. For every subsistent will be either a *subsistens ex subsistentibus* or a *subsistens ex subsistentiis.* Consequently there are two modes of composition. The first is that according to which a subsistent is composed of other subsistents (*subsistens ex subsistentibus*) which are diverse from each other as well as from the composite; for example, as a man is constituted of flesh and bones, or of body and soul.[86] The second mode of composition is such that a subsistent is not composed of other subsistents, for in this respect it can be said to be simple, but that a subsistent is

constituted from subsistences and their proper accidents (*subsistens ex subsistentiis*)—as the human soul is said to be simple because it is not composed of other subsistents but is said to be composite in the second way, since it is constituted from many subsistences and the accidents which adhere to them.[87] From this we can see that it is proper to say that the soul is relatively simple, if by this we mean that it is not composed of other subsistents; but this is only a relative, secondary, and creaturely simplicity. For the soul is not unqualifiedly simple; it is constituted from many forms, substantial and accidental, which cause it to be and to be as it is.

This second type of composition requires some further clarification. If we say, with Gilbert, that a subsistent is constituted from subsistences (*ex subsistentiis*), we must also add with Gilbert that subsistences and accidental forms *are not* to be considered as parts of the *id quod* which is their subject. Gilbert feels that a part must agree in some genus or *ratio* with the whole of which it is a part, but he also maintains that no subsistence or being (*esse*) agrees in any way with the subsistent of which it is the being (*esse*), which means that they are not related as part to whole.[88] Nothing prevents a generic subsistence from being parts of a *tota* or specific subsistence.[89] For this is a case of a complex *id quo* constituted from its parts which are also *id quo*'s. Gilbert is merely saying that no *id quo* is a part of an *id quod*, since the

[87]"Alius vero compositionis est modus, quo non quidem subsistens ex subsistentibus—nam quantum ad hoc simplex est sed *et* multis, quorum unoquoque est, *et* multis, quorum unoquoque aliquid est, ejus constat proprietas ut hominis spiritus qui—unus et simplex quantum ad hoc quod non ex diversis subsistentibus constat—*et* multis subsistentiis est *et* multis earum accidentibus aliquid est, ideoque compositus nec ipsum quod est" (*ibid.*, p. 194, no. 13; *PL*, LXIV, 1321B).

[88]"Nihil enim est esse ejus, cujus pars est. Esse namque et id, quod eo est, nullo prorsus conveniunt genere. Pars autem et id, cujus est pars, multis generibus etiam singulariter unum sunt" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 52, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1270D).

[89]Cf. nn. 45-49 above.

[90]" In quo diligenter est attendendum quod, etsi quandoque non ejusdem sint generis, quae sibi in compositionibus conjunguntur, semper tamen in aliquo sunt ejusdem rationis. Quamvis enim corpus et spiritus diversi generis sint, in hoc tamen sunt ejusdem rationis, quod utraque his, quae praedicantur, supposita sunt. Ipsa vero impossibile est praedicari. Nunquam enim id, quod est, praedicatur" (*In De Duab.*, *Arch.*, p. 300, no. 12; *PL*, LXIV, 1381A).

[91]"Sic igitur anima, quae hominis est pars constitutiva . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 281, no. 2; *PL*, LXIV, 1371D).

[92]"Secundum hanc diffinitionem humana anima videtur esse persona. Non enim sicut quidam dixerunt, est *entelechia*, hoc est forma, sed potius *substantia*, id est subsistens, habens in se formas et diversorum generum accidentia. Est et *naturae rationalis*" (*ibid.*).

[93]Cf. n. 88 above.

parts of an *id quod* are themselves *id quod*'s.[90] And so we can see why Gilbert can truly say, if secondarily, that the soul is simple; it must be so since it has no parts. However, it is not simply simple, because of the multiplicity of *id quo*'s within it. It follows from this that the soul is a subsistent with many *id quo*'s, that the soul is a constitutive part of man.[91] Thus the soul as part of a subsistent cannot be itself a form and must be a subsistent.[92]

Summarily, then, *id quod*'s are beings; that is to say, *est* is said of them properly and primarily because of the being (*esse*) within them. They are said to subsist because they exist independently of their accidents, while they are said to substand because they furnish these accidents with a substrate. This is said of *id quod*'s because of the subsistences, which also may be said to subsist and substand as *id quo*'s, within them. Subsistents are either material or immaterial, yet all created subsistents are concrete. Because they are concrete all subsistents are complex either because they are made up of other subsistents, called their parts; or because they possess within themselves many subsistences and accidents, which never are parts of their subjects. In order to safeguard the immortality of the human soul Gilbert considers it solely as a subsistent and a part of man, and denies it is a form or subsistence.

Gilbert on the Relation of *id quo* 's and *id quod* 's

Having seen Gilbert's teaching on *id quo*'s and *id quod*'s, we may conclude with his doctrine of their relationship to one another. The difficulty involved in describing this relationship is immediately evident if one but recalls that we speak here not of a relationship between beings (*id quod*'s) but between beings and those realities within beings which are necessary to ultimately explain them. However we describe this relationship, it cannot be said to be the relation of parts to a whole, for Gilbert has already stated that *id quo*'s are not parts of subsistents.[93] I suspect that a philosopher can say little more than that these realities are within beings, but it is interesting to note the terminology he may use to say this. Gilbert chooses a term with a long philosophical history to explain this relationship between *id quo*'s and *id quod*'s. It is "participation." We should not let its history

cause us to misinterpret Gilbert's use of the word. For Gilbert says that when a subsistent has something within itself—for example, a nature by which it is or is the kind of thing it is—one can say that the subsistent participates in that nature. Conversely, a nature is said to be participated in by the subsistent in which it inheres.[94] It is well to note here that for Gilbert participation is the relation between an *id quod* and its own *id quo*'s, and not between an *id quod* and some transcendent exemplar.[95] In view of this definition of participation, *id quo*'s cannot participate in anything because they do not have within themselves realities by which they are and are the kinds of things they are.[96] Thus for example, John is a man because he participates in that specific subsistence which is his own being (*esse*); that is,

[94]"Cum enim subsistens in se aliquid (ut naturam qua sit vel aliquid sit) habet, dicitur quod ipsum eâ naturâ participat. Natura vero quae, quoniam inest subsistenti, dicitur ab eo participari. . ."(*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 198, no 21; *PL*, LXIV, 1324A).

[95]This is not to deny that a relation exists between a natural subsistent and the exemplars; it is to deny that such a relationship is called, by Gilbert, participation. He speaks in other terms of this relationship, for example: "AT VERO id QUOD EST, ACCEPTA in se FORMA ESSENDI, id est eâ quam abstractim intellectus concipit subsistentiâ (Quae acceptio dicitur 'generatio') EST ATQUE materiae (quae 'hyle' dicitur) formaeque hujus, quae Graece 'usyosis' vocatur, concursu—opifice illa forma (quae nominatur 'usya') juxta exemplar illius quae dicitur 'ydea'—ycon (hoc est illius exemplaris exemplum et imago) CONSISTIT ut corpus, eo quod ut esse corporalitatem habet est corpus; et homo eo quod humanitatem" (*ibid.*, p. 189, no. 7; *PL*, LXIV, 1318C). "EX HIS ENIM FORMIS, QUAE SUNT PRAETER MATERIAM . . . ISTAE FORMAE, QUAE SUNT IN MATERIA ET ei, quod est esse materiae, advenientes CORPUS EFFICIUNT quadam exempli ab exemplari suo conformativa deductione VENERUNT" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 57, no. 24; *PL*, LXIV, 1274C).

[96]"SED IPSUM ESSE, id est subsistentia quae inest subsistenti, NULLO MODO PARTICIPAT ALIQUO. Quippe quod in se non habet esse, quo sit, nullo modo cum esse potest habere in se, quo quale vel quantum sit. . . . Itaque cum esse non possit in se habere quo sit, nec participatione aliud aliquid in se habebit" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 190, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1318D-1319A). Cf. nn. 56-58 above.

[97]"OMNE QUOD EST, scilicet omne subsistens, PARTICIPAT EO QUOD EST ejus ESSE, non quidem ut eo sit aliquid, sed ac hoc tantum UT eo SIT. Cum eodem vero idem subsistens quodam ALIO PARTICIPAT, UT eo SIT ALIQUID. Sed illa participatio, qua eo quod est esse participat, naturâ prior est; altera vero posterior. Unde infert: AC PER HOC. Quasi: quia videlicet non potest *esse aliquid*, nisi prius naturaliter sit, ID QUOD EST (sicut dictum est) PARTICIPAT EO QUOD EST ESSE, UT SIT. EST VERO naturaliter prius, UT deinde PARTICIPET ALIO QUOLIBET quo aliquid sit" (*ibid.*, p. 192, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV, 1320A).

[98]"Concretio vero eidem subsistentiae naturas posterioris rationis accommodat ut, cui cum illa insunt, simplex non sit" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 48, no. 9; *PL*, LXIV, 1267B).

[99]"Creatio namque subsistentiam inesse facit ut, cui inest, ab ea aliquid sit" (*ibid.*, p. 47; *PL*, LXIV, 1267A).

[100]"Nam omnia *naturalia* non modo creata sed etiam concreta sunt" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 192, no. 12; *PL*, LXIV, 1320B).

[101]Cf. n. 18 above.

his own humanity; but this subsistence which is John's being (*esse*) cannot itself be said to participate in anything, since it has nothing within itself and is not itself an *id quod*.

There are two kinds of participation, since there are two kinds of natures to be participated in. Every subsistent first participates in its being (*esse*) in order that it exist, and only then does the subsistent participate in those *id quo*'s which follow upon being. Thus a subsistent participates in its being (*esse*) by a prior (in nature, not in time) participation; and it participates in its accidental perfections by a posterior participation.[97] Since, as we have seen, subsistences inhere only while accidental *id quo*'s adhere to their proper subsistences in order to inhere, we could very well call the prior participation "direct participation" and the posterior participation "indirect participation."

This twofold participation on the part of every created subsistent brings about a situation whereby many forms are simultaneously present to, or inhering in, an *id quod*. This multiplicity of forms is not a disordered aggregate, but rather each form is in its subject according to fixed relations to all the other forms in its subject. This accommodation of forms to each other within the same subsistent is called by Gilbert "concretion." For concretion accommodates natures to one another, and especially those which are posterior to those which are prior.[98] By means of creation a subsistence with its concomitant accidental adjuncts is made to inhere in a subject.[99] But because a multiplicity of forms is created in a subsistent, every subsistent is not only created but also concreted.[100] It matters not whether the subsistent be material or immaterial; if there are many *id quo*'s within it they must be properly related to one another. Hence every created subsistent may be called "concrete."

Summarily, then, God creates natural subsistents, both corporeal and incorporeal. And this creative act produces its effect of making the subsistent be and be the kind of thing it is through the forms which God places in it. These forms are produced in their subject so that we can say that the subject participates in each form. And the forms themselves are the images or icons of the exemplars, which probably are ultimately for Gilbert the divine ideas.[101] Gilbert speaks of this creative act which produces forms which are images of exemplars as

a certain "conformative deduction."[102] The multiplicity of forms in a given subsistent are ordered to one another by concretion, which allows us to call each subsistent "concrete" and to say of each form within it that it is "concreted." All created forms are concreted and therefore can never actually (*actu*) exist apart from the complex of forms to which they are accommodated or apart from the subsistent which participates in them.[103] And all created subsistents have the perfections we attribute to them because of some *id quo* in which they participate, be it substantial or accidental.[104]

Granting, then, that Gilbert's philosophy can be called a formalism,[105] it would seem that we do him no disservice by saying that his entire philosophy is a philosophy of the concrete and the concreted. That is to say, it is a philosophy which attempts to explain reality in terms of concreted forms within concrete subsistents. Under the present limitations one could not expect to do full justice to such a philosophy. The ramifications of such an approach to reality must be left for another time; we have attempted merely to outline Gilbert's approach to the real. But even in outlining the general direction of Gilbert's philosophical speculation, one cannot but admire so vital a metaphysical mind. It is a mystery why so brilliant a metaphysician has for so long been of importance only in theology. Of course, until we are willing to take Gilbert seriously as a philosopher, we shall never see him in his true light. We shall continue to speak of him in the terms and phrases of his contemporaries, which were not always accurate or flattering. We shall fail to see his strong metaphysical speculation as a valid, and therefore important, moment in the history of philosophy. One who has been judged by Professor Gilson to be the most powerful metaphysician of the twelfth century[106] deserves better from our hands.

[102]Cf. n. 95 above.

[103]Cf. n. 58 above.

[104]"Quicquid enim *naturaliter* de subsistente dicitur, aut ejus substantia aut ejus accidens recte intelligitur. Praeter haec tamen de ipso extra naturalium facultatem plurima dicuntur, inter quae illa etiam sunt quae de eodem *denominative* praedicantur" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 205, no. 35; *PL*, LXIV, 1328D-1329A).

[105]Cf. n. 4 above.

[106]"Gilbert est, avec Abélard, le plus puissant spéculatif esprit du XII^e siècle, et si Abélard l'emporte sur le terrain de la logique, Gilbert dépasse de loin Abélard comme métaphysicien" (Gilson, *Philosophie au moyen âge*, 262).

THE AMBIGUITY OF THE FACT

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Introduction

A few years ago the text of a lecture given by William Bevan, Jr., in the Scandinavian countries [1] was published in Copenhagen and Oslo.

There is every reason to speak here of this remarkable paper by an American professor. His lecture can be divided into two parts: the first part can be considered as an attack on the traditional (American) psychology; the second part contains some suggestions about further research.

Bevan starts from the thesis that it is impossible to establish facts without disposing of a certain theory. When establishing facts we cannot get rid of all possible conceptions and theories.[2] In general, too little allowance is made for this by psychologists; and consequently the theory, on the basis of which facts are established, remains concealed.[3]

Bevan makes an attempt to clear up, to a certain extent, the notional conceptions connected with the observation of facts. To begin with, these conceptions are rigid and stubborn; and it is extremely difficult to blot them out or to put them right.[4] Moreover, the function of the conception is not elucidated; that is, is it descriptive or explanatory? Finally, the conceptions used originate in physics and physiology.

Psychology, therefore, is partly built on a complex of conceptual

views of a simplistic, inadequate, and insufficient nature, which, in addition, have been derived from a quite different sphere of thinking. It stands to reason that, as a consequence of the above, progress in psychology is greatly hampered.[5]

In the second part of his discourse Bevan tries to find a way out. Since conceptions are indispensable, we must try to build up adequate ones. Taking into consideration the present state of affairs in the field of scientific research, this is not yet possible. In spite of this, Bevan is of the opinion that he can give some suggestions. In the first place, more attention has to be paid to the interaction of the factors because the relationships between surroundings and behavior are bilateral, not unilateral.[6] Therefore, the stimulus-response scheme is insufficient. Furthermore, we have to start from more flexible designs[7] and accept the divergent character of the physical and perceptive world. Finally, the pragmatic value of our conceptions has to be envisaged.[8]

At the beginning of this essay we spoke of a remarkable feature of the lecture, and we had indeed good reasons to do so. Let us recall here the criticism passed on the traditional psychology by phenomenology in general—and more in particular that put forward by Buytendijk and Merleau-Ponty. We find here, on the part of an American professor, a recognition of a conceptual moment in establishing facts, a recognition of the "scientistic" sphere of thinking, a reduction to the perceptual

[1]"Modern Psychologists: Scientific Woozle Hunters? An Opinion in Outline" (Einar Munksgaards Forlag, Copenhagen).

[2]"But facts, even observations, also depend upon the conceptual orientation of scientist and his competent colleagues . . . All that is factual, observed Goethe, is already theory" (*ibid.*, pp. 6-7).

[3]"Yet many psychologists are inclined to conceive of facts as 'real' bricks out of which theories are built, independent of the theory and independent of the builder. Concepts, facts and framework are man-made devices" (*ibid.*, p. 7).

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 8.

[5]This covers Buytendijk's and Merleau-Ponty's criticism of scientistic psychology

[6]"Single-factor design is built on the presumption that the relationships between variables designated for manipulation and behavior are unilateral" (*ibid.*, p. 21).

[7]*Ibid.*, p. 22.

[8]"The most profound weakness of neurologizing, however, is one of regarding acquired habits of thinking as peremptory descriptions of 'Nature', that is of caching in the back of one's mind the expectation that our model is 'something that exists' and is perhaps something that is even eventually observable—and this even by some of our nimblest minds" (*ibid.*, p. 24).

[9]Fernand Alquié, "Une philosophie de l'ambiguité," *Fontaine*, No. 59.

[10]Alphonse de Waelhens, *Une philosophie de l'ambiguité, l'existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (Louvain, 1951).

world and a recognition of the dialectical relation between stimulus and behavior.

Here we can speak of an attack on the basic principles of those sciences, which want to abandon all theories and base themselves exclusively on the facts, since they see the fact as a firm, unambiguous basis. At the same time it is shown here, however, how dangerous it is to build on a dubious philosophic basis; for Bevan, being under the influence of pragmatism, only attaches a pragmatic value to the concept. If we accept that the establishing of facts is unimaginable without conceptions and that the latter have only a pragmatic value, all sciences only have a pragmatic value.

We deem it necessary to reflect upon the relation between fact and conception. This is not at all an easy task. We would like to elucidate in this article some aspects of this relationship, on the basis of which we will prove that in more than one respect the fact is ambiguous. First of all, we will examine what is meant by ambiguity; next, we will see what has to be understood by a fact; and finally we will prove that the fact is ambiguous.

Our findings will undoubtedly be of some use in connection with discussions between representatives of the traditional and the new phenomenological psychology, a subject with which we will deal in the conclusion of this article.

I. What is Ambiguity?

Alquié [9] and de Waelhens [10] use the word "ambiguity" to define the character of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. In phenomenological literature in general it plays an important part. Something is ambiguous when it has more than one meaning. Ambiguity is a form of having a meaning. A meaning or a plurality of meanings is present both in our intentional act and in its correlate. So, if our intentional acts have more than one meaning, the same applies also to the correlate.

May we convert the proposition and assert that every plurality of meanings is always ambiguity? By no means. If something has several meanings, it might be possible that one individual meaning applies to one individual case, and another meaning to another case; so it is with analogous concepts. If something is ambiguous, all the

meanings are applicable in one and the same instance;[11] none of them is applied in an absolute way. The individual meanings can only be understood in their mutual relation. The truth does not lie properly in a separate meaning but in the commingling of all of them. Properly speaking, it is impossible to fully enunciate in a rational work the exact signification of the ambiguous, for in such a work the various meanings are analyzed and put side by side. In analysis, however, the proper reality of the ambiguous gets lost, for it consists in the unity of all the meanings.

Do we not understand the ambiguous in its totality? We do indeed. Experience has taught us that we have a "comprehension" of the ambiguous; we realize the ambiguity of humor, of a witty remark, and of an evasive answer. In a rational exposition, however, their proper sense is lost.[12] The exposition occasions the comprehension but never causes it. There is only question of a seeing-at-once.

Ambiguity, therefore, shows the following features. (*a*) In one phenomenon several meanings are applicable simultaneously. (*b*) Each meaning is coherent with the others; therefore, none of them is applicable absolutely. (*c*) Properly speaking, the ambiguous can only be attained in an understanding-at-once. In phenomenology, we speak of "phenomenological comprehension," which refers to a mutual implication of meanings. *(d)* The exposition is of an inadequate nature. It depends on "phenomenological comprehension" and can, in turn, only be its occasion, never its cause. Ambiguity, therefore, is closely bound up with dialectical unity, with the unity of mutual implication, which was found by Merleau-Ponty when he made a thorough analysis of the *Gestalt.* It constitutes the central viewpoint of his philosophy.

[11]Jean Wahl defines ambiguity as follows: "La condition humaine est telle que les mêmes phénomènes peuvent être envisagés dans des contextes différents" (*Les philosophies de l'existence* [Paris: Collin, 1954], p. 130).

[12]Furthermore Jean Wahl remarks that in the sphere of ambiguity existential thinking is difficult. "Sans doute, en allant de l'idée de paradoxe à l'idée d'ambiguité, la pensée existentielle perd une partie de son acuité; mais d'autre part, elle gagne peut-être en ampleur" (*ibid.*).

[13]H. Robbers, "Is History Found in Infra-human Reality?" ("Heeft het infrahumane geschiedenis?"), *Tijdschrift voor philosophie,* XVI (No. 1, 1954), 39-40

[14]*Ibid.*, 39.

[15]*Ibid.*, 39-40.

[16]"The fact essentially implies a relation to a finite human notion and this human notion itself also is a fact" (*ibid.*, 42).

II. What is a Fact?

The word "fact" has a special meaning. Granted this, we have two possibilities: either we have in view a special part of reality, or we approach reality with a special attitude.

Is it true that we have in mind a special part of reality when speaking of facts? Robbers is of the opinion that this is the case.[13] According to him, facts are only found in the field of contingent reality and historical happenings, for the fact is nascent and comes into existence.[14] Therefore, neither the existence of God nor the creation of the world can be considered as a fact, since they are the foundation of all facts.[15] We think, however, that Robbers intends to speak about the historical fact, which can be gathered from the very heading of his article ("Is History Found in Infra-human Reality?"), and from the article's identifying *fact* and *event*, an identification which undoubtedly holds good for historical fact but not for fact in its broadest meaning.

We are of the opinion that without any objection we may say, "The existence of God is an incontestable fact" or "It is a fact that the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees." Eternal and immutable reality, too, can be looked upon as a fact. We can establish facts with regard to everything that exists—about the visible world, the world of dreams and imagination, the reign of eternal truth; in short, about everything.

In case we do not use the word "fact" to indicate a special part of reality but do want to express a special meaning, the second possibility mentioned above has to be chosen; that is, we express reality as it is approached by us with a special attitude. Or, to speak in phenomenological terms, the fact is to be considered as the correlate of a special human attitude. Do not think that herewith we enter the idealistic sphere of thinking. Man is an intentional being; he really enters a real world. Our human existence is a dialogue of question and answer with the world. The world replies to our questions in a way that is consistent with our attitude toward the world; the intentional correlate lies in the world and not in the sphere of our immanent life. It lies in the world with which we are confronted.[16]

Therefore, if we want to explore the meaning of the word "fact," we will have to analyze the attitude in correlation with which a thing

presents itself as a fact. It will be impossible, however, to analyze this attitude without taking into consideration its intentional correlate. Both of them constitute a dialectical unity and can only be understood in relation to each other.

Robbers points out that the fact "rises," "stands out" against an undetermined background.[17] Although he speaks about the historical fact, the same can be said of the fact in general, provided these terms are interpreted in the gnoseological and not in the realistic sense of the word. The fact catches the eye. The fact is a lightening point in a field, which is only present in an undetermined way. If we approach a thing in order to establish facts, we take it in its concrete presence—either in the real world, the world of imagination, the world of faith, or wherever it may be. As long as we analyze an abstract meaning, we do not establish facts. A fact is a concrete presence.

This last sentence, however, is not convertible. It is possible to experience things as being present without viewing them as facts. When admiring the beauty of a thing, when being engaged in a conversation, when being in love with a person, we indeed experience a presence, but we do not establish facts. If we want to establish facts, we enter into contact with concrete things, without living together with them. The establishing of facts implies to a certain extent a setting apart. It is not the same thing to feel annoyed and to establish this annoyance as a fact. In this connection we refer to the findings of Heidegger regarding the *Als-Struktur*.[18] We always approach things in a certain attitude. We are not in the first place a "surveying eye." The human eye is situated in the world. Things exist for us in an *Als-Struktur*. Heidegger distinguishes between the "existential-hermeneutical as" and the "apophantical as";[19] the former indicates the way in which things exist for us when we are living together with them; the latter indicates them as the object of a proposition. Heidegger points out that he indicates the two extremities, between which, of course, a transition is possible. The observation, which at the same time is a setting apart, tends towards an enunciation but does not necessarily come so far. As long as we live together with things ("existential-hermeneutical as"), we do not establish facts. Something will become a fact when we abstract the "as-moment" (this is

[17] *Ibid.*, 40, 43.

[18] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1949), p. 149.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

always a meaning) from the concrete thing in such a way that we see it as an aspect of the real thing. This process culminates in the singular judgment. If we pronounce such a judgment, we abstract a meaning from the concrete thing and attach it again. Something is considered as a fact in the full sense of the word when we seize it as an "apophantical as." Therefore, two elements are essential: abstraction and conjunction. The fact supposes both our analyzing and our synthesizing attitude. It is obvious that the meaning exists for us before it is made the predicate of a judgment and therefore before it formally is a fact. It exists in our experience, but this experience is not yet the establishing of facts.

The establishing of facts is always realized according to the following scheme. It is a fact that a concrete thing exists or that it exists in this way or another. In both cases a meaning (either the existence or a manner of existence) is taken from the concrete thing and attributed to it. With this scheme as a basis, we arrive at the important conclusion that it is impossible to establish facts without having notions. The "as-element" of concrete experience is taken from the concrete thing. What does this mean but an elementary abstraction, the establishing of notions? Here we agree with Bevan's way of thinking: it is impossible to establish facts without establishing notions. Both things go hand in hand without one being prior to the other. We cannot possibly put aside all notions and purely accept facts, as some scientists want to do. The establishing of facts implies the establishing of notions. If our notions are poor, our knowledge of facts is poor too. If our notions are defective, this will have its repercussion in our establishing of facts, as becomes evident in the reading of Merleau-Ponty's works. Merleau-Ponty has not organized new psychological experiments personally. He takes other people's experiments as a basis for discovering new facts which had remained concealed from other psychologists. How is this possible? Because Merleau-Ponty approaches the same experiments with new, richer concepts. This enables him to put new questions; therefore the old experiment gives him a new answer.

It would be wrong to think that by attaching a function to the concept when we establish facts we want to reduce the latter to a mere speculation. On the contrary, if we establish facts, we approach con-

crete things, but in conceptions. The establishing of facts is the meeting point of abstraction and contact with concrete things, of conception and reality. If we are working with notions, there are two alternatives: either we see the notion as a qualification of a thing, in which case we establish a fact; or we analyze the notion itself, in which case we enter the field of abstract speculation.

Does the same apply if we establish the simple fact of a thing's existence? If, for example, we say that Peter is there or that God exists? Yes. There is a difference, too, between being aware of a person's presence and establishing this presence as a fact. The latter implies a notion of existence, as becomes evident if we remember that a realist and an idealist differ in their opinion about the value of existence. This difference is closely bound up with the difference of their notion of existence.

It is deceiving, therefore, to eliminate the question of the value of our notions by making an appeal to the facts, the value of our establishing facts being indissolubly linked with the value of our notions. We can dismiss the problem of the value of our notions, but in doing so we leave obscure the value of our establishing of facts. It would be interesting to examine how the relative value of the old-time psychological schools corresponds to the inadequate character of their notions. We sometimes wonder how they could be blind to certain facts. It was quite impossible for them, however, to establish certain facts because their conceptions were insufficient. The fact that psychologists became receptive to new facts is connected with an enrichment of their conceptions. We cannot say that the one thing occasions the other; both go hand in hand and constitute a dialectical unity, a unity of mutual implication. We approach here two aspects of one and the same phenomenon.

The above clearly shows once again the correspondence between philosophy and psychology, or between philosophy and science. Philosophy looks to our conceptions in order to determine their value. Philosophy, consequently, determines the value of our establishing facts.

III. The Ambiguity of the Fact

The above analysis of the fact is far from complete and leaves untouched many questions, which exceed the scope of an article. It will do, however, to establish that in many respects the fact is ambiguous. In the first place, each establishing of a fact is both absolute and

relative, and these two imply each other. We saw already that when establishing a fact we note that something exists or that it exists in this way or that. We can easily reduce these two to one. If we note that something exists in this way, we have indeed in view a way of being, but we approach it in its concrete presence. Each establishing of a fact, therefore, has in view something present, either a presence as such (the existence) or a qualified presence. In this respect the fact is absolute. In case we establish a fact, we note a presence, which holds good for everybody and which calls for everybody's admission. This holds not only for a presence in the real world but also for a presence in the world of imagination. If I tell somebody that I see a head in the flames, I ask him to recognize this "being-so" in my imaginary world. Each establishing of a fact has an absolute meaning, within the sphere of existence of the fact. As long as this absolute meaning is nonexistent, there is no question of facts.

On the other hand, however, when establishing facts, we make use of notions. These notions are necessarily human ones; they are even *my* notions. I cannot abandon my notions in order to compare them with the things noted.

Here we are confronted with a first ambiguity of the fact. Each establishing of a fact has an absolute meaning because I note a presence. At the same time, however, each establishing of a fact is relative inasmuch as I view this presence in human notions, in my own notions. Each establishing of a fact has a universal meaning, since it is a grip on a *real presence*; and still it is particular, because I seize it in my notions. There is an absolute intention in relative notions. If, for example, we should think away one of these two moments, we think away the fact itself; if we think away one of the two moments, we violate the other. When conceiving a fact, we have a grip on a *presence;* if we deny it, we deny the proper intention of our conception. If, on the other hand, we overlook our *conception*, we deny the medium, our grip, by which we realize the intention. Both the absolute moment and the relative moment are undeniable, but nevertheless they permeate and make each other indeterminate. We can understand the absolute character of the fact only in the light of the relative conception, and vice versa. The absolute and the relative character, the universal and the particular character, the everlasting

value of facts and the historical value of our notions permeate each other. We find here ambiguity in the fullest sense of the word. It would be very useful to examine how this ambiguity plays an important part in the various theories about scientific knowledge. Here the absolute moment, there the moment of relativity is emphasized too much. We must recognize both moments, however, in their mutual relationship and interdetermination. It is very dangerous to describe one of the two moments without taking into account the other one, for in that case we can no longer understand it in its proper character.

It is the business of existential phenomenology to throw a strong light upon the moment of relativity, but this involves a great danger. According to Merleau-Ponty, metaphysics dies if it is brought into contact with the absolute being.[20] Indeed, metaphysics, any human science, would be unimaginable if, to speak in Merleau-Ponty's terms, we should not be at a distance from their objects, if we should not approach them by means of relative notions, by means of our creative word (*parole parlante*). On the other hand, however, our notions are meaningless unless they are notions of something; the creative word should have an object. We could equally well say, therefore, that our notions, our words, shrivel up if we deny the absolute character of our establishing facts. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, the philosophy of ambiguity, recognizes insufficiently this fundamental ambiguity.

This interpenetration of the absolute and the relative character of our knowledge is felt by everybody in his conversation with other people. If the absolute moment should be nonexistent, we would not communicate our views to other people; if our knowledge should not be relative, we would not be interested in their opinion. Only those who experience both moments in a well-balanced way can be good conversation partners. A phenomenology of human conversation should not lose sight of these points of view.

There is still another ambiguous character which is inherent in the fact, more particularly in the psychical fact. We saw already that only if we retire from coexistence with things can we establish facts. For this reason, facts are nonexistent for animals, which, so to speak, cling to things without any distance. It goes without saying that the way in which we coexist with things implies already the possibility of withdrawing. Therefore out attitude towards things differs from the

[20]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Sens et non-sens* (Paris : Nagel, 1948), p. 191.

way in which animals stand towards them. It is not our intention, though, to go further into these problems. In any case, our establishing of facts supposes our coexistence with things. Therefore the world of facts is not our most original world but is an expression of it, and each expression necessarily is of a partial nature. If we establish a fact, we abstract a meaning from a totality. It goes without saying that the meaning can only be understood in the light of this totality. The meaning of one and the same fact is dependent on this context. Two boys feel annoyed during a lesson: the one, because his intelligence is insufficient to get through the subject being taught; the other, because the pace at which the lesson is given does not match his intelligence. One single fact is insignificant. It has to be seen in the light of other facts and finally in the light of the totality of meaning expressed in the different facts. Therefore the meaning of a fact is not fully independent. The facts mutually determine one another and can only be understood in their interdependency. Here we are confronted with a new ambiguity. The facts which apply to one and the same totality do not have an independent meaning. Each new fact which is established alters the meaning of the facts which were already known. The proper truth of the facts lies in the commingling of all of them.

We noted already that the world of facts is not our most original world. We approach a thing, a person, as a totality of meaning prior to expressing this totality in a multitude of facts. Could we not retire, therefore, to the original totality in order to judge the facts from that angle? Not at all. Neither here nor elsewhere is expression merely a disclosure of things which were already existent to us. In the expression something comes into existence in a new way. The expression originates a new form of truth. The light of original experience and its expression are not equivalent, and therefore we cannot abandon all facts and retire to the original totality of meaning because the latter only becomes clear in the establishing of facts. On the one hand we cannot overloop the expression; on the other hand, however, the expression should not be looked upon as the most original source of light. We solve this problem by looking upon the fact as just a partial expression of a preceding meaning-totality. This implies, however, a recognition of the ambiguity of the fact and involves our

recognizing the interdetermination of the different facts and our accepting the coherence of all of them. We have to admit that the sense of an "established" fact can undergo a change by facts still to be discovered. So we hardly can call a fact definitely established.

There is still another ambiguity, which more in particular refers to the psychical fact. We saw already that when establishing a fact we have in mind a real presence, but what is the meaning of "presence" in the field of the human psyche? One of the basic principles of Sartre is that man never is what he is and that he is what he is not. For man is at a distance from himself. He is always ahead of himself. Merleau-Ponty is of the same opinion when he characterizes man as always transcending himself (*mouvement de transcendance*). We think this is not entirely true. Indeed, our life is always a being-on-the-way to meaning, but isn't it also a being-in-meaning? In our moving towards a future we exist, and in our existing we move towards a future. In any case, it is evident that in the field of the human psyche "presence" is ambiguous, and this ambiguity penetrates into any psychical fact.

We have established that the fact is ambiguous in a triple way. It would be possible to indicate additional forms of ambiguity, but the foregoing clearly shows that the fact is ambiguous.

Conclusion

It will be clear from the above that scientism—that is, the implicit philosophy which, during a certain period, dominated the way of thinking of scientists and which is still existent in some quarters—is untenable. Scientism looks upon the fact as the most original datum and the only sufficient basis for science. According to scientism, philosophic speculation is made superfluous by an appeal to the facts. Scientism explicitly rejects all forms of philosophical thinking, but in spite of this it is a philosophy in itself; namely, a very simplistic philosophy about the fact and about our knowledge thereof. After closer reflection upon the fact, it has become evident to us that the establishing of facts implies the use of notions and that the world of facts supposes a more original world; namely, the world of concrete experience. As a consequence thereof we must admit that metaphysics and phenomenology have indeed reason to exist, and even more than

that. The sense of our knowledge of facts is demonstrated only in a metaphysical and phenomenological reflection.

Metaphysical reflection contributes to our penetrating into the meaning of the fact. We saw that each establishing of a fact views a presence, either the mere existence or a qualified presence. The absolute value of the fact is closely bound up with this. Metaphysics is a reflection upon the presence and our knowledge of it. It is up to metaphysics, therefore, to unfold the deepest value of our knowledge of facts. This is shown in Bevan's essay mentioned earlier in this article. He looks upon our notions as purely pragmatic work schedules. This is a philosophical view, not a scientific one. Both the recognition of metaphysics and the negation of it represent a metaphysical judgment. Consequently, psychology and science in general are really underestimated by Bevan because, according to him, they do not indicate the way to penetrate into the very nature of reality but only constitute a means to predict what will happen. It is necessary, therefore, to reflect upon the value of our notions in order to discover the real value of science. It goes without saying that we can leave these questions unanswered, but in that case we leave out of consideration the value of science.

Is it true that philosophical reflection upon the nature, the function, the value of our notions is of any importance for the intrinsic development of science? One might think that philosophical reflection is necessary to judge the over-all value of the sciences but does not contribute to their intrinsic development. It is doubtful, however, whether this opinion is right. We saw that the enrichment of our world of notions makes us receptive to facts. If the establishing of facts depends on our notions, the enrichment of notional knowledge and the greater openness for facts will go hand in hand. In our opinion Bevan has clearly proved this. It is obvious, therefore, that philosophical reflection upon the notions of a science is important for its intrinsic development.

We think we may conclude from the above that, for the development of science, phenomenology is of prime importance and that we cannot reject it by making an appeal on the facts. The world of facts is an expression of the world in which we exist. Phenomenology is aware of this and wants to see the facts in the light of the original meaning-

totality. This is not only useful but absolutely necessary, in particular in psychology. It is of great and decisive value to see facts as an expression of an original world, even if this world only becomes clear to us in the expression, even if we cannot neglect each form of expression and withdraw to the original world. Phenomenology made us more conscious of the ambiguous character of the fact.

Donald Gelpi, S.J.

THE PLOTINIAN *LOGOS* DOCTRINE

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Let us, then, explain once again what logos *is and why it is reasonable for it to be such. This, then, is* logos*—the attempt should be made, if perhaps we might hit on it . . .*— Enneads, III, 2, 16, 10-13.

The philosophical problem of the *logos* as a cosmological force in Plotinus is enough to discourage even a scholar of robust constitution. To begin with, treatments of the problem are limited to a few magazine and journal articles and chance references in studies of other related problems in philosophy. These meager secondary sources seem to be incapable of deciding upon a consistent definition of *logos* as a cosmological principle.[1] Moreover, the texts of Plotinus only increase the confusion. Apparently Plotinus himself had difficulty in explaining the meaning of his *logos* doctrine to his own disciples, with whom he had personal contact.[2] That this is so is not surprising, for as one proceeds through the pertinent texts, the word *logos* shifts meanings with the dexterity of a Proteus. Even when the word is used in the sense of a cosmological *logos*, one finds to one's dismay that there is not one *logos* only but a multiplicity of *logoi* of different sorts. One meets with a universal *logos*,[3] particular *logoi*,[4] seminal *logoi*,[5] and *logoi synthetoi*.[6]

Any intelligent approach to the problem of *logos* as a cosmological principle in Plotinus must determine with accuracy the nature and function of these various *logoi* as well as their relation to the hypostases of the Plotinian universe. This is the double problem which we propose to solve in this article. As we proceed, the reader will, I believe, become more and more aware of the fact that the doctrine of *logos* is key in understanding Plotinus's universe and in coming to grips with the central problems of his metaphysic.

When one steps from a Christian world into the emanationist universe of Plotinus, one experiences the same bewilderment that Alice felt when she stepped through the looking glass.

The first principle of the Plotinian universe, the One, unlike the Christian God, possesses a chilly transcendence and shares no perfections in common with the universe which flows from it.[7] The *Nous*,

[1]W. R. Inge's definition suffers from a certain imprecision. He defines the cosmological *logos* as "that which, proceeding from Spirit, either directly or through the medium of the World Soul, and identical in its nature with Soul, conveys the energy of Spirit and Soul into Matter" (*The Philosophy of Plotinus* [2 vols. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929], I, 125). This definition states inaccurately the relation of *logos* and the World Soul and is inapplicable to *logos* as found in *Nous*; cf. *Enn.*, V. 9, 3. On the other hand, H. Leisgang regards the *logos* as the binding force between the One, the *Nous*, and Soul; cf. "Logos," *Real-Encyclopädie*, ed. A. F. von Pauly, Vol. XIII (1927), cols. 1059-61. M. Heinze looks upon the *logos* as the source of universal harmony; cf. *Die Lehre vom Logos in der grieschen Philosophie* (Oldenburg: F. Schmidt, 1872), pp. 326-27. He regards the Plotinian *logos* doctrine, however, as a mere repetition of earlier Stoic teachings (*ibid.*, p. 329). This conciliatory function of the *logos* is also noted by B. A. G. Fuller; cf. *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1912), p. 210. J. Guitton presents a definition which is accurate as far as it goes but limited in its viewpoint and incomplete: "Dans l'univers de Plotin le logos va prendre encore une signification nouvelle: il illustre surtout, croyons-nous, la loi qui oblige tout être passe de l'éternel au temps à s'invertir" (*Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin* [Paris: Boivin & Co., 1933], p. 47). R. E. Witt defines *logos* thus: "Logos for Plotinus is a spiritual activity due both as created and as creator to the desire for contemplation" ("The Plotinian Logos and Its Stoic Basis," *Classical Quarterly*, XXV [1931], 103). This definition apart from the unfortunate words "created" and "creator" misreads the Greek word *energeia* to mean "activity"; see *infra*, n. 57. P. V. Pistorius, in spite of *Enn.*, II, 3, 17, defines *logos* as an "immanent concept"; cf. *Plotinus and Neo-Platonism* (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1952), pp. 70-71. A. H. Armstrong suggests that *logos* is a "formative force proceeding from a higher principle which expresses and represents that principle on a lower plane of being" (*Plotinus* [London: Allen & Unwin, 1953], p. 35). These definitions are all either too limited in their point of view and hence distort the true meaning of *logos*, or they incorrectly assume that when Plotinus uses the words "*logos* of matter" and "*logos* of the One or of *Nous*" he uses the word *logos* univocally. Another tendency of these writers is to extend the term "seminal *logos*" beyond its natural bounds.

[2]Cf. *Enn.*, III, 2, 16, 10-13.

[3]Cf. *ibid.*, 3, 1, 1-4.

[4]*Ibid.*, 4-8.

[5]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 1, 8-14.

[6]Cf. *ibid.*, II, 4, 3, 5-9.

[7]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 2, 1, 1-11.

[8]Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 12.

[9]Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 3, 12, 1-8; IV, 3, 18.

[10]Cf. *ibid.*, II, 9, 7; 2, 3, 1-6; IV, 3, 9.

[11]Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 2, 22.

[12]Cf. *ibid.*, III, 9, 3; VI, 4, 16.

[13]Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 3, 5; I, 8, 7 and 14.

[14]Cf. *ibid.*, III, 3, 18; 4, 2.

[15]Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 15, 20-22; IV, 7, 3, 26-32; III, 1, 3, 1-6.

[16]*Ibid.*, VI, 4, 11, 15-17.

[17]Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 4, 35, 8-14.

the second hypostasis of Plotinus, is the eternal exemplar of a fluctuating, temporal world of sensation.[8] The third and most complex hypostasis, the Soul, possesses three "levels."

At its highest "level," Soul remains in the *Nous* and shares in the higher unity of the *Nous*.[9] Its second "level," the World-Soul, contains, governs, as well as transcends, the sensible universe. As the life principle of the sense world, the World-Soul contains all the perfections of the sensible universe and draws them into a single vital unity.[10] The third "level" of Soul, particular Soul, participates in the divine Soul in the *Nous*[11] but is the most scattered manifestation of Soul. It is Soul dividing itself in order to impart itself to the images of particular sensible things.[12] At their lowest levels of sensation and vegetation, particular Souls become enmeshed in and corrupted by matter. Matter terminates the Plotinian emanation and vitiates any form which attempts to fill its emptiness.[13] The sensible universe results from the mixture of Soul and matter.[14]

Within this world of waning perfection, the universal *logos* has a specific function to perform.

The Universal *Logos*

Because it is a principle of extreme diversity, the universal *logos* is a principle of the sensible universe and is bound to the lower realms of being.[15] The job which the universal *logos* must perform within this universe of diverse sensible perfections is extremely complex. In the earliest texts, we find the universal *logos* conceived as a principle of unification and reconciliation of the multiplicity of perfection found in the sensible universe. This notion is never retracted by Plotinus. "The diversity [of the universe] is indeed simple, and everything is one, for there is a *logos* which is both one and many, and everything that exists is one."[16] This task of reconciliation and unification the universal *logos* accomplishes by subsuming the diversity and multiplicity of the sense world into a single universal life process. Hence, as a result of the activity of the universal *logos*, the sensible universe is in fact a single living being.[17]

More concretely, the task of the universal *logos* involves the following points. The unifying activity of the universal *logos* establishes a

hierarchy among the beings of the universe by organizing particular Souls according to a predetermined pattern and by directing the generation and corruption of particular beings within the sensible universe through the timely insertion and withdrawal of particular Souls within the sense order.[18]

In addition, the universal *logos* assumes under its jurisdiction whatever in the sense universe could not be ascribed to the activity of particular and seminal *logoi*.

[18]Cf. *ibid.*, 3, 8, 16-22; also *ibid.*, 10, 38-42. Here Plotinus speaks of the World-Soul as supplying the *logos* of life to material things, which in turn supplies them with the forms whose *logoi* it has. See also *ibid.*, 12, 12-19; V, 7, 3, 14-19.

[19]*Ibid.*, IV, 4, 39, 1-13.

[20]Cf. *ibid.*, III, 1, 8, 1-7.

[21]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 10, 1-6.

[22]Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 9, 3, 17-18.

[23]In the text quoted, Plotinus in fact cites three sources of frustration of the activity of the seminal *logoi*: (1) "things" which take place in opposition to the seminal *logoi*; (2) "things" which proceed from matter; and (3) the actions and passions of the universe.

Opposition to the seminal logoi: In *Nous*, the perfections of the universe are contained in a primal unity. Hence, in *Nous* there is no possibility of the opposition of one perfection to another. Opposition is therefore restricted to the lower levels of being, where perfections are scattered and multiplied. This scattering of the perfections of *Nous* is in some sense the work of the universal *logos*; cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 16, 28-57; VI, 7, 15, 20-22; VI, 7, 12; III, 2, 16, 41-47.

"Things" which proceed from matter: Logos produces the physical body by its approach to matter; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 2, 21-25. Of itself matter is formless and indeterminate; cf. *ibid.*, II, 4, 4, 17-20. *Logos*, then, is related to matter as a formative and illuminative principle; *logos*, however, is dimmed by an admixture with the darkness of matter; cf. *ibid.*, 5, 6-12. Although matter is intractable to their formative influence, matter is the true receptacle of form and of *logos*; cf. *ibid.*, I, 6, 2, 13-28. The result of this recalcitrance on the part of matter to the influence of *logos* is the presence of privation in the subject and of that which is contrary to nature; cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 10, 1-6.

Action and passion: Action and passion are either natural or artificial; natural action implies the action of the whole upon the part or of the part upon the part. Artificial action and passion result in the production of some artefact, as, for instance, when an artist acts upon the bronze to produce a statue. Natural action and passion take place within the normal processes of nature and involve the passage of influence from the universal life principle to some part of the universe; for example, the universe acting upon its parts to dispose them according to the universal order. Action and passion between particular things, says Plotinus, are a matter of our daily experience; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 4, 3, 1-15.

Action and passion especially in this last sense demand some higher ordering principle; for *even when indulging in their own proper activities*, the individual things in the universe of our experience frequently frustrate the natural drive of the *logoi* within them from attaining the object of those *logoi*; cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 5, 9-15; IV, 4, 33, 1-11. Since, however, a principle of growth cannot contain within itself the explanation of the frustration of its own proper activity, this frustration must be accounted for at a higher level of activity than that of the particular *logoi*; hence, both the particular *logoi* together with their activities and their privations must be reduced to some universal and overriding *logos*.

> Events in the universe do not take place according to seminal *logoi*, but according to *logoi* which are more comprehensive and which belong to things which are prior to what is proper to the *logoi* of the seeds; for in the seminal *logoi* there is nothing of those things which take place in opposition to the seminal *logoi* themselves nor of those things which proceed from matter which work together for the good of the whole nor of those things which are done to one another by the things which come to be. But the *logos* of the universe is more like a reason [*logos*] which puts order and law into a city, because it knows what the citizens will do and why they do it and so makes laws for all these exigencies and weaves together in its laws all their passions and deeds including what is honorable in those deeds as well as what is dishonorable, with everything by a kind of automatic process proceeding to a harmony.[19]

The particular beings of the sensible universe take their origin in seeds.[20] Each seed, however, contains *logoi* within it which are of their nature disposed to bring the seed to full and mature growth.[21] Thus, in every seed, there is a complex of powers gathered into a unity.[22]

These powers, however, are not unlimited in their efficacy. Often enough in guiding the progress of the seed, the *logos* will encounter an opposing force which it is too weak to overcome. The result is the mutilation of the perfection which the *logos* was seeking to produce. This thwarting of the activity of the seminal *logos* results in phenomena such as lameness.[23]

From this it is clear to Plotinus that if the universe is not to be reduced to a primal chaos, there must be an overriding *logos* whose function is the reconciliation of the frustrations of these seminal *logoi* into some sort of predetermined order and pattern.

The example of a lawmaker which Plotinus employs here is enlightening, for it reveals the function of the universal *logos* as being essentially one of compromise. The good lawmaker does not govern his city in the abstract, says Plotinus, but seeks rather to achieve a proper balance and proportion between the bad and good elements of the commonwealth in order to achieve the ultimate good of the city

as a whole. So too the universal *logos*, by embracing in itself both subsidiary *logoi* and those evils which fall outside the jurisdiction of these subsidiary *logoi*, achieves from out of this general mélange a balanced proportion of the elements that work ultimately for the good of the universe.

The transferal of the activity of the particular *logoi* "to another sequence and to another order,"[24] that of the universal *logos*, in no way impairs the autonomous activity of these lesser *logoi*. Plotinus does not wish to say that the universal *logos* by its own power produces the effects which we ascribe to particular *logoi*. Such a doctrine would, in effect, deny the necessity of the existence of particular *logoi*.

Nevertheless, if both particular *logoi* and the universal *logos* are simultaneously active in the generation and corruption of everything in the sensible universe, some method must be discovered to ensure the autonomous activity of each of these *logoi*. Plotinus gives his solution to this problem in a passage of the sixth *Ennead*.[25]

In this text, the problem of protecting the autonomy of both the universal *logos* and the particular *logoi* is solved by carefully circumscribing the activity of these different *logoi* within the sense world. The activity of the universal *logos* is limited to providing an incomplete schematization to matter which must be filled in ultimately by the proper activity of the particular *logoi*. Hence, the universal *logos* cannot be correctly said to bring sensible things into being. This, strictly speaking, is the function of the particular *logoi*. Rather, the universal *logos* embraces all things and is present to them without directly causing them.[26]

The ultimate noetic basis for positing the existence of a universal

[24]Cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 5, 9-15.

[25]*Ibid.*, VI, 7, 7, 8-16; particular *logoi* are significantly referred to in this text as "psychic powers" and "particular Souls." See also *ibid.*, III, 2, 17, 1-41; 54-67; 74-83.

[26]Cf. *ibid.*, III, 3, 1, 1-4; 5, 46-54.

[27]The "someone" is Epicurus. See *Plotini Enneades (I-III)*, ed. Henry and Schwyzer (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1951), I, 274.

[28]*Enn.*, III, 2, 4, 26-33.

[29]Cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 16, 28-57.

[30]Noncausal in the sense that the universal *logos* in no way compromises the autonomy of the particular *logoi*, even though the particular *logoi* flow from the universal *logos* and are part of it; cf. *ibid.*, 41-57.

[31]"And the powers of the seeds furnish us with a comparison of what we are talking about: for in the whole seed everything is present in a state of indivision, and the *logoi* are, so to speak, at a single center; and there is a *logos* for the eye, and one for the hands, each of the *logoi* being recognized as distinct through the sensible part which comes to be because of it. Now, each of the powers in the seeds is a single, complete *logos* together with the parts of the sensible being which are contained in

logos is the Plotinian axiom of the priority of order over disorder and of intelligibility over unintelligibility.

> Order does not exist by reason of disorder, nor does regularity exist by reason of irregularity, as someone [27] has thought. This would result in higher things coming to be by reason of lower things and in higher things coming to be in such a way as to be seen. Rather order comes to be through the introduction of order; because there is order, because there is regularity and *logos*, disorder exists; because there is *logos* there is irregularity and unintelligibility, not that the nobler things have caused the deficiencies of those less noble; but rather those things which aspire to receive higher perfections are impotent to receive them either by their nature or by reason of circumstance or because of the hindrance of others.[28]

Thus, the primacy of perfection over imperfection necessarily demands the corresponding primacy of order and *logos* over disorder.

Because the universal *logos* is the *logos* of the entire universe it is a step closer to the primal unity from which all multiplicity flows than are the particular *logoi*. By containing them within itself, the universal *logos* subsumes them into its higher unity. But its link with multiplicity remains strong—so strong, in fact, that the universal *logos* is a perfect *logos* when it pushes multiplicity to such an extreme that contradictory beings result from it. In this sense, the universal *logos* is the origin of strife and conflict within the universe; but by containing within its higher unity the conflict of opposites it is able to reconcile this conflict into a harmony.[29]

The function of the universal *logos*, then, may be summarized as this: to blend by a non-causal [30] presence the diverse and conflicting elements of the sensible universe into the harmonious life-process of the unique animal which is the universe.

Particular *Logoi* : Seminal *Logoi*

The seminal *logoi* are powers of that part of Soul which are operative in the seed of a corporeal being and which guide that being in its proper development. As such, they are formative [31] (*eidos*) with regard

to what is corporeal and must mediate form from the intellectual realm to the realm of sense.[32] Present in the seed before development, they contain in a state of indivision those perfections, like eyes or hands, which will later separate into the various parts of the body. The

the *logos*. The *logos* has something corporeal as its matter—for example, that which is liquid—but it itself is altogether form (*eidos*), the *logos* being proper to the sort of Soul which is generative; and that Soul is itself an image of another more powerful Soul. Some call this Soul in the seeds nature, which arises from above, from forces anterior to it, like light from a fire, and has changed and informed matter, without being compelled mechanically nor by employing the famous levers but by imparting *logoi*" (*ibid.*, V, 9, 6, 10-24).

One should be wary of taking *eidos* in too literal a sense, since neither *eidos* nor *hyle* are being used here in a strictly literal sense but only to establish a proper dichotomy between that which is formed and that which is formative. The diversification of sensible perfections caused by the *logoi* is also due in part to matter. The "more powerful Soul" of which particular Souls are "images" is, of course, the universal Soul from which particular Souls proceed; cf. *ibid.*, II, 9, 7.

[32]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 10, 1-6.

[33]For parallel references to the seminal *logoi*, see *ibid.*, IV, 9, 3, 17-18; II, 6, 1, 7-12; IV, 3, 10, 10-13; III, 7, 11, 20-35.

[34]*Ibid.*, II, 4, 3, 5-9.

[35]The term "nature" is applied to the seminal *logoi* in their formation of a portion of a corporeal being; cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 6, 10-24. The term, however, is also broadened in other texts to include the World-Soul; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 4, 11.

[36]In the passage immediately preceding this text Plotinus had been discussing our attitude toward the indetermination we find in things. Indetermination, he says, is not to be held in low esteem if it is such as we find in the Soul; for Soul is conceptually indeterminate with regard to its prior hypostasis. Soul, however, presents itself willingly as an apt receptacle of the determination of *Nous*; cf. *ibid.*, II, 4, 3, 1-5. For Soul proceeds from *Nous* in a state of indetermination and becomes determined and full only by looking back upon *Nous* and contemplating it; cf. *ibid.*, V, 2, 1. We are able, then, to distinguish conceptually something in Soul which corresponds to matter and to form; cf. *ibid.*, 9, 3, 11-37; II, 9, 5. Soul is an intelligible composite. Since, however, the composite elements of Soul are only conceptually separable, Soul is less composite than the composites in the sensible order. In the text we are discussing, Plotinus introduces the composite *logoi* as a contrast to the intelligible composites like Soul; for the composite *logoi* make nature to be something actually composite, inasmuch as bodies result from the entrance of a *logos* into matter, although the *logos* which enters matter is itself distinct from matter; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 2, 21-25; V, 9, 3, 1-6. For an excellent and most scholarly treatment of this and related problems in Plotinian metaphysics, see Leo Sweeney, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII (1957), 531-35.

[37]Cf. *Enn.*, III, 8, 2, 22-34.

[38]Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 2, 21-25; see also *ibid.*, II, 7, 3, 7-15; III, 3, 1, 1-8.

[39]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 7, 1, 7-17; see also *ibid.*, 2, 17-20. In commenting on this tractate, Brehier correctly remarks that Plotinus wishes to point out in his argument that the Stoic difficulties with his doctrine of individuality come from a misunderstanding of the nature of *logos*. The *logos* which produces one individual does not exclude from the particular Soul all the other *logoi* which are present in every other individual. It merely predominates over those other *logoi*. See Plotinus, *Enneads*, ed. and trans. E. Brehier (7 vols. Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1938), V, 121. See also *Enn.*, VI, 7, 6, 21-23; VI, 7, 7, 1-31; V, 7, 3, 14-19.

[40]*Ibid.*, III, 8, 2, 23-24.

powers (*logoi*) are themselves all concentrated, as it were, at a single central point within the seed, from which point the diverse perfections which they produce will proceed.[33]

Particular *Logoi* : *Logoi Synthetoi*

There is only one clear reference to *logos synthetos* in the *Enneads*.

> Among the intelligibles, composites are different and not like corporeals, since there are *logoi* which are composite (*synthetoi*) and these make nature, which is striving toward form, to be actually composite.[34]

In this text, since the *logoi* of the sense world of becoming are referred to in the plural, they are certainly particular *logoi*, not the universal *logos* considered under some special aspect. Nevertheless, a careful reading of this text will reveal that the *logos synthetos*, or composite *logos*, is assigned no special function in the produciton of the corporeal being. Instead, the *logos* is denominated *synthetos*, or composite, because it enters into composition with something distinct from itself—namely, matter—with the result that nature, the sense world under the vitalizing influence of Soul,[35] here represented as being in a constant state of becoming because it is "striving toward form," becomes actually composite.[36]

Particular *Logoi*

In addition to seminal *logoi* and composite *logoi*, Plotinus speaks of several distinct types of particular *logoi*. There is a *logos* of life in each particular living being, which in turn gives rise to lower *logoi* whose function it is to produce a sensible form within the being.[37] Then there is a *logos* of corporeity, which constitutes a body as either an element or a compound.[38] Finally, there are individual *logoi* which correspond numerically to each particular existent which comes to be.[39]

The *logos* of life is endowed with a twofold function. It is the vivifying principle of the particular plant or animal; it is also the source of the lower *logoi* of sensible form. These *logoi* of sensible form, because they are "inert" (that is, unproductive of a subsequent *logos*), are also "final" (that is, the last of the series of emanating *logoi*).[40]

The *logos* of corporeity has as its specific function the constitution

of an element or of a compound.[41] The *logoi* of a compound body employ the elements as their matter, inasmuch as the elements with their *logoi* cannot account for the complex organization of a compound.[42]

The individual *logoi* are never conceived by Plotinus as producing individuality as such. Instead, the philosopher merely insists that since one and the same thing cannot possibly be reduplicated within the same world cycle, it is necessary to have a numerically and specifically different *logos* for every individual thing that comes to be. To speak, then, of individual *logoi* tells one much about the numerical correspondence of a given *logos* with a given sensible effect; it reveals nothing about the function of the individual *logos* within the existent. "Individual *logos*" becomes, therefore, a blanket term not unlike *logos synthetos*, inasmuch as it designates the particular *logos* by some accidental property extrinsic to its nature.[43]

[41]Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 2, 21-25.

[42]Cf. *ibid.*, 5, 1-7; V, 9, 6, 10-24.

[43]See *supra*, n. 39.

[44]There are three reasons for including the seminal *logoi* exclusively under the *logos* of corporeal compounds. (1) Whenever the seminal *logos* appears in Plotinus, it is referred to as forming a portion of a compound being. There is never a question of the seminal *logoi* constituting the elements; cf. *Enn.*, VI, 7, 14, 3-18; V, 9, 10, 1-6; 3, 9-18. (2) The seminal *logoi* are formative only after the *logoi* of the elements have been imparted to matter; cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 3, 24-30. (3) A *logos* of an element can contain no subordinate *logoi*, because an element, being simple, permits only a single *logos* for its perfect constitution; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 5, 2-7.

[45]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 7, 3, 14-19; see also *ibid.*, IV, 3, 12, 12-19; III, 6, 16, 29-30; 17, 15-26; IV, 3, 9, 48-51.

[46]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 7, 1, 7-17; 2, 17-20.

[47]In *ibid.*, 8, 3, 1-10, Plotinus appears to say that *logos* cannot be predicated of the *Nous* at all. The best interpretation of this difficult text is, we suggest, the following one. (1) The *logos* "in nature" referred to in the text is *logos* as found in Soul. (2) The *logos* "more beautiful than the *logos* in nature" is *logos* which is in *Nous* and identical with the *Nous*; cf. *ibid.*, II, 7, 3, 7-15. (3) The *logos* prior to Soul, which Soul comprehends and which is "not yet innate nor in something distinct from itself, but which is in itself" and hence is "not even a *logos*, but the maker of the first *logos* of the beauty which is in besouled matter" is the One. For the One can be called *logos* only in the same equivocal sense in which it is said to be all things; namely, that it is the equivocal cause of all things. Cf. *ibid.*, V, 1, 7, 21-26; V, 6, 4, 8-15; V, 2, 1, 1-12; 9, 1-17; VI, 8, 15, 30-38. That the One can be said to be "in itself" is clear from *ibid.*, VI, 9, 3, 49-51; the phrase "in itself" merely implies transcendence. (4) The "first *logos*" produced by the One is the *Nous*, the eternal pattern of the *logoi* of Soul. (5) The pronoun *autos* in line ten of the Greek text refers, not to the One, which is the "maker" of the "first *logos*," but to the "first *logos*" itself, which is eternal *Nous*. (6) *Logos* as in the *Nous* is said to be "innate"; *logos* as in Soul is said to be "in something distinct from itself." For *logos* is innate in *Nous*, since its prior principle is not *logos* but only the equivocal cause of *logos*, whereas *logos* in the Soul is clearly in something distinct from itself; namely, in sensible matter.

Moreover, since corporeity, whether simple or composite, belongs to the realm of the sensible, one can include the *logos* of corporeity under the *logoi* of sensible form.

Hence, the particular *logoi* can be reduced to two general categories. They are either *logoi* of life or *logoi* of sensible form, for the seminal *logoi*, being powers ordered to the production of some part of the particular living thing, are clearly *logoi* of sensible form included in the *logos* of a compound as a subordinate power. Moreover, as we have seen, the *logos synthetos* is not a distinct type of *logos* at all but merely those *logoi* which are found in matter. As such, the *logos synthetos* is simply identifiable with the *logos* of corporeity and with the seminal *logoi*. Since we shall later suggest that the *logos* of life is identical with particular Soul, the following diagram will show the interrelation of the different types of particular *logoi*.

Logoi Synthetoi or *Logoi* of Sensible Form

logos of life (particular Soul) { *logos* of corporeal elements; *logos* of corporeal compounds—seminal *logoi*[44] }

We have already indicated the primary function of each type of particular *logos*. In addition to these primary functions, the particular *logoi* possess many secondary ones. Since the particular *logoi* supply the sensible forms to a corporeal being, the particular *logoi* are also responsible for the evolution and growth of the living body.[45] For this reason the particular *logos* is said to determine the size and duration of each particular thing—its size by regulating its quantitative growth, its duration by guiding the course of its life through time. The one-to-one correspondence of individual *logoi* with their sensible effects together with the limited number of the *logoi* necessitates the exact cyclic repetition of events in the sensible universe.[46]

Logos, the *Nous*, and Soul

It remains for us to determine the relationship of *logos* to the hypostases of the Plotinian universe.

The word *logos* can be predicated of the *Nous* in a dual sense.[47]

First of all, the *Nous* can be said to be a *logos* inasmuch as it contains within itself at a higher level of reality archetypal *logoi* corresponding to the *logoi* which exist at the level of Soul.[48] Secondly, the *Nous* is said to be a *logos* in the sense that it is a principle of unity-diversity analogous to the *logoi* of the Soul, since the *Nous* reconciles into a unity all the different types of *logoi* just as the *logoi* themselves reconcile into a unity the diversity of sensible perfections which they later produce.[49]

For Plotinus, however, the *Nous* is a *logos* merely analogous to the

[48]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 5, 21-26; II, 4, 5, 6-12; 3, 11, 8-14.

[49]Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 14, 4-18.

[50]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 5, 21-26; VI, 2, 21, 27-32.

[51]In *ibid.*, III, 8, 3, 1-23, Plotinus explains that *logos* is itself a contemplation as well as a product of contemplation. That this would be so seems at first a contradiction because of the incompatibility of the activity of *logos* with contemplation. The text, however, goes on to explain that the lower *logoi* are contemplations only in the sense of being products of contemplation; see also *ibid.*, II, 3, 17, 1-9; III, 8, 6, 9-27; 7. 1-22. See also Sweeney, "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII, 531-35.

[52]Cf. *Enn.*, VI, 1, 10, 15-24.

[53]The dual relationship of Soul upward to *Nous* and downward to matter is implied in *ibid.*, 9, 1-15, where *logos* is called a "causal participation in form."

[54]Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 3, 10, 38-42; 7, 2, 22-25.

[55]Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 5, 28-30; V, 9, 3, 21-34.

[56]The genetic Soul is that lower portion of Soul which produces the sensible universe. It includes both the universal Soul and particular Souls; cf. *ibid.*, I, 1, 8, 9-18. The *logoi* of the genetic Soul are not to be conceived as thoughts of the genetic Soul but as its powers. These powers are matter-bound, powers which manipulate matter. They are the product of the *Nous* which is in Soul (cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 3, 21-34); but as powers active at the level of matter they are neither intellections nor contemplative visions. The higher *logoi* in the divine Soul and in *Nous* are indirectly active in the functioning of the lower *logoi* by nourishing them and giving them the power to act; cf. *ibid.*, II, 3, 17, 1-9; 4, 5, 6-12; IV, 3, 11, 8-14; V, 9, 3, 21-24.

[57]To denominate *logos* as a power (*dynamis*) of Soul seems to contradict *ibid.*, VI, 2, 5, 10-14, where *logos* is said to be an act (*energeia*) of Soul, while Soul is a power (*dynamis*) of *logos*. *Energeia* and *dynamis* appear in Plotinus in the basic sense of act and potency, act being a determination of potency, potency being a passive capacity for determination; cf. *ibid.*, II, 1, 5, 1-2. *Dynamis*, however, can also be an active, causal power. Thus, the One can be said to be the *dynamis*, causal power of all things; cf. *ibid.*, V, 3, 15, 32-35. Hence, in *ibid.*, VI, 2, 5, 10-14, the *ousia* or being of the Soul should be regarded as the *active power* of the *logos*; that is, the power which effectively produces the *logos*. Similarly, the *logoi* are active powers of the Soul with regard to the sensible universe. Moreover, in *ibid.*, 1, 10, 15-24, we learn that *logos* cannot be said to be an active power of Soul in the sense of an accidental quality distinct from Soul. Rather the *logoi* are *energeiai*, or acts, identical with the being of Soul itself. Hence, the *logoi* are acts of Soul in the sense that they are Soul itself as entitatively constituted to produce a particular effect in the sensible universe. See also Sweeney, "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII, 531-35.

[58]See *supra*, n. 39.

[59]Cf. *Enn.*, IV, 7, 3, 13-36.

[60]Cf. *ibid.*, 3, 8, 16-22.

logoi of the Soul; for the *Nous* is a transcendent *logos* which grounds the essentially temporal and passible *logoi* of the Soul in the stability and permanence of its eternity.[50] Being the prior principle of the two, the *Nous* communicates to the Soul the *logoi* which Soul possesses, through the lesser intelligence (*nous*) which is in Soul itself. For Soul becomes filled in its being only by turning back to *Nous* and contemplating the reality in *Nous*.[51]

Logos as found in Soul is not something distinct from Soul; it is identical with Soul itself.[52] Yet it is not simply Soul but Soul under a dual aspect.[53] First of all and essentially, *logos* is Soul as matter-bound as ordered to the production of the sensible universe.[54] Here, we may distinguish three levels of *logos*. The first is the divine Soul, where the *logoi* are pure intellections and productive of no sensible effect.[55] The second is the universal *logos*, the first *logos* of the genetic Soul.[56] The third is particular logos, which is embraced in the universal *logos* and produced by it.

Secondly, in a universe of emanation, the lower *logos* cannot exist without a higher *logos* which gives rise to it. Hence, each *logos* of Soul must exist as bound to a higher *logos* which resembles the *logos* of Soul and transcends it. We should, however, emphasize once again that though they are powers (states, dispositions) of the Soul,[57] the *logoi* are indistinguishable from the being of the Soul itself, a fact which gives some insight into the unity of the third hypostasis.

A few words concerning the relation between the *logos* of life and Soul are necessary at this point. *Logos*, as we have pointed out, is a power of Soul, *identical* with Soul itself and ordered ultimately to the production of some effect in matter. Granted the existence of a *logos* of life,[58] then, this *logos* can be nothing else than Soul as disposed to give life to some particular being at some particular time and place in the evolution of the universe. Now, Soul as disposed to give life to some particular part of the universe is nothing else than particular Soul.[59]

Once this fact of Plotinian psychology is adequately grasped, certain texts concerning *logos* may be read in a new and clearer light.

It becomes clear, for instance, how the universal *logos* can be the source of order among the Souls themselves.[60] For as a result of the identity of Soul and *logos*, the universal *logos* is identifiable with the

World-Soul itself, inasmuch as the universal *logos* is simply Soul in its power to animate and govern the entire universe.[61] Moreover, if particular Soul is identical with the particular *logos* of life, then it becomes clear not only why a parallel is set up between the various levels of Soul and the different *logoi*,[62] but also how particular Souls can be regulated by the universal *logos*.[63] For the particular Souls are simply *logoi* and parts of the universal *logos* which by guiding the life of the universe causes their ascent and descent into matter.[64]

Moreover, the meaning of the assertion that the universal *logos* is a "power of the World-Soul" [65] emerges clearly, for power is here to be understood as a causal disposition identical with the very entity of the World-Soul itself.[66]

Hence, we may conclude that considered as a doctrine of the entitative constitution of Soul, Plotinus's *logos* doctrine is an attempt to salvage the integrity and unity of Soul as "a single totality," [67] entitatively disposed toward the production of a multitude of material objects. For the entitative dispositions, the powers which produce the multitude of objects, are in no way distinct from one another in the way that accidental faculties are distinct. This same notion is also transferred to the realm of *Nous*, where the *logoi* are identical with the entity of *Nous* itself.[68]

Moreover, we can understand how each Soul (that is, each *logos* of life) may be said to contain all the *logoi* of the universe; [69] for each particular Soul is nothing else than a disposition, an affection, of a single totality which comprehends within itself every perfection of the universe.

[61]Cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 16, 17-23.
[62]Cf. *ibid.*, 1, 8, 1-7.
[63]Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 3, 8, 16-22; 10, 38-42.
[64]Cf. *ibid.*, 12, 12-19; V, 7, 3, 14-19.
[65]Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 7, 8-16.
[66]Cf. *ibid.*, 5, 1-8; 11-18; VI, 1, 10, 15-24.
[67]Cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 16, 28-34.
[68]Cf. *ibid.*, II, 7, 3, 7-15.
[69]Cf. *ibid.*, V, 7, 1, 7-17.
[70]Several less happy possibilities occur to us. "Mode" is one, but it has unfortunate Spinozistic connotations; the Spinozistic modes do not possess the dynamic quality of the Plotinian *logoi*. Another alternative might be "affection." The word implies some sort of special modification which is not necessarily accidental and is to this extent acceptable. It is, however, as undynamic as "mode" and, to that extent, equally unacceptable. "State" in the sense of some permanent condition is likewise passive and static in its connotation. "Disposition" is a bit more active in connotation, but it suffers from the considerable disadvantage of being the precise word which Plotinus uses to define *logos*; cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 5, 11-18. Thus the word presents insuperable difficulties of translation when the word *logos* and "disposition" appear side by side. "Habit" is another possibility; it is dynamic in connotation, but it also implies something acquired and accidental in nature and, to this extent, is unacceptable.

What, then, is the Plotinian *logos* essentially and in itself? Essentially, the Plotinian *logos* is an active power identical with the being of the hypostasis in which it exists and ordered to the production of some reality lower than itself. *Logos* is found only in *Nous* and Soul. The lower reality which it produces will always be another *logos* of an inferior nature, except in the case of the final *logoi*. The final *logoi* are the *logoi* of sensible form. Since sensible form does not produce any other being, the *logoi* of sensible form terminate the process of universal emanation.

Thus the *logos* serves two major functions in Plotinian cosmological emanation. The fact that the *logos* is found only in *Nous* and Soul restricts the *logos* to the realms of being. Because the *logos* is an active power, identical with the being of *Nous* and of Soul, the *logos* is the ultimate ontological explanation of the dynamic aspects of Plotinian being. The orientation of each manifestation of *logos* to the necessary production of a reality less perfect than itself grounds the intrinsic propensity of being to degenerate from the perfection of being, found in *Nous*, down through the various levels of psychic existence, to the final corruption of being when Soul is mingled with matter.

The search for an adequate English equivalent of the Greek word *logos* is a difficult one. In the last analysis, we suggest that the word "rule" will serve.[70] The word has several advantages: (1) it is dynamic in connotation, a fact which is congruent with the notion of *logos* as an active disposition of Soul and of *Nous;* (2) it is not entirely divorced from noetic implications, inasmuch as rules are the conceptions of a mind, and thus the word is congruent with the origin of *logos* in the Soul by way of a noetic act; (3) finally, the word is possessed of the same amount of ambiguity concerning the entitative status of *logos* as the Greek word itself.

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God in Modern Philosophy. **By James Collins. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959. Pp. xii + 476. $6.50.**

How does one go about writing on God in modern phiosophy? There are three ways.

1) One can take the "true" philosophical position, say, Thomistic realism as a closed system, give an exposition of its philosophy of God, and then proceed to contrast it with the various modern alternatives. The approach would not be merely comparative. The aim would be to show that errors are logically possible by denying this or that truth in realism, and then to correlate with these errors the various attempts of modern philosophers to deal with the philosophy of God. If you deny this realistic truth you get Descartes; if you deny that, you get Kant; and so on.

The advantage of this method lies in its formal clarity. The disadvantage lies in its questionable psychology and pedagogy. For those who do not already have the truth—and it is really for these that the book should be written—such a procedure has a bludgeoning effect in addition to appearing question-begging. This method might be called the "dogmatic approach."

2) One can consider the philosophy of God of each man as a self-contained, atomic bit of thought. But even atoms are related, and so it would be shown how the ideas of one man "influence" the ideas of another. Since there is no metaphysical truth in any systematic form, one is confined to giving a history of the influences of ideas upon philosophers. Critically, one is limited to considering the various *Weltanschauungen* from the standpoint of formal consistency. The history of philosophy is reduced to the "history of ideas." This method may be called the "skeptical approach."

3) The third way is that which Mr. Collins takes. He gives an exposition and criticism of the thoughts about God of a selected group of modern philosophers. The truth of classical realism is assumed implicitly throughout and is made explicit in the final chapter. In this way realism is taken as an open, not closed, system. "The study of modern conceptions of God can make a positive, doctrinal contribution to the development of realistic

theism. Such an inquiry helps to identify the pressing issues, to work out some of the chief modes of explanation, to suggest new sources of evidences, and to render the main tenets more explicit, more philosophically ordered, and more relevant to the contemporary world" (p. xi).

Mr. Collins begins with the thought of Nicholas of Cues, (1401-64), and ends with "the existentialist quarrel over God." In the pre-Kantian controversy between rationalism and empiricism the former attempted to free the intellect from dependence upon the senses. And empiricism attempted to free the senses from dependence upon the intellect—which it succeeded in doing rather well. In either case the concept of God does not fare well; for it tends to become a "function," rescuing philosophers from their initial errors. In rationalism the concept of God became the "Instrumental Guarantor of the rationalistic systems" (p. 90). Of course, the empiricists could find no such God.

With Kant a new kind of functionalism is introduced. Not God, but the idea of God, becomes a postulate for moral purposes. The idea is no longer needed to shore up a rationalism, since such a metaphysical system is no longer possible. However, as a postulate God is recognized for the sake of morality, and not that the moral life is founded upon the recognition of an obligation to God.

If a pragmatic conception of God was potentially in the thought of Kant, it became actual in the thought of Mill, James, and others. "Instead of a functionalism ordained to the rationalist and idealist systems, [Mill] proposed a functional theism which would serve the purposes of a utilitarian and positivist type of empiricism" (p. 296). Without any causal and analogical basis for an inference to God, the equivocal God in the order of knowing can become only a finite God in being. The conclusion of James naturally follows. "In saying 'God exists' all I imply is that my purposes are cared for by a mind so powerful as on the whole to control the drift of the universe" (p. 301). But even this is but a stage to the final conclusion. If, as with Kant, God is no longer a necessary postulate for morality but rather a convenient hypothesis for those who find it convenient, then there will be those who no longer find such a hypothesis convenient or functional. If human interests are absolute, then something called "Science" is much more useful.

Mr. Collins finally concludes with pointing out that the rise of existentialism comes about because there are those who are concerned about what the logic of modern philosophy inexorably decrees and yet who are not prepared to reject the modern errors that cause the trouble. The accumulated wisdom of realism cannot be equated with a rationalistic strain which has been part of its history. If the modern existentialist does not understand this, he then opposes the realistic synthesis in the name of

existence. "Existential knowledge about God is itself the peak of philosophical wisdom and is not instrumental to any wonder-destroying conception of the perfect system of knowledge" (p. 383).

In the final chapter Mr. Collins appraises the modern attempts at a philosophy of God and suggests the realist philosophy of God not only as a solution but as the position in terms of which one may even understand the inadequacy of alternative positions. "The causal inference terminates not in a view of the divine act of existing itself but in the humanly concluded knowledge that the proposition 'The purely actual being and first cause, God, exists' is well founded and true. The realistic proof gives knowledge *about* the existing God, but not by *using* the divine act of existing as the conclusion of the inference itself. This is the most radical level at which one can see the nonfunctional approach of realistic theism to God" (p. 399).

With the exception of the final chapter on realism, the volume should provide almost everyone with a confirmation, at least in appearance, of his position. For the fideist it demonstrates what he knew all along, that one cannot know God through reason because God *does* exist. For the naturalist, materialist, or positivist it demonstrates what he has long "known," that one cannot know God through reason *because* God does not exist. I say, "at least in appearance," for the catch in it all is this, that only a realist could have written such a book. No "modern," of the type the volume is about, could have produced it.

The book is an excellent one in every way. One can conceive how a work of this kind might have been written differently. But the reviewer cannot imagine how better it might have been done. The book is not for the beginner, but it should prove valuable to anyone who has had some disciplined study in philosophy.

However, no book is so perfect that something will not cause a raised eyebrow. Mr. Collins speaks of "naturalistic atheists" (p. 299). This is possible, for an atheist might also be an idealist; for example, Hegel. But Mr. Collins also speaks of a theistic form of naturalism (p. 389) and also of something called "atheistic naturalism" (pp. 153, 389). But is it not the case that almost by definition naturalism must be atheism?

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Modes of Being. **By Paul Weiss. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1958. Pp. viii + 617. $10.00.**

Although for many years now logical positivism has been announcing the death of metaphysics, it is very much alive in Professor Paul Weiss's *Modes of Being*. In this work the author attempts to "articulate a vision

of the whole of things" (p. 3). This is to be a counteragent to the tendency toward fragmentation that marks much of contemporary thought. Even though the logical analysts at one time gave promise of fulfilling this role, they have not done so; but they in turn "turned themselves into another race of specialists, alongside the others, concentrating on the restricted task of clarifying the intent, language, usage or practice of scientific men" (p. 6). But the special sciences require the knowledge of one, coherent, exhaustive whole.

For unless one knows what it is to be a man, no co-ordinate studies of man are possible. Only if one knows what it is to be a man can one correlate the findings of doctors, biologists, psychologists, and anthropologists. To lose sight of the whole is to fail to realize that the purpose of limited investigations is to understand the real from many independent and convergent views. Thus, the special disciplines do require a comprehensive view of reality, because "if we are to engage in limited enterprises, if we are to know what they diversely seek and express, if we are to understand what contributions they can make to the enterprise of life and learning, we must somehow take account of all there is and can be known" (p. 7). Professor Weiss sets out to provide just such an account.

In the *Modes of Being* Weiss distinguishes four irreducible modes: actuality, ideality, existence, and God. He compares them to four notions in Plato—motion, rest, other, and the same; to four notions in Aristotle—efficient, final, material, and formal cause; and to four notions in Whitehead—actual occasions, eternal objects, creativity, and God. But he believes a significant difference between his modes and these notions is that "each mode has a finality of its own, and has systematic and dialectic relations to the other three modes" (p. 533). Each of the modes needs the other modes and supplies the needs of the others. This only indicates the main lines of Weiss's thought; no summary can do justice to the orderly and carefully developed presentation of this complex set of ideas in over four-hundred numbered theses.

This modal doctrine of being has its origin in Weiss's effort to resolve the paradox that "a man had obligations which he could not fulfill" (p. 13). This is based on the fact that man, who is finite, feeble, and ignorant, has the obligation to bring the good to its most complete realization. Therefore, man cannot do what he ought to do. Among actualities only man can seek to realize the good in himself or others. But the good, which is the ideal freed from exclusive reference to actualities, ought to be realized. Man as an ethical being has the task of realizing the good which ought to be realized. As an individual he cannot accomplish this; therefore, he must accept as his own whatever is done by all the rest to realize the good. And so, existence and God are needed.

The positive presentation of the doctrine of the modes and their interrelation is followed by what Professor Weiss terms "the negative route." He believes that an adequate philosophy must not only show that opposing doctrines are a subordinate part of itself but also show "how these foolish or mistaken views not only illustrate one's own principles but, as so illustrating them, inevitably urge themselves as views superior to one's own" (p. 380). The adequate system should show that the propositions counter to it are "expressions of the system's elements treated as standing away from it, and as such, because ignoring the claims of all else, necessarily maintaining that they offer the whole truth, and consequently that they ought, and do, cancel, and replace the given system" (p. 381). The aim of the negative route is to reduce the negations of the propositions of the *Modes of Being* to interrelated parts of a single whole wherein they reaffirm the theses of the system.

In the context of the problem of the one and the many, Professor Weiss discusses the togetherness of the four modes. Actuality, ideality, existence, and God constitute four sets of many, each with its own distinctive way of being together. Since each mode has a finality of its own, each presents diverse perspectives of the others. This discussion of the togetherness of the modes concludes Weiss's presentation of "those fundamental characterizations which always apply to the real" (p. 548).

In keeping with the clarity and order that reigns throughout, the author supplies a useful outline of the work in topical headings which refer back to the numbered theses of the text. Also, the graceful Attic style of this work should help shatter the myth, which has thrived ever since Kant struggled with the vernacular, that profound thought requires tangled and awkward phrases.

Only in time will a just evaluation of this work be rendered. At present, some questions can be raised concerning the paradox that has led Professor Weiss to adopt four irreducible modes. This paradox appears to be rooted in the nature of possibility as conceived by the actuality which is man. The good is the ideal freed from exclusive reference to actualities; but the ideal is considered only in terms of universals. As Weiss says, "From the standpoint of the Actual the difference between it and the possible is a difference between the individual and the universal . . ." (p. 115). In other words, Weiss declares, "Possibilities (Ideals viewed from the standpoint of other beings) are generic meanings" (p. 33). But, if man knows the existence of God as creator, then the possibles are not universals, generic meanings, but singulars in the mind of God. Then, too, the moral obligation of man is not the accomplishment of abstract good, but it is to act in conformity with the mind and will of God. However, Weiss rejects analogous knowledge of God, such as is held by Thomists,

because "analogy tells us rightly that we ought to take up the position of others if we are to understand them correctly. But it does not tell us how to do this. Instead it presupposes the achievement which it is intended to promote" (p. 523). Accordingly, analogy is "not too helpful so long as we do not occupy the position of the others but know them only from our own" (p. 523). But if one accepts an experiential and causal inference approach to God's existence, then this objection does not hold up. For Weiss, the notion of God as cause of the universe can only mean either that God had a temporal side, or that there was an occurrence in the unbroken calm of eternity. Since causality is primarily conceived as a temporal sequence, the possibility of knowing the existence of the immutable Creator of the universe through experiential knowledge of His effects in time is excluded in the modal doctrine of being. This Weiss is forced to exclude because he identifies knowledge with abstraction whereby a neutrality is attained: "It [knowledge] is the world as distorted by our being but recovered in an abstract form by our minds" (p. 533). Knowledge is "actuality as having attained the state of neutrality, as having become the togetherness of all, though at the price of an abstraction from its concreteness" (p. 533). This theory of knowledge leaves no room for a concrete judgment of existence to found a causal and experiential approach to the existence of God.

Throughout the work Weiss presents penetrating analyses of some of the major approaches to the philosophical problems that he is treating. One such remark that should alert Thomists to greater precision of thought and expression concerns the tendency to speak as though there was only the existence of God and as though creatures did not have their own proper existence: "The Thomists sometimes speak as though they meant to hold that all Existence is God, in him or from him. But it is not clear then how I can exist" (p. 191). Also, Weiss's criticism of Whitehead's actual entities as perpetually perishing is acute: "Self-maintenance, like quiescence and rest, is thus an achievement. It is not, as Whitehead supposed, an achievement which must immediately end in failure, in the perishing of being" (p. 31). These and many other such insights recommend this book to all who are interested in observing a fine philosophical mind at work and in learning from it.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

An Etienne Gilson Tribute. **Presented by His North American Students. Ed. Charles J. O'Neil. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. x + 347. $7.00.**

This volume honors Etienne Gilson on his seventy-fifth anniversary, and it does so in the best way at the command of philosophers and scholars—by

offering fruits of their independent labors. All the contributors were Gilson's students at some time during his generation of distinguished teaching at Toronto, and they bear witness to his great capacity for arousing the love of wisdom and then disciplining it to the ways of research and communication.

Most of the essays show that marked historical orientation which we have come to expect and respect in men trained at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Greek philosophy is represented only by Father Owens, but his study of Heraclitus is a specially fresh and vigorous offering. A critical review is made of the three main views of Heraclitus as cosmologist, metaphysician of flux, and moralist. Owens is particularly severe upon the universal-flux interpretation and the venerable Platonic contrast of Parmenides and Heraclitus. He himself regards the Heraclitean fragments as being mainly a moral treatise on the need to make constant adjustments in steering an undeviating course toward the common moral wisdom. Like Heidegger, who has a penchant for "the obscure one," Heraclitus sees the surrounding universe in the light of his conception of human conduct and its pattern of balanced tensions.

Although Gilson's interest in the rest of Greek philosophy, the Patristic period, and the early Middle Ages is not reflected in depth in this collection, there are two solid papers devoted to the *Liber De Causis* and the Victorines. Father Sweeney continues his examination of the history of infinity and allied concepts by analyzing the treatment of creation in the *Liber*. He concludes that, although there is considerable obscurity about divine freedom and transcendence, still the *Liber* does break through emanationism sufficiently to regard the first cause genuinely as a creator, a giver of being or actual existence. For his part, Father Lacroix gives a fine description of what the Victorine school regarded as the main traits required for attaining wisdom: humility, total dedication to the work itself, and a lifelong pursuit of wisdom as providing the greatest consolation.

There is a strong concentration of studies in the medieval field, from St. Thomas onward. Jean Quidort of Paris is the subject of two researches, one into his metaphysics and another into his political position. Father Heiman reports on the questions in Quidort's lectures on the *Sentences* dealing with the *esse* of creatures. This *esse* is distinct from the essence, and both are caused by the one creative act of God. In a provocative re-reading of Quidort on political authority, Professor Griesbach challenges the view of Fathers Leclercq and J. C. Murray that Quidort is working out the consequences of the Thomistic doctrine on the Church and political life. On the contrary, Quidort handles the Thomistic texts arbitrarily in order to minimize the papal power within the Church, to

release the political power from subordination to the pope, and thus to remove the Thomistic notion of the subjection of all political rulers to the pope as supreme ruler. Other essays in this area deal with extrinsic titles to interest (Professor Johnston), Thomas of Sutton's contemporary attack on the Scotistic doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being (Father Przezdziecki, who shows that Sutton's analysis of the predicaments and divine names is intended to direct attention to differences which must be expressed in the *concept* of being), and an account of a manuscript criticism of Ockham's theory of the universal (Father Synan).

Most of the remaining papers either examine aspects of St. Thomas or rethink doctrinal issues in a Thomistic spirit; as befits a book honoring Gilson, these contributions constitute the heart of the collection. Teachers who have been disturbed about facile appeals to the finality principle will welcome Father Klubertanz's careful and penetrating analysis of St. Thomas on *omne agens agit propter finem.* The validity of this proposition is established through arguments based on the determination of the efficient cause, the presence of tendency and dynamic order in existing agents, nature as a principle of activity directed toward a goal, and divine intelligent creative causality. Klubertanz reaches the following conclusion, similar to the earlier finding of Father Owens on causality:

> In St. Thomas' view, therefore, the proposition, "Every agent acts for a goal," is not a self-evident principle, nor a truth known from the logical implications of prior logical principles, but a conclusion of a real proof resting on the immediate experience of nature and tendency.

Another metaphysical essay is Professor Anderson's clear and orderly presentation of St. Thomas's teaching on the sense in which we can say that God's knowledge is scientific. Not only does this study bring out the thoroughly analogical treatment of knowledge but also the readiness of St. Thomas to adapt his meanings for "scientific" to the exigencies of the particular problem at hand.

Two of the contributors address themselves to problems on man and intellectual knolwedge in St. Thomas. Professor Pegis scrutinizes the text of *Contra Gentiles*, II, cap. 56, on whether any intellectual substance can be united to a body. Pegis agrees with Pomponazzi that St. Thomas could only propound and answer this question by transforming the Aristotelian psychology, and also that the transformation involved the influence of the Christian faith; but he rejects Pomponazzi's conclusion that therefore the result is good Christian faith but not philosophy. This then leads Pegis to maintain that the Thomistic position on the unity of man is adequate as being philosophically open to the technical data of the problem and yet

that this position is "Christian philosophy, that is to say, a philosophy that considers its openness to the influence of revelation to be nothing less than a turning to the source of its nature." Professor Robb traces out the later teaching of St. Thomas on the human soul as a form and also an individual substance, using as a guide the axiom that in all intellectual beings their *intelligere* is *esse*. He concentrates particularly on the *Quaestiones De Anima* and notes the close relation established by Aquinas between hand and human intellect, an association which Marx persuaded himself to regard as palmary evidence of the materialistic conception of man and history.

Father Gerard Smith gives an intensely reflective and terse analysis of the problem of sensibles and metaphysics. If we consider the sensibles first of all within the framework of a dialectic of multiplicity, they are reducible to passive potentials which simply are nonbeing in themselves and are found in, and related to, existential situations. Once this reduction is accepted, we can only speak about the *esse* of sensibles as *esse* by making a demonstration that they are caused to be and thus by viewing them as dependent on God. If the sensible is first approached not as a potential ingredient ordered to an existential situation but as a sensibly existing being, however, the inquirer can begin with the evidenced truth that sensible beings exist and then discover some consequences of this proposition. This is the difference between beginning with existence as a situation and beginning with the sensible beings known actually to exist. That there are some important consequences of stressing natural things as subjects of existing is brought out by Professor Schmitz, writing with special reference to the modern substitution of objects-of-human-consciousness for existing things. He defends against Husserl and Whitehead the meaning of a subject of existing, even when it is not a subject itself having consciousness.

The need to re-examine the founding judgments in metaphysics is brought out in three essays of an epistemological nature. Father Schmidt observes that even an immediate realism requires some careful reflective analysis if it seeks to be a philosophical position. He traces out three aspects of the evidence of sense perception in order to show that our judgments of existence are well grounded: the plural determinations in experience, the presentedness of concrete and unified things, and the active self-presenting character of sense things. In his critical survey of the influence of presuppositions upon various philosophical and scientific accounts of the original condition of experiencing, Father Thro concludes that we have to be on guard against an idealistic, naturalistic, and psychologistic predetermining of the account. The distinction between the experiencer and the experienced existents acting upon him is a basic point

in the realist analysis of ordinary experience. That there is a common structure uncoverable through such analysis is the theme developed by Father Henle, whose paper, "A Phenomenological Approach to Realism," is one of the few detailed presentations in English of how a realist does actually go about showing to other men the philosophical grounds of his epistemology. To do so in a successful way, one must enter deeply into the modern adventure of evaluating the evidence for realism and must then work sympathetically but firmly toward restoring the perspectives which can only be called the common human ones of knowing our world and ourselves. A postulatory realism which refuses to engage in this internal discussion of the modern situation will find it difficult to flourish as a philosophically significant doctrine.

Another constructive and appreciative approach to the contemporary mind is made by Professor Bourke. He finds some valuable considerations in the procedures of metaethics which are usually cultivated by logical positivists and the analysts. In an age when everyone is working on the metaplane of reflecting on the kind of statements used within ethics and other bodies of discourse, it is fatal to trudge ahead without any regard for the problems which arise at this second level of inquiry. Among other advantages which Bourke sees in the study of metaethics by alert Thomists are: it sharpens the question of whether ethics is only a demonstrative science or also a wisdom; the emotive or noncognitivist interpretations of ethics underline the role of right appetite in ethical reasoning and suggest that a purely cognitivist view of ethics is inadequate; the attempt to compare the formal structure of Thomistic ethics with other ethical structures (not merely a comparison of one thesis in an ethics with that of another school) leads to some real difficulties of classification and eventually to a better understanding of what is unique in the ethical doctrine of St. Thomas. Professor Walton describes the theory of concept formation in Hempel, Northrop, and Korzybski, suggesting some corrective points drawn from the Thomistic theory of human knowledge. Professor Lynch gives us a careful report on the relation between being and language in Heidegger, who of all contemporaries seems to join them in the closest way.

This notable set of papers is crowned by a concluding response from Professor Gilson himself. He reminds teachers of philosophy to remain loyal to their original ideal of pursuing wisdom and to be careful to arouse the same humble and purifying love in their students, who must learn to acknowledge how far we are from having already attained a satisfactory philosophical vision. We can turn to Gilson's own life as a teacher, as well as his lecture on "The Eminence of Teaching," for further encouragement in the work of integrating our teaching activities always more closely with our personal reflections.

LEO B. KAUFMANN, S.J., *Mount St. Michael's*

An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the "Parmenides." **By William F. Lynch, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 255. $6.00.**

This work allows for no superficial reading and presupposes no slight acquaintance with recent Platonic scholarship. One need not agree with Father Lynch's basic interpretation to welcome it as a strong fresh breeze dissipating the smog generated by modern Neoplatonists and dutifully laid down by most textbooks.

Lynch offers not just another key to the riddle of the *Parmenides* but, through his original solution to its antinomies, a new synthesis, within limitations, for all of Plato. While giving credit to Cornford's "careful analysis" (p. 6) he questions not only Cornford's negative understanding of Hypothesis I but his multiple meanings for "One" in the other hypotheses. Lynch insists "that the meaning of the word does not change in the slightest way" (p. 15, n. 10). The result is that all the various hypotheses "are nothing less than an analysis of the constitutive elements of anything that is a true *one*, or unity, in any order of being" (p. 9). Thus any being or any one is approached, now with reference to its *intrinsic* principle which corresponds to "unity as such" (p. 64), now as a whole-of-parts. Moreover, this unambiguous (yet somehow analogous) meaning of unity suggests "any number of possible applications" (p. 15, no. 10) and makes "clear that it is the intention of the eight hypotheses to discuss as many problems in the logic, the metaphysics, and the physics of the Platonic system as is possible in their brief compass" (p. 139).

That the author unifies Plato toward a later dialogue rather than the well-worn *Republic* shows promise, but any such static unification may turn a system of organic growth into prefabricated rationalism. Moreover, he proposes as "almost a first principle of criticism to expect always that Plato is saying in the *Parmenides* what he has said or will be saying in other parts of his total work" (p. 17). But why shouldn't Plato—developing as he wrote—encounter serious *aporiai* in the *Parmenides*, only to reorientate his thinking in the *Sophist*?

That the interpretation is openly analytic is to Lynch's credit as a scholar. Thus this reviewer is not dismayed by one more historical construct, but neither is he thrilled by perfect consistency and broad scope of results. What he finds unsatisfactory is the constricted basis of interpretation. It answers neatly the problems allowed, plus a plethora of questions—listed in the table of contents—but all ultimately irrelevant when divorced from the missing issues. For the author finds no inconsistency in simple

anachronisms like developed analogy and existential questions, nor any discomfort in juxtaposing *Plato*, *Metaphysics*, and *Being*.

His familiarity with modern Platonic studies, especially little-known but very significant articles in classical and philological journals, hardly extends to Scholastics. "The Dilemma of Being and Unity," by Pegis, might itself have forestalled the easy identification of Being and One, in that "the two are convertible" (p. 11). Also Eslick's articles show that to take Aristotle at his word is not to constrict but to liberate one's appreciation of Plato's genius.

Lynch rejects Neoplatonism, but—innocent of any hypothesis in which Aristotle is neither a knave nor a fool—he remains scandalized by any mistrust of participation.

But to recognize with Aristotle the radical *chōrismos* between every being and its essence, between Being and the One, is not to join a petty pupil maligning his teacher, but to follow the master critic, an eye witness, analyzing the greatest Greek of them all—down to his tragic flaw—with pedestrian consequences for participation itself, unless liberated from its own Platonic milieu.

However, just to focus attention on being and unity is a contribution, and no Platonic scholar may safely ignore this book—perhaps for years to come.

ARNOLD J. BENEDETTO, S.J., *Spring Hill College*

An Introduction to Natural Theology. **By Maurice R. Holloway, S.J. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Co., Inc., 1959. Pp. xxviii + 492. $4.00.**

In this book Father Holloway has given us a full, leisurely, and orderly presentation of natural theology. He shows himself throughout to be a very competent guide in St Thomas's philosophy of God. The topics treated and the order followed are, for the most part, the ones traditional in natural theology, though one misses an explicit treatment of the unicity of God and of his immensity (as distinct from his omnipresence).

The author first presents his subject in the form of problems, which he carefully delineates and subdivides. Then he explains the conditions requisite for the satisfactory solution of the problems. Step by step the problems are solved, the positive doctrine proved, and the objections answered. Helpful summaries are interspersed at strategic intervals; and almost every one of the chapters concludes with a useful, stylized summary consisting of a neat statement of the thesis, explanation of terms, the adversaries (in a few cases), the proof, and a few suggested readings. Especially interesting are the six appendices which deal with such matters

as invalid proofs for the existence of God, medieval and modern agnosticism, existentialism, and atheism. The style is simple, without unusual phraseology or involved sentences. There is a very gracious foreword by Father Renard. The book, beautifully printed (despite a few typographical errors), is a worthy companion to the other textbooks written these past few years by the professors of philosophy of Saint Louis University and printed by Appleton-Century-Crofts.

The author lays no claim to originality, but his book does supply us with fuller and more-helpful-than-usual treatments of some of the major problems of natural theology; for example, the chapters on knowing and naming God. Father Holloway is steeped in the spirit, the writings, and the method of St. Thomas, so much so that even when he does not explicitly refer to texts of the Angelic Doctor the reader feels that what is said is a trustworthy paraphrase of Aquinas.

Some teachers might prefer a treatment with a proportion differing from that of the author. The opening chapters strike me as being too lengthy. On the other hand, the pages on God's infinity are much too brief, and the discussion of the problem of evil perhaps not realistic enough, certainly not developed enough. One may also prefer more freshness of style. The author explains in his preface, page xv, why he continually uses the works of St. Thomas. Still, we could wish for more personal analyses. Even the difficulties and objections have a medieval, or at least an academic, atmosphere about them (partially offset by the appendices). We should like to have seen more chapters written in the manner of the beautiful and moving final chapter, "God as the End of Man."

GERALD A. MCCOOL, S.J., *Loyola Seminary, Shrub Oak, N.Y.*

First Philosophy. **By Robert J. Kreyche. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959. Pp. 328. $4.00.**

Kreyche's book is a thorough and clearly presented course in general metaphysics. Unlike many modern texts, it does not include a section devoted to natural theology. The claim on its dust jacket that the book "integrates Thomistic metaphysics with contemporary developments" is quite well justified, considering the introductory nature of the work. The results of much modern Thomistic research have been incorporated into its exposition of the traditional problems of general metaphysics. The discussion of the abstraction of being, for example, has been strongly influenced by Maritain's writings on the relation of the judgment of separation to the three degrees of abstraction; and the proof given for the necessary dependence of the finite being on its efficient cause reveals the author's debt

to Gilson and de Raeymaeker. Non-Scholastic philosophy is given adequate treatment in the historical conspectus of the individual problems, and a fine selection of modern books and articles can be found in the bibliographies of the various chapters.

Some readers may complain of repetitiousness in the author's exposition. After a proof of the triple metaphysical composition in the structure of finite material beings, a fair amount of the same ground is gone over again in a rather lengthy consideration of potency and act in relation to the problem of limitation; and it is the author's practice to reiterate the main points considered in each chapter in a series of summary sections at its conclusion. The reviewer believes, however, the repetition has been effected with sufficient variety and skill to make it genuinely helpful to the student in his personal penetration of the exacting and closely woven philosophical reflection which is required for the solution of philosophical problems.

The author is to be congratulated on the composition of a textbook which is both mature and readable. He has brought the course in general metaphysics within the grasp of the intelligent college student with no undue sacrifice of its philosophical content.

FRANÇOIS EVAIN, S.J., *Grand Séminaire (Ambatoroka, Madagascar)*

Enciclopedia Filosofica. **By the Istituto per la Collaborazione Culturale. Venice-Rome, 1957-1958. Vol. I (A-Eq), xxvii pp. + 1958 cols.; II (Er-Le), xix pp. + 1916 cols.; III(Li-Rei), xix pp. + 1942 cols.; IV (Rel-Z; indices), xix pp. + 1964 cols.**

The *Enciclopedia Filosofica,* recently put out by the Italian publishing house of Sansoni, deserves the widest possible diffusion. For this work is a valuable tool not only for students but also for professors of philosophy.

As the title itself indicates, this is not a dictionary but an encyclopedia. We have already in theology what is practically a whole library in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique.* In philosophy, up to the present, we had only dictionaries, such as the general dictionary of A. Lalande, the *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie,* or the more specialized ones like the old *Thomas-Lexicon* of the German Schütz, or, more recently, the excellent American work, *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas.* In this Italian work, we have an encyclopedia—the difference must be stressed. Whereas a dictionary is essentially analytical, an encyclopedia is consciously synthetic. It must therefore provide not only definitions of terms but also must determine their historical and theoretical content and the ultimate relationships between connected terms.

This purpose has been excellently achieved by the *Enciclopedia Filosofica.* Published with record speed (1957-58), the fruit of ten years work, it offers

a total of 12,000 terms, divided into 5,000 theoretical and 7,000 historical terms. A detailed study decided the relative importance of these different terms. There are four groups, the first of from 1,400 to 1,000 lines; the second, of 800 to 400 lines; the third, of 200 to 80 lines; and the fourth, of 60 to 20 lines. To these there are added brief notes shorter than 20 lines. A lengthy index of fifty-three pages divided into four columns permits a rapid and intelligent use of the resources of the *Enciclopedia.*

As far as its doctrinal aspect is concerned, the collaborators must be congratulated on the orientation of their work. It was not easy to avoid making of this work a pretext or a stage for the defense of one or another system. Particularly satisfactory are the studies concerning disciplines connected with philosophy: sociology (rather briefly), political economy, law, biology, physics, mathematics, art, and literature. Without any trace of eclecticism in the derogatory sense, the *Enciclopedia* shows how a spiritualism of Christian inspiration can satisfy the most divergent demands of human reason.

In the historical aspect of the articles, the editors have been very careful not to exaggerate the classical distinction between major and minor authors. It is also a pleasure to see the refreshing openness to non-European currents of thought. Finally, a very large place is given to contemporary writers.

It would have been desirable to have more detailed, even exhaustive, bibliographies; and to see the connections between the related disciplines and philosophy more consistently observed, especially as regards sociology.

But these small reservations do not take away the very great value of the work. Congratulations are in order to the Reverend C. Giacon, S.J., who managed to join together collaborators and mechanical processes to bring to light such a great enterprise. It is to be hoped that a group of workers will soon bring out an American edition.

Formale Logik. **By Paul Lorenzen. "Sammlung Göschen," Band 1176-1176a. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. Pp. 165. Paper, DM 4.80.**

This is a very fine but extremely brief introduction to formal logic, so brief that its sentences are sometimes as difficult and compressed as its formulae. The author, who has written technical articles in this field, is a competent guide.

The structure of the book is a pedagogical one, imitating in some respects the historical development of logic. The first part deals with Aristotelian syllogistics; the author moves rapidly from the use of German sentences to a symbolic notation. In the second section, the classical propositional logic is explained and illustrated. The third section takes up the propositional calculus very briefly. The fourth section, which the author calls the effective logic of conjunction, is developed at greater length. The fifth section is concerned with the logic of the quantifiers. The final section dealing with equality is again very brief.

The arrangement and development of topics has some advantages and is probably best suited for a reader who already knows some logic.

Gergonne'a Teoria Definicii. **By Stanislaw Kaminski. Lublin: Katolickiego Uniw. Lubelskiego, 1958. Pp. 142. Paper, 25 zl.**

This is a study of the theory of definition of J. D. Gergonne, who wrote on mathematics in the first quarter of the nineteenth century and is considered one of the precursors of mathematical logic. The author begins his study with a review of historical and contemporary notions of definition, and in this context locates the work of Gergonne himself. "Definition" can designate the action of defining, the sum of the elements of the definition, and the meaning of the definition. In any definition, the defining elements are univocal characteristics. For Gergonne, a definition concerns words, and its purpose is to enable us to use a word intelligently in its proper language. Yet he distinguishes "conventional" from "lexical" definitions by holding that the former defines words, the latter "things." He maintains that the latter ones should be proved.

In the second part of the study, the author discusses the characteristics of

definition. It enriches language (by providing new abbreviations); it pertains only to some terms, not to all (primary terms in any system cannot be defined); it must conform to the proper semantical category and to the way of admitting that category in the language of the system. Gergonne held that a definition is an enuntiation; the author maintains that a definition as such is not a proposition in the logical sense.

Finally, the author concludes with a consideration of the rules for definition, discussing and comparing Gergonne's rules with those of other writers. He also devotes some time to the problem of "implicit" definitions.

There is a bibliography.

Henri Bergson. Quellen und Konsequenzen einer induktiven Metaphysik. **By Günther Pflug. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 393. DM 38.**

When Bergson began his philosophical career, the main currents of European philosophy were those of British and French empiricism, German apriorism, and French spiritualism. Bergson's first major step toward his own distinctive metaphysics was taken with the publication of the *Données immédiates*. This first step still contains obscurities about intuition and the notion of "the real"; it seems to be involved in a kind of Cartesian separation of matter and mind. But it broaches the problem of metaphysical method, here viewed partly as analysis, and it brings out the significance of time as lived duration and distinguishes it from space and from physical time. The next major step was taken with *Matière et mémoire*. Here Bergson developed a broader theory of reality and of knowledge, extended the scope of freedom, and enlarged on the themes of subjectivity, the biological orientation of perception, and the critique of objective science. After these major philosophical works, Bergson turned to a series of shorter psychological writings, which served on the one hand to keep him in touch with the positivistic, empirical tendencies of the scientists and empirically minded philosophers, and on the other broadened the basis of philosophy in psychological experience. He insisted that if a transcendental analysis of unity and synthesis were to be done, it could be done only at the end of philosophy, not at the beginning and as a condition. The goals of a spiritualistic psychology (and metaphysics) are to be attained by strictly empirical methods. Because of this method he contrasted his own work sharply with that of the spiritualists and the Cartesians. These efforts culminated in a critique of Kant based on the fact that there is more than one natural science, on a corresponding distinction of levels of necessity and on the distinction of levels of experience. All these finds brought their fruit in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*.

The next stage in Bergson's development is *Evolution créatrice*, in which

the basis for a metaphysical view of external reality is provided. This is done principally through an interpretation of time and duration in things themselves, expressed as evolution and *élan vital*. The final step was taken in the *Deux sources*, in which ethics was connected with psychology as metaphysics had been. However, the author indicates that this unification set up a new problem in the relation between sociology and ethics, which reflects in its turn the dualism of reason and intuition. The author concludes then that the last word of Bergson's brought him practically back to a view akin to that of the French spiritualists, that philosophy is reflective knowledge (that has no content of its own other than what is supplied by the positive sciences).

There is a good bibliography of secondary sources and a very detailed chronological list of Bergson's writings; there is also an index.

The study investigates the possible sources and influences on Bergson's thought in a very thorough fashion, and has the merit also of seeing the importance of some of the "minor" writings in the development of that thought. The combining of historical, analytical, and critical moments makes the book very difficult reading. In addition, the author tends to push any and every distinction to the point of a dualism.

Heraklit. Worte tönen durch Jahrtausende. **By Heinrich Quirung. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 164.**

This is a presentation of the Greek fragments together with a literal German translation; most of the texts have longer or shorter commentaries and interpretations, and there is a lengthy introductory section.

The introductory section (pp. 9-48), entitled "Heraclitus in the Judgment of Posterity," is a tissue of references so woven together as to establish the Greek philosopher as the greatest thinker of all time, consistently right in all his basic insights, occasionally surpassed in details (such as the atomic theory), yet even then in harmony with the latest. This impression is partly due to the author's attempt to include all the judgments of later writers in such a brief treatment, but it is partly also due to the author's own exaggerated opinion. And one of the reasons for the author's high estimate is that—in his view at least—Heraclitus is the first thoroughgoing naturalistic materialist.

Das Lebensproblem heute. Beitrag der Zellforschung zur Philosophie des Organischen. **By Johannes Haas. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. 150. Paper.**

In an introductory chapter, the author explains what he means by a problem and in what the problem of life consists; namely, in the explana-

tion of what life is. In the next two chapters he takes up functional elementary processes and morphogenesis. Here he summarizes in a non-technical way the significant biological data and then points out as precisely as possible in what these functions consist. In the fourth chapter he concludes with an over-all view of the matters covered and a philosophical analysis. In the course of his exposition, the author stresses the interrelationship and mutual complementarity of mechanistic and teleological considerations (he insists that "mechanism" need not denote a materialistic monism). From this dual aspect of the evidence, he then concludes in his final chapter to a philosophy of organism which he calls "vitalism" and which is in some respects similar to the dualistic view historically known under that name.

Materialistische Dialektik. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag. **By Helmut Ogiermann. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. 275.**

The author points out that no full-scale systematic critique of materialistic dialectic as a *philosophical* method has been undertaken. In the first part of his work, he undertakes to summarize what has been said about what this method is both by non-Marxists and by the Marxists themselves. In all this, he is careful to document his presentation. In the treatment of Marxist authors, he lists these points as important: dialectic and metaphysics, dialectical contradiction, change as dialectical contradiction, the laws and tasks of dialectic, materialistic monism, matter and spirit as levels of being, and the materialism of dialectic. This first part concludes with a summary which is very well stated.

The second part is a systematic critique. The author begins with a consideration of the Marxist critique of idealism. Next he considers the meaning and function of negativity in the dialectic. Then he takes up the ontological implications of materialistic dialectic: opposition and contradiction, relation and dialectic, dialectical movement, dialectical self-movement, the dialectic of the levels of being, and the relationship between matter and being. He devotes special attention to the implications of the combination of dialectic and materialism in dialectical materialism.

This is a very useful study because of its excellent documentation and because of the clarity of the presentation and argumentation. All who are interested in understanding the philosophy of Marxism will find this book a very great help; they will find in it also a well-grounded an very sharp criticism.

Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum. **Vol. II (1958), pp. 30; Vol. III (1959), pp. 27. Warsaw, Polska Akademia Nauk.**

These fascicles contain accounts of work and of texts on medieval philosophy in Poland; all these accounts are written in French. There are a number of very brief notes. Among the longer articles in Fascicle II there are studies by Zofia Wlodek on Armand de Belvézer (pp. 6-12), a list of manuscripts in Polish libraries containing commentaries on the *De Ente* by Wladyslaw Seńko (pp. 13-18); and a supplement to the *Repertorium* of Stegmuller by various researchers listing additional manuscripts of commentaries on the *Sentences* (pp. 22-27).

In Fascicle III, Zofia Wlodek has a note on the chronology of Richard of Middleton (pp. 3-6); Wladyslaw Seńko lists anonymous commentaries on the *De Ente* belonging to the fifteenth century (pp. 7-16); Jerzy B. Korolec comments on the commentary of Humbert de Prully on the *Sentences* (pp. 17-21). These are also several briefer notes.

Morte ed Immortalità. **By Michele Federico Sciacca. Milan: Marzorati, 1959. Pp. vii + 383. Paper, L. 3500.**

In a long introduction the author points out the psychological and philosophical aspects of death. In the first part, dealing with death, he begins by considering what he calls the "naturalistic" view of death in the philosophy of Spinoza, of romantic naturalism, of Schopenhauer. Then he considers death and immortality as philosophical problems, from a point of view akin to that of existentialism and personalism. In the second part, the author treats of immortality. He begins by considering the nature of immortality, contrasting it with what he calls "historical perpetuity." The transition between present human existence and suprahistorical immortality is the metaphysical act of death; in such a view, the continuity between the two modes of being almost disappears. Then he takes up the argument for immortality, arguing from the nature of man as a personal spirit, especially from the experience of consciousness and the nature of knowledge as a synthesis. In the third part, the author deals with suicide. He begins by asking how the moral problem of suicide is to be placed, especially in connection with "existence," freedom, and value. He considers the fundamental forms of suicide, as affirmation, as aesthetic act, and what he calls "metaphysical" suicide (of the Stoic hero or of the negative type for whom all particular reality is a limitation). Finally, he criticizes the arguments of St. Augustine and St. Thomas but accepts them in a "purified" Christian sense.

In much of his writing, M. Sciacca is occupied with a dialectical treatment of rationalistic idealism. This theme also appears in the present

volume, though in a less exclusive way. Since existentialist themes are also dealt with, it is likely that the book will have a wider appeal and a greater influence; certainly the sincerity and profundity of the treatment deserve wide attention.

Die Naturrechtslehre Samuel Pufendorfs. **By Hans Welzel. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. Pp. 114. Paper, DM 14.80.**

In the eighteenth century, natural-law theory enjoyed a great vogue, and Pufendorf was a highly regarded author at that time. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries positivism held such a sway over the minds of a great many ethicians and political philosophers that a revival of natural-law theory seemed unthinkable. Yet the day has come, and so a study on Pufendorf is welcome. The author of the present study did this work as his dissertation but published it only in part; he has in the meantime published other works in moral and political philosophy.

In this study the author first lays down the basic historical background and the method he intends to follow. He begins his examination of Pufendorf's doctrine with the *entia moralia*, which are sharply distinguished from physical being yet have some kind of reality. Next he considers the basic principle of law and follows with a study of more particular principles down to positive law. The theory of the state is given separate consideration, as is also the theory of the right of punishment. A final chapter compares natural law and religion, and the state and the Church.

The author notes one weakness of Pufendorf's conception: a confusion about the ultimate grounding of the natural law. There are others: an overoptimistic conception of the power of reason to decide a priori even detailed conclusions, an absence of historical sense, and a failure to see the significance of cultural variation—all faults common to the age, not peculiar to Pufendorf.

Der personale Glaube. **By Carlos Cirne-Lima. Innsbruck: Felizian Rauch, 1959. Pp. 156. Paper, S. 60.**

Seldom does a slim volume like this touch significantly on many fields; this study of faith as a personal relationship is one of the most stimulating and challenging works to appear in the '50s. The author employs the latest techniques yet at the same time relates his analyses significantly to a large body of traditional thought.

The book begins with a brief placing of the problem of faith from the tradition of Catholic theology supplemented by recent philosophical investigations. The next section is a phenomenological analysis of the act of faith in a person and in what he says. Particularly important here are

the distinction between faith and "pseudo-faith" (which is a syllogistic process which in human affairs usually leads to probability), and the distinction of three levels of knowledge: the intuitive (exemplified in perception), the abstractive-discursive (which is divided into concept, judgment, and reasoning), and the personal (which is faith in another or its absence). (It is to be noted that the "personal" in turn can be submitted to abstraction and analysis.)

The second section of the book is a study of the epistemological and metaphysical structure of interpersonal faith. After a brief discussion of the nature of metaphysics and its relation to this question, the author examines the material brought forth in the preceding phenomenological analysis. In his analysis of intuitive knowledge, he identifies this with the Thomistic *species intelligibilis*, transforming the latter from its traditional position as a precognitive cause of cognition to an act of cognition strictly so called. The *species intelligibilis* is then a passively received intellectual grasp of the total object, from which concepts and judgments arise, and which is further identified with the "immediate evidence" of which epistemologists speak. The level of abstractive-discursive knowledge is handled much in the traditional way; the traditional "three acts of the intellect" are assigned to this level. The third level of phenomenological analysis—namely, personal knowledge—is considered to be a "free knowledge." The author points out that the free choice according to St. Thomas is a composite act, involving both reason and will as standing in a mutual relationship. He then considers personal knowledge as a kind of converse situation, an act of intellect with which an act of freedom is connected as an internally constitutive part. In the analysis of faith as the highest form of personal knowledge, the author maintains that an act of faith is a "saying yes to another person," a total response to a total concrete reality.

The relationship of these various levels to each other is a complex one. Logical dependence (as in inference) operates strictly only within the third level. The intuition arises from the sensory phantasm but does not *logically* depend on it; it is logically self-motivated. Similarly, personal knowledge, and so also faith, arises from an intuition but does not logically depend on it; it is also self-motivated in the free acceptance of another person. Thus, as the author says, I may know one person very well and accord him very little faith, if any, whereas I may know another only slightly and yet accord him a quite full belief. The intuition is therefore logically a condition of faith as regards its content but not as regards its certitude.

In an appendix the author applies his analysis to the theological problem of the act of faith. The author points out that "saying yes to another person" implies "holding as true what another says." Thus he can take

account of the Conciliar definition. By applying his account of the *logical* independence of faith from its antecedent conditions, he can account for both the freedom and the certitude of the act of faith.

The most obscure element in the analysis is the interpretation of the relationship of the levels to each other in terms of an "a priori" condition.

La philosophie anglaise et américaine. **By Serge Hutin. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958. Pp. 128. Paper.**

This historical survey is directed not to specialists but to the general reading public, and to a group of readers to whom not only the precise subject matter is presumed to be unknown but even its more general environment (for example, the educational systems of Great Britain and the United States). In spite of these difficulties, multiplied by brevity of the space alloted to him, the author has succeeded in mentioning the names of most of the important philosophers (and of many unimportant ones) and indicating some points of their thought. He is sympathetic even toward tendencies which he thinks his readers will not understand or approve of (such as empiricism, the rejection of Cartesian dualism, and so on).

Platon. Logos und Mythos. **By Kurt Hildebrandt. 2nd ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 396.**

The first edition of this work was published in 1933. The present edition is a corrected reprint with the addition of a "postscript" (pp. 369-95) which reviews the later development of Platonic studies and concludes with some additional comments which refer to particular pages of this edition.

Hildebrandt's work is well known, but perhaps its long absence from the bookshelves is a reason for commenting on its nature and general structure. The work was intended to present an over-all view of Plato and to include in such a view all its aspects, particularly its function as a Greek ideal. It is more humanistic in inspiration, though it does not entirely neglect the results of philological study and philosophical analysis. Throughout, Plato's writing is considered in the light of his so-called "political activity." The work is divided into three parts. The first deals with his efforts to reform Athens. The second considers the foundations for a new kind of state in the souls of the future citizens. The third takes up Plato's distinction between thinking and doing, and views the writings in relation to politics and religion.

Pojecie Koniecznosci w Filozofii sw. Tomasza z Akwinu. **By Stanislaw Mazierski. Lublin: Katolickiego, 1958. Pp. 119. Paper, 25 zl.**

The author begins by examining the notion of necessity as it is presented by contemporary philosophers, and he concludes that in their view necessity is a relation between objects, never object or idea in itself. But he maintains that it is not a relation but a property of relations belonging to a certain class.

The author finds in St. Thomas four kinds of necessity: logical, ontological, causal, and moral. The last of these he does not intend to treat. He argues first that logical necessity depends on ontological necessity. Ontological necessity does not belong to a being or to an "object" in itself and properly speaking, but only to some properties of objects (for example, the relation between essence and existence). And, since being is analogical, the necessity of beings cannot be equal but admits a certain gradation. The author maintains that his third kind of necessity, causal necessity, has been overlooked in traditional philosophy. Causality, furthermore, can be viewed in two ways; it has a physical aspect and also a metaphysical aspect. In its physical aspect, causality is concerned with the constant succession of phenomena and gives rise to physical laws. In its metaphysical aspect, causality is explained differently by different philosophers. This means that we must be aware of the methodology in use by various philosophers. The author holds that according to St. Thomas physical relations are relatively necessary, metaphysical ones absolutely. The general formulae which express these relations he calls the "physical" and the "metaphysical principles" of causality.

The author holds that most Thomists call the metaphysical principle of causality an "analytic proposition of the second degree" (on the ground that the predicate expresses a property really distinct from the subject but contained in its definition), whereas the physical principle of causality is a synthetic one. The former is absolutely necessary and cannot be denied without contradiction; the latter is conditionally necessary and can be denied without logical contradiction, but its denial is an error.

At the end of his study, the author states that the notion of necessity and its related notions are not adequate expressions of reality but only a kind of schematic representation.

There are a bibliography and a French summary, but no index. Though some recent studies are mentioned, a number of studies dealing with the nature of these so-called "principles" are not listed. This may explain why the author takes into account only the division of certain judgments into analytic and synthetic.

Schöpferische Sprache und Rhythmus. **By Felix Mayer. Ed. with a postscript by Erich Simenauer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 115. DM 12.**

The author of this work was a trained and practicing psychiatrist who was interested in the problems of language for many years. This study of language is neither analytical nor historical but something like a phenomenological attempt to discover the essence of language in itself. The author begins by criticizing very sharply the logical view of language and the contention that there is only a conventional connection between language and thought. The sources for his investigation are principally dream-imagery, the language of gesture, the dance and rhythmic movement in general, song, and music.

Out of all this he develops the theory that there is a twofold point of view that man can take of himself and the world: an objectivating one proper to science and an ego-centered, emotional, living participation in the flow of reality. The first is characteristic of a visual world of space; the second of an aural-and-spoken world of movement, life, and feeling. Moreover, he takes the former one to be derivative and secondary. On the basis of this he criticizes the average man, who, he contends, has reduced the vital content of his life to an objective shadow-world where all is neatly arranged and dead.

There are many good points in the book. But just as the conventionalist view of language can be pushed to ridiculous and harmful extremes, the view that language is part of the expressive-affective life can be made into a weapon against science and the intellect. Precisely such an emphasis is highlighted by the postcript which makes of this theory of language an open anti-intellectualism.

Situation de la philosophie contemporaine. **By Stanislas Breton. Lyon: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 200. Paper, 900 f.**

This volume is the result of a series of lectures. The author begins by defining philosophy by three characteristics: (*a*) "radicalism"—the view of a problem in all its dimensions (the question of the meaning and value of the universe); (*b*) "thematization"—a sustained effort of investigation or solution; (*c*) "rationality"—a work of reason in its critical function of control and revision. By "contemporary" philosophy, he understands that which is immediately and in itself influential on living men—is read, studied, referred to. On this basis, the author finds three currents of contemporary philosophy: existentialism, Marxism, scientific philosophy. After a brief synoptic view of these currents, the author points out what he considers their common element: they are philosophies in situation and of

a situation. They are differentiated among themselves by their different understanding of three principles: (1) the principle of indetermination and transcendence; (2) the principle of determination and logical intelligibility; (3) the principle of determination of consciousness by existence.

After this general treatment, the author devotes the rest of his work to Marxism and existentialism. He considers Marxism principally as a philosophy of man and of culture; he takes up particularly the influence of Engels. He details some of the controversies: dogmatism and revisionism, scientific naturalism, historicity, revolution, slavery and freedom, and negativity.

After some general references to existentialism, he devotes his attention to the criticisms of that doctrine and the responses of the existentialists. Next, he takes up the problem of liberty; he deals with the relation between nature and freedom, the analysis of the free act, and the forms of liberty. He discusses in detail the analyses of Mounier, Sartre, and Heidegger.

This is a stimulating attempt to find a unifying point of view on contemporary philosophy.

Studi Jaspersiani. **By Alberto Caracciolo. Milan: Marzorati, 1958. Pp. 192. Paper, L. 1700.**

This volume consists of a collection of articles previously published in Italian journals. The author is well acquainted with his subject and deals sympathetically with it. His purpose in combining these articles is to present what he conceives to be some of the basic themes of the German philosopher. The first study, by far the longest, deals with the positions of, and the discussion between, Bultmann and Jaspers on "demythologization" of religion. The second concerns the nature of philosophy. The third deals with the relation between philosophy and science. The fourth takes up Jasper's notion of tragedy, the fifth the interpretation of the art of Leonardo. A final chapter reviews the attitudes of other philosophers on Jaspers and his response.

La Teoria Linguistica di Benedetto Croce. **By Santino Cavacuiti. Milan: Marzorati, 1959. Pp. 192. Paper, L. 1700.**

According to the author, the linguistic theory of Croce must be approached from the background of his idealistic monism and his neo-Kantian distinction between intuition and concept. Moreover, it must be remembered that the Crocean theory of art is purely an expressionism. As a result, language as such has simply no connection with logic. On the other hand, language is one of the essential, unchangeable categories of

spirit. Nevertheless, on account of the "circularity" of intuition and concept, language can be permeated with logic. As a result, the Crocean linguistics is a curious blend of a-priori idealism and psychological positivism.

The last chapter takes up two points, the influence of Croce upon linguistic theory and a critical revision of the theory itself. As the bibliography shows, the influence of Croce was almost entirely confined to Italian authors, with the exception of a few philosophical idealists in other countries.

Tier und Mensch. **By Georg Siegmund. Frankfurt am Main: Josef Knecht, Carolusdruckerei, 1958. Pp. 312. DM 12.80.**

The author of this work is a well-known theologian who has also written on "philosophical anthropology" (philosophical psychology), biology, and medicine. Here he intends to give a comprehensive view of the similarities and differences between man and animals. As he maintains, modern attitudes are confused: man is just an animal; animals need special protection; animals may be used in any way at all by man since they are just biological machines.

The work begins with a general view of the problem, in which stress is laid on the relevance which it has to man's understanding of what sort of being he himself is. Next is a discussion of the difference between man and animal according to the view of dialectical materialism. A third chapter criticizes a-priori evolutionism. The author insists that no "law" of development should be allowed to obscure relevant facts. Then in a series of chapters the uniqueness of the human being is viewed in terms of structure, development, and life. In a following series of chapters the animal is considered in itself, as a "psychic subject." These considerations are followed by several chapters devoted to a comparison between men and animals, in which language plays a very significant part. Referring to the theory that "rationality" is nothing more than the simultaneous presence and interworking of a multiplicity of high-order senses, the author studies the cases of blind and deaf persons and shows that any theory of the sensory nature of intelligence is untenable. The next-to-the-last chapter deals with the relation between man and the animals he has assumed into his life, a striking chapter which, however, seems a bit extreme. A final chapter sums up the conclusions of the study. There are a few pages of notes and an index of proper names, but none of the subjects.

This book should be very valuable for the general reader and for beginning students of philosophy and psychology, and is profound enough to provide material for even advanced discussions of the topic.

Über die Krisis des modernen Sondereigentumsbegriffes. **By Cyrill von Korvin-Krasinski, O.S.B. 2d ed. Freiburg: Paulusverlag, 1958. Pp. 36. Paper, 3.30 f. s.**

This is an enlarged version of an article that appeared in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 1954, pp. 64-87. The principal additions are answers to objections directed against the article and references to later writings and papal pronouncements. As is well known, the thesis of the author is that material things are negatively common to all men by natural law but, on account of original sin, they can be privately owned *jure gentium*—which he takes to be a part of positive law). Nevertheless, even when privately owned, they must be used for the common good. He maintains that both propositions are the common teaching of the early Church and of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Where this leaves the ethician is evident; what it implies for the possibility of allowing for cultural development as a factor in the determination of natural law is equally evident. This is not to say that the point of the article is wrong or trivial; it does point to a vacuum in ethical argumentation which is not yet being filled.

La valeur dans la philosophie de Louis Lavelle. **By Wesley Piersol. Paris: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 191. Paper.**

This is a dissertation written for the University of Lyons; it is a systematic textual analysis and synthesis of Lavelle's chief doctrine. Lavelle has been classified as a partisan of "the philosophy of spirit" and of "subjectivity." This study will not change any of these judgments. But it is useful as a well organized summary of Lavelle's doctrine and as a relatively simple and clear introduction to it.

The book has four parts. In the first, Lavelle's teaching on the psychology of value is given: it concerns existence, is related to sentiment, will, and desire. In the second part, the characters of value are studied: its unity and multiplicity, the hierarchy of values, the relation between good and evil. The third part concerns the "incarnation" of value: it deals with possibility, time, progress, and liberty. The fourth part presents Lavelle's metaphysics of value. Value is closely related to being, in particular to existence; it is the spirit in act; it is revealed in and reveals "spiritual intimacy"—of the knower to himself, of value to the knower, of God to finite knowers.

There is a selective bibliography aimed at providing the means for further study.

Vom Sinn der Selbsterkenntnis. **By Katharina Kanthack. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. Pp. 211. DM 18.**

The author intends her work to make explicit some points which are not merely in harmony with Heidegger but are in his writings, even though only in an implicit form. Hence she supposes and demands of the reader that he be familiar with his writings "bis zu seiner letzten Zeile" (p. 2).

In a preparatory section, the author explains that all historical systems of metaphysics are faulty in that they adopt a univocal meaning of being as found in some particular kind of being. She attacks the substance-accident categorization, connecting it with the tendency of all metaphysicians to think of man and of God as things. Other objections are those against the notion of truth as adequation between intellect and thing, and against the distinction between subject and object. She maintains also that psychoanalysis and the Satrean understanding of man are full of the same defects.

The main part of the work considers the Self as "being-with" (*Mitsein*). The author first considers the source of this "being-with others" in the fact of the human community, its various possibilities, and its perversion in the so-called "mass man." Then she takes up "being-with in living incarnation." First she considers being with another as an individual and the problems and mistakes that occur in this relationship. Next she considers the relationship to others in general, the meaning of "the stranger," and similar themes.

It would be an education for positivists and behaviorists to read a work like this with an open and receptive mind; an encounter with language analysis might be advantageous for an existentialist writer. In any case, the book is worth some effort.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

"Publication in North America" will be understood to refer not only to works originally published in that area, but also to works originally published in some other country and simultaneously or subsequently issued by some North American publisher under his own imprint. In the latter case (if it is known), the book will be marked by the symbol ‡ in the left hand margin.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* The Modern Schoolman *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

Abbo, John A. *Political Thought: Men and Ideas.* Westminster: Newman Press, 1959. $5.75.

Adler, Joshua. *Philosophy of Judaism.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. $3.00.

Albert, Ethel M., and Others. *Selected Bibliography of Values, Ethics and Esthetics in the Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, 1935-1958.* Chicago: Free Press; Nov., 1959. $7.50.

Allen, Edgar Leonard. *From Plato to Nietzsche.* New York: Association Press; Oct., 1959. $3.75.

Auerbach, M. Morton. *Conservative Illusion.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. $6.75.

Aurobindo, Sri. *On Yoga.* Tome 1 and 2. Westport, Conn.: Associated Booksellers; Oct., 1959. $6.00 ea.

———. *Practical Guide to Integral Yoga.* Westport, Conn.: Associated Booksellers; Oct., 1959. $2.50.

Ayer, A. J. *Logical Positivism.* Chicago: Free Press, 1959. $6.75.

Bacon, Francis. *New Organon.* Ed. Fulton H. Anderson. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Dec., 1959. $1.25.

Bagehot, Walter. *Physics and Politics.* [Reprint.] Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 164. $3.25.

Balakian, Anna. *Surrealism.* New York: Noonday Press; Nov., 1959. $4.50; paper, $1.45.

Baldwin, Charles Sears. *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic to 1400.* Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 342. $4.50.

Barker, Ernest. *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle.* New York: Dover Pubns.; Sept., 1959. $1.85.

Barnes, Hazel. *The Literature of Possibility.* Lincoln, Univ. of Nebraska Press. $5.75.

Beck, Lewis White. *Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Practical Reason.'* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Jan., 1960. $6.00.

Bergmann, Gustav. *Meaning and Existence.* Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1960. Pp. xi + 274. $6.50; paper, $1.75.

This book is a collection of fourteen articles that have appeared since 1954. But they have much more than a unity of time. The author, in his introduction to this volume, says that in his view, " 'Minds, Meanings, Ontology, Analyticity, and Ideal Languages' [can be considered] as a fully expressive title" (p. vii). Given the author's view of ontology, there is indeed a close unity.

There seems to be in addition another unity. All the essays except two deal explicitly with the views of the philosophical analysts and their predecessors. In every case, the author takes issue with these views to move closer to a kind of realism. The two essays which at first sight seem not to be of the same kind deal with Ockham and Malebranche. Yet even here the treatment is almost entirely analytical.

There is a good index, which is of real necessity for this kind of book.

Bergson, Henri. *Philosophy of Poetry.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. $2.75.

Berle, Adolph Augustine, Jr. *Power without Property.* New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1959. Pp. 192. $3.75.

Berlin, Sir Isaiah, *Karl Marx.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 280. Paper, $1.50.

Berthold, Fred, Jr. *The Fear of God.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 158. $3.00.

Blackham, Harold John. *Six Existentialist Thinkers.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. vii + 173. Paper, $1.25.

Blakney, Raymond B. *An Immanuel Kant Reader.* New York: Harper & Bros.; June 1960. $5.00.

Blanchard, Brand (ed.). *Education in the Age of Science.* New York: Basic Books Pub. Co.; Oct., 1959. $4.50.

Bluck, R. S. *Plato's 'Phaedo.'* Trans. from the Greek, with introd., notes and appendices. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. 218. Paper, $1.25.

Bochenski, J. M. *History of Formal Logic.* Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press; Dec., 1959. $10.00.

Boethius. *Consolation of Philosophy.* Trans. Richard H. Green. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Jan., 1960. 95¢

Bordeaux, Henry. *Edith Stein.* Trans. Donald and Idella Gallagher. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1960. Pp. xi + 87. $3.50.

This little book is, as the translators say in their introduction, not a biography or a study of Edith Stein's thought but a series of meditations on the significance of her life for our time. The author presents his subject as a kind of dramatic symbol—the translators suggest that the reader view the chapters as "scenes in a modern mystery play in which Edith Stein and kindred spirits play roles fraught with symbolic meaning" (p. x). Indirectly, the reading of this book could help an American reader to grasp some of the spirit of a contemporary Christian philosopher.

There is a useful selected bibliography (pp. 85-87).

Bowra, C. M. *Greek Experience.* New York: New American Lib. of World Literature; Oct., 1959. 50¢

Breasted, James Henry. *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Sept., 1959. $1.95.

Bretall, Robert (ed.). *A Kierkegaard Anthology.* New York: Modern Lib., 1959. Pp. 519. $1.65.

Brickman, William W., and Lehrer, Stanley (eds.). *John Dewey: Master Educator.* New York: Society for the Advancement of Education, 1959. Pp. 123. $2.50; paper, $1.95.

Broad, Charles Dunbar. *Scientific Thought.* Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1959. Pp. 555. Paper, $1.95.

Bromberg, Walter. *The Mind of Man.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 344. Paper, $1.95.

Bronowski, Jacob. *Science and Human Values.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 94. Paper, 95¢

Brown, Brendan F. *Natural Law Reader.* New York: Oceana Pubns.; Nov., 1959. $3.50; paper, $1.35.

Brusher, Edward. *Logic.* San Francisco: Fearon Pubs., 1959. Pp. 159. Paper, $2.00.

Buckleh, Anees K. *The Philosopher.* New York: Exposition Press, 1959. Pp. 108. $3.00.

Buckley, Michael J. *Morality and the Homosexual.* Westminster: Newman Press; Feb., 1960. $3.50.

Burke, Kenneth. *The Philosophy of Literary Form.* Rev. and abridged ed. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 336. $3.25.

Cajetan, Thomas de Vio, Cardinal. *The Analogy of Names* and *The Concept of Being.* Tr. Edward A. Bushinski, c.s.sp., and Henry J. Koren, c.s.sp. 2d ed. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1959. Pp. x + 95. $2.25; paper, $1.50.

This English translation was first published in 1953, and it is good to know that enough copies were sold to warrant reprinting. This second edition has had a few printing mistakes eliminated and has been slightly enlarged; there is an additional short comment in the introduction referring to some recent studies on Cajetan; these studies are quoted at the relevant point in the text, and the bibliography includes these and several other recent items.

Canavan, Francis, s.j. *Political Reason of Edmund Burke.* "Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics," No. 3. Durham: Duke Univ. Press; Jan., 1960. $5.00.

Cantril, Hadley, and Bumstead, Charles H. *Reflections on the Human Venture.* New York: New York Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. $6.00.

Cassirer, Ernst. *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment.* Trans. Fritz Koelln and James Pettegrove. [Reprint.] Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 366. $3.50.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. *Lokayata.* Los Angeles: Perkins Oriental Books, 1959. Pp. 723. $10.00.

Checklist of Books and Pamphlets in the Social Sciences. Albany: New York State Lib., 1959. Pp. 42. Paper.

Childs, Marquis William, and Reston, James (eds.). *Walter Lippmann and His Times.* New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1959. Pp. 256. $3.95.

Churchman, C. West (ed.). *Experience and Reflection of E. A. Singer.* Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; Oct., 1959. $5.00.

Clagett, Marshall (ed.). *Critical Problems in the History of Science.* Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press; Oct., 1959. $5.00.

———. *The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages.* Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1959. Pp. 711. $8.00.

Clark, Sir Wilfrid E. Le Gros. *The Foundations of Human Evolution.* Eugene, Ore.: State System of Higher Education, 1959. Pp. 74. Paper, $1.00.

COHEN, FELIX S. *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals.* [Reprint.] Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 303. Paper, $1.95.

COLLIN, REMY GUSTAVE. *Evolution.* Trans. J. Tester. "Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism," Vol. 30. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1959. Pp. 143. $2.95.

Community. Nomos, II. Ed. Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. viii + 293. $5.00.

Nomos is the Yearbook of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy. The present volume includes the papers presented at the Society's second meeting in 1957, "somewhat enlarged and revised," including some of the discussions. The rest was written specially for this volume. There are sixteen papers, divided into two parts, "Community and the Law," and "Community and Society." Every reader will probably have his own way of organizing these papers, but one way of viewing them is to see a triad of positions. One group views man as having a nature governed by its own law which is elaborated with greater or lesser distinctness into moral patterns of societal organization. Another group takes organization as a fact and works back to structure and law as merely formal (that is, empty) principles. The third approaches community scientifically, in terms of its observable structures and substructures, and refrains from either affirming or denying ethical and moral considerations.

Students in the fields of political theory, jurisprudence, social ethics, and sociology will find this volume of papers very much worthwhile. Even the evidence of talk at cross-purposes manifest in the discussions will be enlightening—it reflects at a higher and intelligible level some of the problems of American thought.

COPLESTON, FREDERICK, S.J. *A History of Philosophy.* Vol. VI. *Wolff to Kant.* Westminster: Newman Press; Mar., 1960. $4.50.

CROCKER, LESTER G. *An Age of Crisis. Man and World in Eighteenth Century French Thought.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. Pp. 512. $7.50.

CRONIN, JOHN FRANCIS. *Social Principles and Economic Life.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. 459. $6.50.

‡ CROSSMAN, RICHARD HOWARD STAFFORD. *Plato Today.* 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 215. $4.00.

CURRY, WALTER CLYDE. *Shakespeare's Philosophical Patterns.* 2d ed. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xiv + 261. $5.00.

D'ARCY, M. C., S.J. *The Meaning and Matter of History.* New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1959. Pp. 309. $5.50.

DART, RAYMOND A., and CRAIG, DENNIS BATHGATE. *Adventures with the Missing Link.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 276. $5.00.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER. *The Historical Reality of Christian Culture.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Feb., 1960. $3.50.

DEBREU, GERARD. *Theory of Value.* New York: John Wiley & Sons; Sept., 1959. $5.25.

DE LUBAC, HENRY, S.J. *The Discovery of God.* Trans. Alick Dru. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons; Mar., 1960. $3.95.

D'ENTREVES, A. P. *Medieval Contributions to Political Thought.* New York: Humanities Press; Sept., 1959. $3.75.

Dialogue on John Dewey. New York: Horizon Press. Pp. 155. $2.50.

DIAMOND, MALCOLM L. *Martin Buber.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Apr., 1960. $4.00.

DIRKSEN, ALOYS, C.PP.S. *Elementary Patrology.* St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1959. Pp. xiii + 314. $4.00.

Though this volume is written from a strictly theological viewpoint, it can be useful to students of philosophy inasmuch at it gives

a general introduction to the lives, teaching activities, writings, and thought of the Church Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of the first seven centuries of the Christian era. The second part of the book consist of two appendices; the first of these identifies minor writers and works (pp. 213-301); the second lists and briefly describes the lesser heresies of the early Church (pp. 303-14).

DONOHUE, JOHN W., S.J. *Work and Education.* Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xi + 238. $4.00.

This study investigates the place of work in the process of education. A preliminary chapter describes the problem historically and analytically. The author sketches the development of labor from simple manual crafts to a complex technological culture, and the gamut of views from the aristocratic contempt of manual labor to the technocratic exclusion of everything else.

In the next three chapters, three different views of the relation of work to human perfection and education are considered. The first view is that of Marxism, in which productive work is considered the noblest activity of man; pure science and even literature were known and enjoyed by Marx himself, yet his theory does not seem to allow these activities much place, nor is any detailed theory of education provided by him. The second view is that of Dewey, in which thought and action are brought close together by means of the instrumentalist notion of thought. Work in this view is not mere production; it is social and even moral activity; but it is also true that intelligence is never speculative. And it is well known that Dewey wanted manual activity in the school, not for its economic value but for its educational, even humanistic value. The third view is that of some literary humanists, according to which work is the servant of leisure. Work is admitted to be necessary, but civilization and culture are leisure-time activities; education, therefore, neither includes work nor is ordered toward work.

The second part of the book takes up the notion of a Christian synthesis. The author holds that in principle a Christian philosophy of life would hold both the dignity of work and the value of contemplation, but he also admits that a practical working out of this is another matter. For work belongs to the level of human history; it is a terrestrial value. Hence the views of some Christians tend to consider work as a pure means. On the other hand, a certain group of authors (mostly French or of French inspiration) have called for a new humanism which would incorporate technology, a view which its proponents call "incarnational." The author shows that Christians hold that work has a religious value; the productive work of a craftsman or farmer does "humanize" the material universe, and science as a whole does also insure an increased control over material nature. It is admitted that industrialism is a different kind of problem, yet it is also held that machine civilization does not necessarily dehumanize the production worker. (Perhaps this is more of an ideal than a proximately realizable possibility.) The Christian view sees in work personal, ethical, social, and supernatural values.

The translation of this optimistic synthesis into educational terms is attempted in the final chapter. Though the recommendations remain at a somewhat general level, they should be of interest and value to educators.

The book is concerned with an important problem not only for philosophers of education but also for ethicians, psychologists, and theologians.

Dorsey, John, and Seegers, Walter H. *Living Consciously.* Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press; Oct., 1959. $4.95.

Dougherty, Kenneth. *General Ethics.* Peeksill, N.Y.: Graymoor Press, 1960. $3.00.

Dubay, Thomas, s. m. *Philosophy of the State as Educator.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1960. Pp. xii + 237. $5.95.

This is an analysis of the rights and duties of the state in education. The author begins with a short section on the philosophy of civil society, stressing its basis in natural law. In the second part, he takes three different views on the state's function in education (individualism, totalitarianism, and the Catholic position) and concludes with a general survey of various philosophies in the light of what ought to be the state's ultimate purpose in education.

In the third section there is a consideration of the relation between the state and other educational agencies, especially the Church and private groups. The author considers both the question of assistance and that of control. This section is concluded with a treatment of the public school. In the fourth section there is a discussion of the state's duties in regard to its own citizenry and other civil societies.

There is a brief bibliography and an index.

‡ Ewing, Alfred Cyril. *Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. 190. $4.50.

Farber, Marvin. *Naturalism and Subjectivism.* Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1959. Pp. 400. $9.50.

Fearnside, W. W., and Holther, W. B. *Fallacy, the Counterfeit of Argument.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. Pp. 224. Paper, $1.95.

Feibleman, James K, *Religious Platonism.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Nov., 1959. $4.50.

Feifel, Herman (ed.). *The Meaning of Death.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. Pp. xviii + 351. $6.50.

Fellman, David. *Problem of Civil Rights.* New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press; Dec., 1959. $2.75.

Fogarty, Daniel. *Roots for a New Rhetoric.* New York: Teachers College, 1959. Pp. xii + 158. $5.00.

Frankel, Charles (ed.). *Golden Age of American Philosophy.* New York: George Braziller; Jan., 1960. $7.50.

Freud, Sigmund. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* Trans. from the German by James Strachey. Introd. and notes prepared for this edition by Gregory Zilboorg. New York: Bantam Books, 1959. Pp. 121. Paper, 50¢

Fromm, Erich; Suzuki, D. T.; and De Martino, Richard. *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Feb., 1960. $4.00.

Frothingham, Octavius Brooks. *Transcendentalism in New England.* Introd. by Sydney E. Ahlstrom. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 415. Paper, $1.75.

Gardiner, Patrick (ed.). *Theories of History.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1959. Pp. 549. $8.50.

Garnett, A. Campbell. *Ethics: A Critical Introduction.* New York: Ronald Press Co.; Jan., 1960. Pp. 540. $5.50.

Gilbert, Allan H. *Principles and Practice of Criticism.* Detroit: Wayne State Univ.; Sept., 1959. $4.50.

Gilbert, Neal War. *Concepts of Method in the Renaissance and Their Ancient and Medieval Antecedents.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Jan., 1960. $5.00.

Gilbert, William. *De Magnete.* Trans. P. Fleury Mottelay. New York: Dover Pubs., 1959. Pp. liv + 368. Paper, $2.00.

First published in Latin in 1600, this treatise was not translated into English until 1893, and the English edition has long been out of print. The work is one of the classics of physical science, both because it laid the foundations of a very important part of physics and because it gives rich and detailed accounts of the author's own methods.

The present edition is an excellent printed reproduction, strongly bound, yet priced most reasonably.

GILSON, ETIENNE. *Elements of Christian Philosophy.* New York: Doubleday & Co.; Mar., 1960. Pp. 360. $5.50.

———. *Painting and Reality.* [Reprint.] New York: Meridian Books, 1959. Pp. 416. Paper, $1.55.

GONDA, J. *Four Studies in the Language of the Veda.* New York: Humanities Press; Nov., 1959. $6.00.

GOOCH, G. P. *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Oct., 1959. $1.60.

GREENE, JOHN C. *The Death of Adam.* Ames: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 388. $4.95.

‡ GUITTON, JEAN. *The Modernity of Saint Augustine.* Trans. from the French by A. V. Littledale. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1959. Pp. 89. $2.50.

GURR, JOHN EDWIN, S.J. *The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 1750-1900.* Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xi + 196. $6.00.

The scope of this study of the textbook tradition is clearly indicated in its title. The work is thorough, detailed, and fully documented.

The author's method is both historical and critical. He not only presents the texts but analyzes them in their historical context. He is chiefly interested in showing that a particular way of handling the principle of sufficient reason is internally connected with a particular view of metaphysics.

This study is important for several reasons. Though the authors treated are almost all minor figures, taken together they constitute a tradition which on the one hand continues and makes explicit previous philosophical thinking and on the other is the soil out of which new ideas arise, often by way of reaction. Often enough, students of philosophy become acquainted only with the great figures and are puzzled or misunderstand them because they are ignorant of the background. For contemporary Thomists, the study has an additional significance. It will show them one good reason why their own writings are interpreted in ways foreign to their own intent, inasmuch as they are looked on as merely continuing a prior tradition. It will also enable them to approach their philosophical inheritance more critically and to eliminate distorting accretions.

GUSTAVSON, CARL G. *A Preface to History.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955. Pp. ix + 222. Paper, $1.95.

HABER, FRANCIS C. *The Age of the World: Moses to Darwin.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. Pp. 303. $5.00.

HADAS, MOSES. *Hellenistic Culture.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1959. $6.00.

HAGMAIER, GEORGE, C.S.P., and GLEASON, ROBERT, S.J. *Counselling the Catholic.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. xiv + 301. $4.50.

This volume is intended to be on the practical level; but it is not a manual of practice, a case-book, or a set of rules. Its purpose is to help the counsellor, director, or parent to understand the emotional problems of people, especially the young. The several introductory chapters try to explain the factors which concretely enter into the

formation of a personality (rather successfully combining some points from depth psychology with more commonsense approaches). Then follow four chapters on the psychological causes of four basic problem areas with a number of principles of direction. Two chapters are devoted to more serious psychological problems with suggestions on how to make use of community resources.

The next part of the book gives a moral evaluation of action in the areas whose psychological structure was considered before. There is a final chapter on Catholicism and psychiatry. There are two appendices, one giving a brief account of some mental illnesses that a counsellor may meet with, another giving a list of the principal associations that offer specialized guidance and help. There is a brief selected bibliography.

This is the best book of its kind yet published; it is well-informed, calm, and judicious. It is an excellent guide for the solution of both the practical and the theoretical problems it deals with. It is also highly recommended to ethicians as an excellent concrete presentation of the factors that influence the voluntareity and modify the moral quality of human activity.

HANDLIN, OSCAR. *John Dewey's Challenge to Education.* Foreword by Arthur G. Wirth. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 59. $2.50.

HARRIS, C. R. S. *Duns Scotus.* 2 vols. New York: Humanities Press; Sept., 1959. Set, $15.00.

HARRIS, MARJORIE S. *Francisco Romero on the Problems of Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. $3.75.

HAVARD, WILLIAM C. *Henry Sidgwick and Late Utilitarian Political Philosophy.* Gainsville: Univ. of Florida Press; Dec., 1959. $6.00.

HEINE, HEINRICH. *Religion and Philosophy in Germany.* Trans. from the German by John Snodgrass. Introd. by Ludwig Marcuse. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. Pp. 200. Paper, $1.45.

HENDEL, CHARLES W. (ed.). *John Dewey and the Experimental Spirit in Philosophy.* New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. vi + 119. $3.00.

This is the text of four lectures presented in March, 1959, at Yale University. The first paper, contributed by the editor, analyzes the new empiricism of Dewey and relates it to what he calls the philosophical tradition. Dewey, it is said, rejected the old (that is, British) empiricism on the ground that it is exclusive and atomic, and opposed tradition (that is, the classical rationalists) because they neglected experience. Dewey's greatness, it is claimed, lies in his reinstatement of the full range of experience. including its objective character. The second paper, by Nathaniel M. Lawrence, is entitled "Education as Social Process." This study admits the idealistic implications of Deweyan experience but stresses the activity and growth of the individual. Sociality is both the condition and the result of education considered as total growth. The third paper, by Richard J. Bernstein, deals with knowledge and value, and points out that Dewey denied the traditional (that is, the empiricist and rationalist) disjunction between cognition as passive and speculative and action as outside of knowledge. Dewey, it is said, did not reduce knowledge to the merely instrumental but recognized the reflective as a value in itself, especially in aesthetic experience. The fourth paper, by John E. Smith, returns to the theme of experience. He relates Dewey's criticism of British empiricism to the Darwinian theory and shows that his notion of experience was a valuable enlargement. Experience includes activity, and can even be considered as a transaction, thus relating knowing and doing. Professor

Smith then raises three serious questions: It is possible and legitimate to ignore all general questions? Is it reasonable to ignore the individual as much as Dewey does? Is Dewey's notion of metaphysics adequate?

———. *Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume.* New York: Liberal Arts Press; Jan., 1960. $4.50.

HOCK, ALFRED. *Reason and Genius.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. $3.75.

HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST. *Strength of Men and Nations.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Oct., 1959. $3.50.

HODGES, AUBYN H., JR. *The Mystery of God.* New York: Greenwich Book Publishers, 1959. Pp. 46. $2.00.

HOFFMAN, FREDERICK J. *Freudianism and the Literary Mind.* New York: Grove Press, 1959. Pp. 361. Paper, $2.45.

HOGREFE, PEARL. *The Sir Thomas More Circle.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1960. Pp. vi + 360. $5.75.

This is a study of the ideas of St. Thomas More and his friends and associates, and of their influence, especially through writings and plays. The book is divided into two parts. In the first part, the ideas of the "circle" are examined as forming a program of reform. These ideas are grouped by the author under the heads of nature and the law of nature, true nobility, religious reform, law, education in general, and the education of women. The author holds that none of these ideas is very original; but she points out that they were very sincerely held, that they were viewed as making up a coherent program of action, and that they were presented in a personal, lively, and moving way. In her presentation of these ideas from the writings and activity of the people themselves, the author is often felicitous, and usually understanding and fair. There are occasional lapses from a completely adequate understanding, especially with regard to some of the religious ideas and with the relation between nature and reason on the one hand and faith and revelation on the other.

The second part of the book examines the expression of these various ideas on secular drama.

HOWELLS, WILLIAM. *Mankind in the Making.* New York: Doubleday & Co.; Nov., 1959. $4.95.

JAKOBOVITS, IMMANUEL. *Jewish Medical Ethics.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. xlii + 381. $6.00.

JUNG, C. G. *Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self.* Vol. 9, Pt. II of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung.* (Bollingen Series, XX.) New York: Bollingen Foundation, Inc.; Mar., 1959. Pp. 344. $4.50.

KAHN, CHARLES H. *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. Pp. 220. $6.50 .

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.* Trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. xxv + 92. Paper, 80¢

This translation is, the translator tells us, slightly revised from the one he had previously published in 1949; the introduction is also somewhat revised from the one given to this work in a second edition published in 1950. This volume also contains the translation of *What Is Enlightenment?*

The translation is very readable and clear; the introduction is useful and pointed; the edition a well-made one.

———. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Apr., 1960. Paper, $2.35.

Kierkegaard, Soren. *Either/Or.* [Reprint.] Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. 2 vols. Pp. 465, 372. $6.75.

Koch, Adrienne. *Philosophy for a Time of Crisis.* New York: Dutton & Co. Pp. 382. $5.95.

Koren, Henry J., c.s.sp. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. xii + 199. Paper, $3.25.

This work is intended as a textbook for undergraduates. It supposes that the student has some knowledge of metaphysics but does not demand any detailed knowledge of modern science.

After a relatively long introduction explaining what the philosophy of nature is and its relations to other disciplines, the book is divided into two parts. In the first part, the nature of material things is examined. First, a chapter examines the arguments for the hylomorphic composition of things, from substantial change, multiplication of individuals, and temporality; then matter and form are considered in themselves. A third chapter considers the relation between hylomorphism and some data of science, while a fourth considers alternative theories (dynamism, mechanism, hylosystemism). The second part is devoted to the properties of matter; there are chapters on quantity, motion, place, space, time, quality, and causality in sensible things.

A number of additional readings are suggested for each chapter, and a summary of each chapter is provided. At the end of the book, there are ten pages of review questions arranged by chapters.

Kroner, Richard. *Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy.* Philadelphia: Westminster Press; Nov., 1959. $6.00.

‡ Krook, Dorothea. *Three Traditions of Moral Thought.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 354. $5.50.

Kuenzli, Alfred E. (ed.) *The Phenomenological Problem.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. x + 321. $4.50.

Kwant, Remy C., o.s.a. *A Philosophy of Labor.* "Duquesne Studies," Philosophical Series, 10. Pittsburgh: Dept. of Publications, Duquesne Univ.; Jan., 1960. $5.25; paper, $4.50.

Lamont, Corliss (ed.). *Dialogue on John Dewey.* New York: Horizon Press; Oct., 1959. $2.75.

Lamont, Corliss, and Redmer, Mary (eds.). *Dialogue on George Santayana.* New York: Horizon Press. Pp. 115. $2.50.

Langan, Thomas. *The Meaning of Heidegger. A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. ix + 247. $4.50.

The author contends that Heidegger has a consistently developed philosophy; that the later works carry on the project of the earlier; and that an understanding of either group requires a knowledge of the other. After a general introduction, the author divides his work into two parts. In the first part, the existential analytic of Heidegger is presented as centered around a work or a group of smaller writings. The basic ideas of being, *Dasein*, historicity, fundament, transcendence, the nothing, freedom and originative thinking, essential thinking and poetizing, and the essence of truth are presented in context and in a language that approximates Heidegger's own. In the second part, Heidegger's analysis of the Western tradition is seen as the counterpart of the analysis of the individual existent. Beginning with the notions of the epochal and eschatological nature of being, the history of Western thought is viewed as having three stages: a beginning with the Greeks, a crisis with Descartes, a downfall with rationalistic subjectivism or scientism and technique. From this

analysis, the nature of Heidegger's effort to surpass metaphysics is made clear.

In a final chapter, the author reviews the Heideggerian phenomenology. He contends that some criticisms (for example, that Heidegger is inconsistent, that he reads texts arbitrarily) are not valid, for they are either based on misunderstandings or do not touch his basic intentions. For his own part, the author has two criticisms, both internal to the phenomenology of man as existent: there are arbitrary presuppositions and limitations of evidence, and "the other" is almost totally ignored.

Lazowick, Frank E. *The Science of Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 388. $6.00.

Lee, Dorothy. *Freedom and Culture.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. Pp. 192. Paper, $1.95.

Leigh, Ruth. *Man's Right to Life.* New York: Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, 1959. Pp. 56. Paper, 35¢

Leighton, Alexander H. *My Name Is Legion.* New York: Basic Books Pub. Co.; Nov., 1959. $7.50.

Lenzen, V. F., and Others. *Civilization.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959. Pp. 176. Paper, $1.50.

Lerner, Daniel, and Others. *Evidence and Inference.* Chicago: Free Press; Nov., 1959. $4.00.

Levi, Albert William. *Philosophy and the Modern World.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. $7.50.

Levitt, Morton. *Psychological Systems of Freud and Dewey.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. $3.75.

Lewis, Clarence Irving, and Langford, Cooper Harold. *Symbolic Logic.* [2d rev. ed.] New York: Dover Pubns.; Jan., 1960. $2.00.

Leys, Wayne A. R., and Perry, Charner Marquis. *Philosophy and the Public Interest.* Chicago: Committee to Advance Original Work in Philosophy, 1959. Pp. 72. Paper, $1.00.

This document was prepared for a symposium of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, University of Wisconsin, May 1, 1959. The authors consulted a number of philosophers, lawyers, and social scientists.

After an introductory section which establishes the importance of the concept of the public interest and its significance for philosophers, the authors analyze its use and its various meanings. They begin by pointing out the ambiguity of the term, locate it in relation to a theory of democracy, and relate it historically. Then they examine various questions: the relation of public interest to public policy, the possibility of considering it as an aggregate of individual interests, the advantage of taking the notion on various levels of abstraction, the relevance of procedural approaches, the possibility of defining the term, the significance of political pluralism, explanations in terms of decision-making and role-theory, attempts at synthesis, non-governmental action in the public interest, and a concluding comment. The authors stress the conclusion that substantive theories are not in conflict with formal theories.

There are four appendices. The first deals with public interest in relation to governmental regulation; the second, with self-regulation; the third, with public interest in fiscal matters; and the fourth, with common defense and foreign policy.

The notes contain a large number of useful references to recent publications.

Locke, John. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding.* 2 vols. Ed. Alexan-

der Campbell Fraser. New York: Dover Pubns.; Nov., 1959. Set, $4.50.

Luce, Arthur Aston. *Teach Yourself Logic to Think More Clearly.* New York: Association Press; Oct., 1959. $3.75.

Macgregor, Geddes. *Introduction to Religious Philosophy.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.; Jan., 1960.

Mach, Ernst. *Analysis of Sensations.* [5th enlarged ed.] New York: Dover Pubns.; Dec., 1959. $1.75.

Malevez, L. *Christian Message and Myth.* Westminster: Newman Press; Nov., 1959. $4.75.

Mandler, George, and Kessen, William. *The Language of Psychology.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959. Pp. 301. $6.75.

Maritain, Jacques. *Man's Approach to God.* New York: University Pubs. $2.50.

———. *The Responsibility of the Artist.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1960. Pp. 120. $2.95.

Unifying some themes he had previously discussed, M. Maritain in this volume discusses the nature of art and its relation to morality. As he had done in earlier works, he insists on the distinction between art and prudence (taking art in St. Thomas's sense), and maintains that in their objects these two virtues have no relation to each other. But because the same man is both a man and an artist, both art and prudence bear on his activity even as an artist; and so art and prudence have an extrinsic and indirect relationship. He next examines two slogans, "art for art's sake" and "art for the people," and shows how the first denies all relation between art and prudence, while the second subordinates art to prudence and, more practically, to politics. Yet he also shows the good meanings that could be given to these slogans, the one stressing the intrinsic value of art and its own internal consistency, the other the true meaning and relevance of the common good and the way in which art serves this purpose. In the last chapter, M. Maritain broaches the relation between artistic perfection and human perfection, and shows that there is a kind of asceticism and purity of art which are analogous to their moral counterparts.

———. *Sin of the Angel.* Trans. William L. Rossner; Westminster: Newman Press; Oct., 1959. $3.00.

Martin, C. B. *Religious Belief.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 177. $3.00.

Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrick. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.* New York: International Publishers; Jan., 1960. $3.00.

———. *Holy Family.* New York: International Publishers; Jan., 1960. $3.50.

Mccall, Raymond J. *A Preface to Scientific Psychology.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. vi + 74. Paper.

This short work is intended to serve as an introduction to courses in psychology. Often enough, students expect something quite different from a course labeled psychology and flounder for weeks; often, too, textbooks quite adept in expounding the subject matter itself become hopelessly involved in explaining themselves. The author, who used to give this material as an introduction to his own students, was asked to make it available to others.

The booklet has two chapters. The first explains what a science is and tries to clarify such ideas as controlled observation and measurement, and then contrasts scientific statements with other types of statements, especially philosophical ones. The second chapter

explains the broad divisions of psychology. The book includes a review summary and sample questions on the matter.

MENNINGER, KARL AUGUSTUS. *A Psychiatrist's World.* Ed. Bernard H. Hall. Foreword by Marion E. Kenworthy. New York: Viking Press, 1959. Pp. xxvi + 931. $10.00.

MICHALSON, CARL. *The Hinge of History: An Existential Approach to the Christian Faith.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1959. Pp. 256. $3.95.

MILLS, C. WRIGHT. *The Sociological Imagination.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; May, 1959. Pp. 242. $6.00.

MONTAGU, ASHLEY. *Human Heredity.* Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. 397. $5.00.

MOORE, G. E. *Philosophical Papers.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Nov., 1959. $5.25.

———. *Principia Ethica.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Dec., 1959. $1.95.

MOWRER, O. HOBART. *Learning Theory and Behavior.* New York: John Wiley & Sons; Nov., 1959. $5.75.

MULLER, HERBERT J. *Issues of Freedom.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1960. $4.00.

MYRDAL, GUNNAR. *Value in Social Theory.* Ed. Paul Streeten. New York: Harper & Bros.; Nov., 1959. $5.00.

Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1959. Ed. Marshall R. Jones. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1959. Pp. 252. $4.25; paper, $3.00.

NORTHROP, FILMER STUART CUCKOW. *The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience.* Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1959. Pp. xvi + 331. $6.00.

O'DONNELL, THOMAS J. *Morals in Medicine.* [2d rev. ed.] Westminster: Newman Press; Oct., 1959. $4.75.

OGDEN, CHARLES KAY. *Bentham's Theory of Fictions.* [Reprint of 2d ed.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1959. Pp. 161. Paper, $1.75.

O'NEILL, REGINALD F., S.J. *Theories of Knowledge.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. Pp. xiv + 242. $4.25.

This is a textbook in epistemology for college students who have already had some preliminary acquaintance with philosophy. It is divided into two parts, the first a positive exposition of a realistic theory of knowledge, the second a survey of other theories, presented as pure positions.

The first part begins with judgment and the immediate knowledge of truth and of the knower's power to know truth. Next come chapters on method (which is said to be the analysis of concrete acts of judgment) and the relation of truth to the knower and the known. Then follows the analysis of particular kinds of knowledge: sensation, concepts, judgment, reasoning, deduction, induction, and testimony. There is also a consideration of evidence as the norm and of the three kinds of certitude. The author tries to combine the best of the traditional "Scholastic" epistemology with the recent emphasis on judgment and immediate realism.

The second part discusses skepticism, doubt, the relativity of truth, idealism, rationalism, empiricism, Kantianism, and existentialism. There are a selected bibliography and an index.

The book has an excellent systematic organization. Each chapter begins with a selective bibliography, then continues by locating the problem in general, developing it more concretely, summarizing the argument, and concluding with definitions and sometimes brief

supplementary notes. In the second part the readings are given at the end.

Orynski, Wanda. *Hegel.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1959. $4.75.

Owens, Joseph C., c.ss.r. *A History of Ancient Western Philosophy.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959. Pp. 448. $4.50.

‡ Paul, Julius. *The Legal Realism of Jerome N. Frank.* New York: International Publishers, 1959. Pp. 199. $5.50.

Petit, François. *The Problem of Evil.* Trans. from the French by Christopher Williams. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1959. Pp. 141. $2.95.

Pfeiffer, John Edward. *From Galaxies to Man.* New York: Random House, 1959. Pp. 246. $4.95.

Phelan, Gerald B. *The Wisdom of St. Anselm.* New York: University Pubs. $2.50.

Philosophy of Abraham Lincoln, Ed. William E. Baringer. Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1959. Pp. 167. $3.50.

Pieper, Josef. *Prudence.* Trans. from the German by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Pantheon Books, 1959. Pp. 96. $2.75.

Plato. *Gorgias.* Trans. W. Hamilton. Baltimore: Penguin Books. 85¢

———. *Phaedrus.* Trans. R. Hackforth. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Nov., 1959. $1.00.

———. *Theaetetus.* Pt. I, *Theory of Knowledge.* Trans. Francis M. Cornford. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Sept., 1959. $1.00.

[Plato.] *Examination of Pleasure.* Trans. R. Hackforth. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Oct., 1959. $1.00.

[———.] *Plato's Timaeus.* Trans. from the Greek by Francis M. Cornford and reprinted from his work, *Plato's Cosmology.* Ed. Oskar Piest. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. 143. Paper, 85¢

Radhakrishnan, S. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 409. Paper, $2.25.

Randall, John Herman, Jr. *Aristotle.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 256. $4.75.

Reinhardt, Kurt F. *Existentialist Revolt.* [Rev. ed.] New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co.; Jan., 1960. $4.75.

Rensch, Bernhard. *Evolution above the Species Level.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1959. Pp. 528. $10.00.

Rexine, John E. *Religion in Plato and Cicero.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 72. $2.75.

Riley, Lyman W. (ed.). *Aristotle Texts and Commentaries to 1700 in the University of Pennsylvania Libraries.* A catalogue. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; Sept., 1959. $3.75.

Riley, Woodbridge. *Men and Morals.* New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co.; Dec., 1959. $6.50.

Roberts, David E. *Existentialism and Religious Belief.* Ed. Roger Hazelton. [Reprint.] New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 344. Paper, $1.95.

Rose, Herbert Jenning. *Religion in Greece and Rome.* New introd. by the author. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 326. Paper, $1.60.

Roucek, Joseph S. *The Case for and against Science and Scientism.* Bridgeport, Conn.: author, 1959. Pp. 40. Paper, $1.00.

Royce, Josiah. *World and the Individual.* 2 vols. New York: Dover Pubns.; Jan., 1960. $2.00 ea.

Russell, Bertrand. *Wisdom of the West.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1959. Pp. 320. $12.50.

Sarton, George Alfred Leon. *Ancient Science and Modern Civilization.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 111. Paper, 95¢

Sartre, Jean-Paul. *Age of Reason.* New York: Bantam Books; Oct., 1959. 75¢

Schopenhauer, Arthur. *Freedom of the Will.* Trans. Konstantin Kolenda. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Nov., 1959. 80¢

Sciama, D. W. *Unity of the Universe.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Oct., 1959. $3.95.

Seely, Charles S. *Modern Materialism.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1959. $2.50.

Selekman, Benjamin Morris. *A Moral Philosophy for Management.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. Pp. 231. $6.00.

Sertillanges, A. D. *Intellectual Life.* Trans. Mary Ryan. Westminster: Newman Press; Sept., 1959. $3.00; paper, $1.50.

‡ Shibata, Kei. *Dynamic and Dialectic Theories of World Capitalism.* Los Angeles: Perkins Oriental Books, 1959. Pp. 274. $4.50.

Shuster, George N. *Education and Moral Wisdom.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1960. $4.00.

‡ Singer, Charles Joseph. *A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xviii + 525. $8.00.

———. *From Magic to Science.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. xxxi + 253. Paper, $2.00.

This series of essays, some of which had been previously published, were first printed in 1928. They deal with people and movements of thought from the time of the late Roman Empire to the late Middle Ages. The author is justly considered one of the foremost historians of medicine. On the whole, the information presented in this book still retains its validity, though the interpretations uniformly suppose that mystical experience is an illusion and that theology is no better than magic.

The author has written a brief autobiography for this edition (pp. vii-xvii). The printing and binding are excellent.

Singer, E. A. *Experience and Reflection.* Ed. C. West Churchman. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. Pp. 440. $5.00.

Smith, Huston C. *The Search for America.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959. Pp. 172. $2.95; paper, $1.50.

Smith, Raymond, o.p. *Establishing the Natural Law.* New York: Paulist Press, 1959. Pp. 48. Paper, 50¢

———. *God Exists.* New York: Paulist Press, 1959. Pp. 48. Paper, 50¢

Soltau, Roger. *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* New York: Russell & Russell. $7.50.

Sorokin, Pitirim Aleksandrovich, and Lunden, Walter Albin. *Power and Morality.* Boston: Porter Sargent. 1959. Pp. 204. $3.50.

Sprague, Elmer, and Taylor, Paul W. (eds.). *Knowledge and Value.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 717. $6.50.

Steele, Wayne Hobart. *Strength Through Beauty.* New York: Vantage Press, 1960. Pp. 158. $2.95.

This book is said to be the application of a philosophical or religious insight. The idea seems to be that there is beauty in the universe and that man finds his fulfillment in the perception of this beauty. The present book is an interpretation of mental illness and unhappiness as consisting immediately in a depletion of nerve energy and this depletion in turn being caused by toxins, many of which are produced by the body itself. The author believes that recreation, attention to beauty, a moderate diet which he describes in some detail, and, in many cases, a period of fasting, will enable the body to remove all the toxins and thus to cure mental illness,

restore health and strength, and lead to full happiness, a feeling of buoyancy in living.

STIERNOTTE, ALFRED P. (ed.). *Mysticism and the Modern Mind.* New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. xiv + 206. $4.50.

This is a collection of eleven essays in the philosophy of religion by the editor and nine other writers. There is more or less a common viewpoint, with some exceptions, and this viewpoint is very close to scientific humanism. All the authors agree that mystical experience is to be accepted as a fact, but the "fact" which they accept is the *psychological* reality of the experience. The editor, in his introductory essay (p. 6) professes that the book is not oriented to a psychological study, and this is indeed true. He likewise professes (p. 9) that "mysticism can be given new life only by a ruthless rejection of any esoteric and occult encumbrances accumulated from the past."

John Haynes Holmes, who has the second general essay in the volume, is a retired minister. Henry Nelson Wieman puts the problem of mysticism as lying between an interpretation of it as an experience of the transcendent and another which views it as experience of totality. Lester Mondale, an Ethical Society leader, discusses Emerson's mysticism. Edwin T. Buehrer, a minister of a Unitarian church, writes on mysticism and Whitehead. Kenneth L. Patton, a minister of a Universalist church, deals with mysticism and naturalistic humanism. J. Hutton Hynd, active in Ethical Culture and humanist circles, writes on mysticism and ethics. John A. Irving, Professor of Philosophy in Victoria College, University of Toronto, does not definitely commit himself to the humanist viewpoint; he discusses the "limit of communication" in the light of analytical philosophy. N. A. Nikam, Professor of Philosophy at Mysore University, India, expounds ontological and ethical mysticism in Indian thought. Newton P. Stallknecht, Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University, relates mysticism and existentialism. The editor writes a concluding essay on what he considers the philosophical implications of mysticism.

If it is "nonphilosophical" to admit that some mystical experiences could be a contact of some sort with a transcendent reality, then it is seriously to be doubted whether any "philosophical" investigation of mysticism is possible at all. The book does not afford any evidence that an affirmative answer is the correct one.

STINNETTE, CHARLES R., JR. *Faith, Freedom, and Selfhood.* Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press. Pp. 252. $4.75.

STOODLEY, BARTLETT H. *The Concepts of Sigmund Freud.* Chicago: Free Press, 1959. Pp. xii + 274. $6.00.

STRAUSS, LEO. *What Is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press; Sept., 1959. Pp. 315. $6.00.

SUMNER, WILLIAM GRAHAM. *Folkways.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. vii + 692. Paper, $2.49.

This work has long been recognized to be one of the classics of sociology, and it is still a worth-while book to have on hand. It is true in many sciences that the foundational classics have a breadth of view and a sweep of reasoning that later works can no longer attain, and Sumner not only had an inclusive vision but was master of a great number of details. The work likewise testifies to the great progress made in the last half-century, for Sumner was also credulous, rationalistic, convinced that scientific progress had already, or was shortly about to, sweep away poverty, war, religion and so on.

Suppes, Patrick. *Axiomatic Set Theory.* Princeton: Van Nostrand Co.; Mar., 1960.

Symposium on Evolution. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1959. Pp. 119. $3.00.

The papers in this volume were read at a commemorative symposium at Duquesne University. A short introduction, recalling some aspects of Darwin's life and the effect of his work, was given by Bernard J. Boelen. Evolution and the puzzle of the viruses are dealt with by Frederick C. Bawden. Human organic evolution is considered by Gottfried O. Lang, who considers the fossil record and its genetic interpretations, and concludes that the weight of evidence is in favor of an evolutionary origin of man. The philosophical aspects of evolution are discussed by Andrew G. van Melsen; this paper considers a number of problems: mechanism and vitalism, the nature of science, the distinction between living and nonliving, the relation between nature and man, and the connection between evolution and teleology. The final paper, by the Reverend Cyril Vollert, s.j., deals with evolution and the Bible. After carefully summarizing what biblical scholars presently hold about the meaning of the biblical accounts of the origin of the world and of man, the theological implications of evolution are weighed and found not to be in any essential conflict with revealed truth. The paper concludes with some remarks on the grandeur of the evolutionary view.

The papers by Professor Lang and Father Vollert are excellent and deserve wide attention; they can be understood by students and they will give much light to teachers.

Tax, Sol. (ed.). *Evolution after Darwin.* Vol. I, *The Evolution of Life.* Vol. II, *The Evolution of Man.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; May, 1960. $10.00 each.

‡ Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre, s.j. *The Phenomenon of Man.* Trans. Bernard Wall. Introd. by Sir Julian Huxley. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 318. $5.00.

Père Teilhard, in his preface (p. 29) explicitly disavows any intention of writing a philosophical or theological treatise and asks the reader to read it as a purely scientific work. Sir Julian Huxley, in his introduction, clearly reads it as a partly philosophical and religious book. Apart from the fact that there seem to be two different notions of what philosophy and theology are, there is a question of whether the author actually went further than he intended. As he says, his intention is to describe man as he manifests himself (the phenomenon, that is) in an evolving universe and to describe the whole of that manifestation. The book therefore presents in summary form the data of many diverse sciences (biology, anthropology, psychology) and draws sweeping generalizations which at the very least would be called by many "metascientific."

At any rate, it is the phenomenon of man which is to be explained in any philosophical account of man. Whether the book be philosophy or not, it is therefore of direct interest to the philosopher of human nature.

Père Teilhard's ideas are likely to be known in general, though perhaps most English-speaking readers are not familiar with his thought in detail. In general, the attempt is to view man as a whole, dynamically and historically, and the leading idea is that of evolution. The book begins with a summary statement of cosmogony. This is followed by a synthetic account of the formation and development of life, the biosphere. Here an attempt is made to enuntiate certain "laws" of evolution. The next section deals with man: his

origin, his development, the rise and spread of the noosphere. The final section is entitled "Survival" and projects the movement of evolution into the future.

THOMPSON, KENNETH W. *Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy.* Durham: Duke Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. $3.50.

THOMSON, ROBERT. *The Psychology of Thinking.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959. Pp. 214. Paper, 95¢

THURSTONE, L. L. *The Measurement of Values.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Apr., 1959. Pp. 322. $7.50.

TINBERGEN, NIKO. *Curious Naturalists.* New York: Basic Books Pub. Co.; Sept., 1959. $5.00.

Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. VIII. New Orleans: Tulane Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 121. Paper, $2.00.

This volume is subtitled "Centennial Year Number," and several papers are concerned with Darwin. The first, by James K. Feibleman, deals with Darwin and scientific method. He considers Darwin an excellent example and from that instance professes to find that theoretical interpretation always precedes the facts. This notion of science quite understandably is rejected by many scientists, since such a method is not only unjustifiably selective but has often led to misreadings of the alleged facts. The second paper, by Paul G. Morrison, gives an account in terms of modern logic of evolution, which deals with it as a formal property. The next two papers deal with Bergson. Andrew J. Reck investigates the notion of duration, breaking it down into five steps and critically examining each one; he concludes that the connection between duration and a doctrine of human existence is the most fruitful contribution. Harold N. Lee studies and rejects Bergson's distinction of two radically different modes of knowing.

Edward G. Ballard attempts to define romanticism and to see the elements in culture which led to such a movement. Richard L. Barber tries to define metaphysics in an inclusive way to fit the various historical types. Carl H. Hamburg traces the development of Kant's formalism in ethics. Robert C. Whittemore looks for the deeper foundations of the ontology of Sartre and suggests that it could be found in Whitehead's doctrine of feeling.

UNTERMAN, ISAAC, *A Light amid the Darkness.* New York: Twayne Pubs., 1959. Pp. 208. $4.00.

U. S. Fighting Man's Code. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959. Pp. 160. Paper, 50¢

VIGNAUX, PAUL. *Philosophy of the Middle Ages.* New York: Meridian Books; Nov., 1959. $3.75; paper, $1.35.

VYVYAN, JOHN. *Shakespearean Ethic.* New York: Barnes & Noble; Nov., 1959. $3.75.

WADE, IRA O. *Voltaire and 'Candide'.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Dec., 1959. $8.50.

WAISMANN, FRIEDRICH. *Introductory to Mathematical Thinking.* Foreword by Karl Menger. Trans. from the German by Theodore J. Benac. New York: Harper & Bros.; 1959. Pp. 260. Paper, $1.40.

WALTZ, KENNETH N. *Man, the State, and War.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Aug., 1959. Pp. 272. $5.50.

WARD, LEO R., C.S.C. (ed.). *Ethics and the Social Sciences.* Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame, 1959. Pp. 127. $3.25.

WATSON, WILLIAM HERIOT. *On Understanding Physics.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 146. Paper, $1.25.

WEINBERG, HARRY L. *Levels of Knowing and Existence.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1960. Pp. xiv + 274. $4.50.

Welty, Eberhard, o.p. *A Handbook of Christian Social Ethics.* Vol. I, *Man in Society.* New York: Herder & Herder, 1959. $6.50.

Wertheimer, Max. *Productive Thinking.* Ed. Michael Wertheimer. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 318. $5.50.

Wheelwright, Philip. *Heraclitus.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959. $4.50.

White, Helen Constance. *Prayer and Poetry.* New York, University Pubs. $2.50.

[Whitehead, Alfred North.] *Whitehead's American Essays in Social Philosophy.* Ed. with introd. by A. H. Johnson. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. $4.00.

Wild, John. *Human Freedom and Social Order.* Durham: Duke Univ. Press. Pp. 261. $5.00.

Wilson, Colin Henry. *The Stature of Man.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. Pp. xiv + 171.

Wilson, N. L. *The Concept of Language.* Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press; June, 1959. Pp. 153. $4.95.

Wilson, Robert N. *Man Made Plain.* Cleveland: Howard Allen, 1959. Pp. 375. $5.00.

Wolff, Abraham. *A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the 16th and 17th Centuries.* 2d ed. prepared by Douglas McKie. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Vol. I, pp. xvi + 349; Vol. II, pp. xv + 350-686. Paper, $1.95 ea.

Wollheim, Richard. *F. H. Bradley.* ("Pelican Original.") Baltimore: Penguin Books; Jan., 1960. $1.25.

Wood, Ernest. *Yoga.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959. Pp. 272. Paper, 95¢

Most of this volume describes the various bodily and mental practices which belong to the various kinds of yoga. Introductory and concluding chapters explain the "philosophy" back of them—a mixture of figurative anatomy, a dualistic structure of man (spirit and body), and some brief and rather simple explanations of the "nondualistic" ontology professed by most Indian writers. The book is not intended for anyone with much knowledge of the history of philosophy (though the historical and factual errors probably will not bother most of its readers).

Wulf, Maurice de. *System of Saint Thomas Aquinas.* Trans. Ernest Messenger. New York: Dover Pubns.; Jan., 1960. $1.25.

Zuver, Dudley. *Retreat to Reality.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.; Oct., 1959. $4.75.

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BERGMANN, GUSTAV. *Meaning and Existence.* Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1960. Pp. xi + 274. $6.50; paper, $1.75.

BORDEAUX, HENRY. *Edith Stein.* Trans. Donald and Idella Gallagher. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. xi + 87. $3.50.

CATULLUS. *Odi et Amo.* Trans. with introd. by R. A. Swanson. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. xix + 128. Paper, $1.00.

Centennial Year Number. "Tulane Studies in Philosophy," Vol. VIII. New Orleans: Tulane Univ., 1959. Pp. 121. Paper, $2.00.

DONOHUE, JOHN W., S.J. *Work and Education.* Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xi + 238. $4.00.

DUBAY, THOMAS, S.M. *Philosophy of the State as Educator.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1960. Pp. xii + 237. $5.95.

GILBERT, WILLIAM. *De Magnete.* Trans. P. Fleury Mottelay. New York: Dover Pub., Inc. Pp. liv + 368. $2.00.

GRENET, P.-B. *Ontologie.* Paris: Beauchesne, 1959. Pp. 215. Paper, 990 Fr.

HENDEL, CHARLES W. (ed.). *John Dewey and the Experimental Spirit in Philosophy.* New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. vi + 119. $3.00.

HOGREFE, PEARL. *The Sir Thomas More Circle.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1959. Pp. vi + 360. $5.75.

[KANT, IMMANUEL.] *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.* Ed. Lewis W. Beck. Pp. xxv + 92. Paper, 80¢

KEEZER, DEXTER M. (ed.). *Financing Higher Education, 1960-70.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. Pp. vii + 304. Paper, $2.00.

KOREN, HENRY J., C.S.SP. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. xii + 199. Paper, $3.25.

LANGAN, THOMAS D. *Meaning of Heidegger. A Critical Study of Existentialist Phenomenology.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1959. $4.50.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *The Responsibility of the Artist.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1960. Pp. 120. $2.95.